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In its clamorous polyvocality, T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land can 
be read as a variety of dramatic text — one with a dense, if dis-
persed, form that might have been unrecognizable as drama to 
readers in 1922 when the poem was first published but which 
would be all too familiar to twenty-first-century theatergoers 
acquainted with the bricolage dramaturgies of such playwrights 
as Heiner Müller and such directors as the Wooster Group’s 
Elizabeth LeCompte. Eliot quotes liberally, in several languages, 
from sources ranging from Shakespeare to the Buddha to popu-
lar songs of the poet’s day. High culture mixes with low. The 
sacred becomes entwined with the profane. Snatches of throwa-
way dialogue that could have been overheard in any bedroom 
or any bar come into conversation with the most exalted of ut-
terances. No single, authorial voice unifies; the model of con-
sciousness the poem proposes is a skittering one. It takes a step 
in one direction, then pivots before permitting itself to advance 
too far and sets off in another direction, only to pivot again. In-
sofar as each shift in tone or source text represents a foray into a 
worldview, avenues of inquiry are foreclosed nearly as quickly as 
they are opened. Eliot’s grace and writerly poise collapse into a 
scrum of conflicting impulses comprising a self that fundamen-
tally lacks confidence in itself.
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The poem even struggles to end itself: “these fragments I have 
shored against my ruins,” Eliot announces.1 Language gets de-
moted to matter, to something with heft that can be defensively 
positioned between the self and the world. Language props up 
civilization. Language holds it all together and is now itself fall-
ing apart. The glue won’t stick. The poet can’t write, only pick up 
and rearrange the pieces.
The poem then concludes several times, rehearsing a mastery 
it never attains. Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, “[w]hy then 
Ile fit you. Hieonymo’s mad againe,” suggests an acquiescence 
that truth, even if knowable, is uncommunicable.2 Language 
cannot overcome this divide. Yet, Eliot chooses to quote Ham-
let’s lesser-known urtext rather than the more iconic cultural 
artifact, which allows both plays to come alive in the reader’s 
mind; the one invokes the other, and this invocation points to 
language’s resilience, if not its efficacy. One play will close, one 
character will die, only to be resurrected and revised by some 
as yet unknown collaborator. The very impotence of language 
may speak across the generations, may create the continuity that 
sustains culture. 
The penultimate ending, “Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata,” 
comes from the Upanishads, holy text of the Hindu religion, 
one of the world’s oldest wisdom traditions.3 In his notes, Eliot 
translates these words as “Give, sympathise, control.”4 Else-
where, they have been translated as “give,” “be compassionate,” 
and “restrain yourselves.”5 In the Upanishad from which Eliot 
draws it, this tripartite admonition is broken up, delivered by 
the creator god Prajāpati to his three species of children: gods, 
men, and demons. Prajāpati repeats the same syllable, Da, three 
times, and his different categories of offspring hear, or interpret, 





5 Robert Hume, trans., The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1921), 150.
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a different message. In this way, then, to the gods he recom-
mends restraint. He urges the men to be giving. The devils he 
tells to be compassionate. Here is the hermeneutic that Eliot’s 
poem demands; independently incoherent fragments, like non-
sense syllables, cohere as different channels of expression in 
different readers’ minds. Some early critics assumed that this 
was how Eliot imagined Sanskrit would be experienced by his 
readers, as nonsense, like Hieonymo’s madness, a failure of lan-
guage.6 Madness and sacred knowledge appear as two sides of 
the same coin, irreducible, inextricable.
The final ending, “Shantih shantih shantih,” translates as 
“inner peace,” or “the peace which passeth all understanding.”7 
This cacophonous poem with its many borrowings, interrup-
tions, and eruptions ends with surrender to the unsayable, an 
acknowledgement that that worth having, or being, cannot be 
told, cannot be wrangled into language. Solace is ultimately 
found in the mute void.
The Waste Land was initially praised for its “positive” content, 
its revitalizing transposition of Christian symbols and the Grail 
quest legend into a complex and distinctly modern idiom. Eliot 
encouraged such readings, announcing in his notes that the 
“plan” of the poem and “a good deal of the incidental symbol-
ism” was suggested to him by a book on the Grail legend.8 It was 
not until much later in the century that the poem began to be 
appreciated for that which had inspired censure upon its publi-
cation: its “negative” content. In 1982, for example, Eloise Knapp 
Hay described The Waste Land as “a poem of radical doubt and 
negation, urging that every human desire be stilled except the 
desire for self-surrender, for restraint, and for peace.”9 Read 
negatively, the poem becomes eloquent as a fresh disavowal of 
the species responsible for the First World War, which officially 
6 Cleanth Brooks, Modern Poetry and the Tradition (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1939), 165.
7 Eliot, The Waste Land, 81.
8 Ibid., 82.
9 Eloise Knapp Hay, T.S. Eliot’s Negative Way (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 48.
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ended just four years before The Waste Land was published. The 
war decimated the population of Europe, Eliot’s adopted home, 
and revealed a hitherto inconceivable capacity for human self-
destruction. The war also turned great swaths of the cities and 
fields of the continent into literal wastelands, barren and unin-
habited by any save the fallen and the bereaved. In his poem, 
Eliot marshals great reserves of erudition to help him confront 
the catastrophe of the war, as if surely one of the many books in 
his eclectic library must contain the key to redeeming the car-
nage by rendering it meaningful. He fails. When the poem ends, 
a new kind of creature has been born — one which must live 
with the knowledge that its existence is irredeemable. 
The First World War was one of two catastrophes that occa-
sioned the writing of The Waste Land. The second was personal 
for Eliot; the poet suffered what was diagnosed as a nervous 
breakdown shortly after the war ended. Then-popular theories 
of “psychic scarcity” held that a person’s supply of nervous en-
ergy was finite, like one’s bank account balance. If they were not 
careful, psychic “wastrels” could overdraw and go bankrupt.10 
Unscrupulous, irresponsible, seen as menaces to themselves and 
burdens to others, wastrels of any kind were, then as now, not 
regarded as exemplary members of a society that cherishes pro-
ductivity and efficiency. Eliot, who worked in a bank through-
out the period when he was writing much of his most important 
work, and who frequently complained to friends and family in 
his letters that he was anxious about his personal finances, was 
initially prescribed a “rest cure” in a resort town on the southern 
coast of England to repair the damage he had done to his psy-
chic bank account.11 This treatment proved unsuccessful. 
Instead, Eliot found relief under the care of the “psychologi-
cal doctor” Roger Vittoz at a sanitarium in Lausanne, Switzer-
10 T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Anti-Modernism and the 
Transformation of American Culture 1880–1920 (New York: Pantheon, 
1981), 52–53.
11 Matthew K. Gold, “The Expert Hand and the Obedient Heart: Dr. Vittoz, 
T.S. Eliot, and the Therapeutic Possibilities of The Waste Land,” Journal of 
Modern Literature 23, nos. 3–4 (Summer 2000): 521–22.
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land. He also composed much of The Waste Land there. Though 
Eliot always professed an aversion to Freudian theory, Vittoz’s 
methods were not in most respects too distinct from those of 
the originator of psychoanalysis.12 Vittoz had his quirks — he 
believed that a skilled physician could detect the precise work-
ings of a patient’s brain by placing his hand on the patient’s fore-
head — but his work with Eliot involved regular daily sessions 
and the pursuit of what could be understood as a version of the 
talking cure. 
Vittoz also shared with Freud an understanding of the hu-
man psyche as an economic system, “a system for the produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption of psychic resources.”13 
From Lausanne, Eliot wrote to his brother, “[t]he great thing 
I am trying to learn is how to use all my energy without waste, 
to be calm when there is nothing to be gained by worry, and 
to concentrate without effort.”14 It is interesting to consider the 
title of The Waste Land in this light — Eliot was emphatic in let-
ters to Ezra Pound and others that the title of his poem was not 
The Wasteland, which would have circumscribed its resonances, 
but The Waste Land. The former evokes a decimated, barren, or 
overgrown landscape, but the latter is a different way of writing 
“place of waste,” which suits a text that doubled as a repository 
for what its author was being trained to recognize as his profit-
less worries, his failures to keep calm, his failures to channel his 
energy efficiently. 
From the beginning, the narrator of The Waste Land wrestles 
with the inefficient complexities of his experience of himself and 
the world:
12 Bill Goldstein, The World in Two: Virginia Woolf, T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, 
E.M. Forster, and the Year That Changed Literature (New York: Henry Holt, 
2017), 44–45.
13 Suzanne Raitt, “Psychic Waste: Freud, Fechner, and the Principle of 
Constancy,” in Culture and Waste: The Creation and Destruction of Value, 
eds. Gay Hawkins and Stephen Muecke (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2002), 73.
14 T.S. Eliot in a letter to Henry Eliot, December 13, 1921, The Letters of T.S. 




April is the cruelest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain.15
The narrator gives the impression that he prefers the less ambig-
uous seasons — winter, summer — those that encourage either 
the dormancy of forgetting and abandonment or the tickle of 
surprise and discovery. April pulls in two directions; the narra-
tor at once yearns to lie with the dead and to writhe in the arms of 
someone warm and new. The pull of mourning is overwhelming 
in The Waste Land. The earth is stony; abortion renders wombs 
barren and women prematurely old; Shakespeare’s Ariel keeps 
singing, “those are pearls that were his eyes.”16 Here, as in the 
“neurotic” analysand, the psychic economy is an inefficient one, 
producing excessive, unwanted, and disruptive stimuli: psychic 
waste. The past interferes with the present and the death drive 
vies with the pleasure principle for dominance. Like Freud, Vit-
toz understood himself as being in the business of waste man-
agement, of helping his patient regain psychic equilibrium and 
constancy, where it was presumed something like health could 
be found. The Waste Land is also a record of its author coming 
to terms with the realization that, to exist in the modern world 
outside the confines of the sanitarium, the “worry,” the perverse 
desire, the psychic waste had to be jettisoned. The world had 
become too much. The only way to survive it was to pass over 
the great majority of its sorrows in silence, to learn to ignore 
the insupportable violence at its foundation. Shantih shan-
tih shantih. 
15 Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems, 65. 
16 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, ed. Stanley Wells et al. (New York: 




Eliot’s painful document of becoming-modern (or becoming-
“well”) is evidence that human existence is as bound up with 
what we discard, abject, and devalue as it is with what we recog-
nize and revere. The narrator oscillates between a quasi-religious 
faith in language, in expression, in art, and in being ashamed of 
these superfluities of consciousness the way one is ashamed of 
the stench of one’s own waste products. The Waste Land suggests 
that the most salient feature of being human is our ability to be 
ashamed of ourselves. 
While late-capitalist modernity applies a new and terrible 
pressure to this existential fact, this is not a uniquely modern 
insight — it was articulated in some of our earliest aesthetic ar-
tifacts. Georges Bataille reads the first known artistic gesture as 
a negative gesture, an act of self-abnegation. Examining the pre-
historic cave paintings at Lascaux, Bataille observes that while 
their early human creators rendered animal subjects with appar-
ent reverence and relative anatomical exactitude, when it came 
to depicting human subjects, themselves, the painters omitted 
their own faces, and in some cases replaced them with the faces 
of animals.17
The painters omitted this signifier of that which is most el-
evated in the species, the organ of speech, individuation, and 
recognition. The painters rendered the human not as a superior 
and distinct entity capable of foresight, collaboration, and con-
struction, but as a frail body among stronger bodies. “He had 
not yet prevailed,” Bataille writes of man, “but he apologized.”18 
Long before the human had acquired the ability to shape the 
landscape according to its vision and will, Bataille sees these 
early artists recoiling from the possibility that the human might 
come to stand outside of nature. 
17 Georges Bataille, The Cradle of Humanity: Prehistoric Art and Culture, 




Hannah Arendt identifies this ability as the domain of homo 
faber, or “man the maker,” the human animal engaged in work as 
opposed to mere labor. For Arendt, labor encompasses the bio-
logically dictated activities necessary for subsistence; its prod-
ucts are consumed as quickly as they are brought forth. Work, 
however, refers to the fabrication of things designed to outlive 
their creator. Homo faber is the deviser of laws and institutions, 
the architect of cities, and the maker of art. Where the animal 
is of its environment, constrained by its horizons, homo faber 
takes the environment as a starting point. Homo faber moves 
through the world making improvements, revisions, shaping 
the world to suit her purposes rather than always only adjusting 
herself to suit the purposes of the world. The trees are there to 
be converted into timber, the water to be diverted, the surface 
to be adorned.
The prehistoric human could not have dreamed of industri-
alization, world war, and climate change, but she intuited the 
downfall that this initial separation would bring. According to 
Bataille, the Lascaux paintings represent “a stupefying nega-
tion of man. Far from seeking to affirm humanity against na-
ture, man, born of nature, here voluntarily appears as a kind 
of waste.”19 Early humans perceived and depicted themselves as 
waste, as excess, more like a tumor in the flesh of the world than 
like the “masters and possessors of nature.”20 At the very mo-
ment when the capacity for image-making, for art, was emerg-
ing, the human felt not pride, but shame. The birth of this dif-
ference did not bode well — this difference carried within it the 
possibility of total annihilation.  
This intuition, that our distinction would be as much a source 
of suffering as of joy, also motivates some of our foundational 
dramatic texts. The eponymous protagonist of Aeschylus’s Pro-
metheus Bound is a Titan who steals fire from heaven and gives 
it to human beings. His offense is grave not merely because he 
19 Ibid., 46.
20 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations (New York: The 
Liberal Arts Press, 1960), 45.
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has taken from the gods, but because Prometheus “gave honors 
to mortals beyond what was just.”21 In Aeschylus’s telling, when 
Zeus ascended to the throne of Mount Olympus, he determined 
that the best thing to do with “the unhappy breed of mankind” 
would be “to blot the race out and create a new.”22 Prometheus 
alone, harboring a special fondness for the creatures, took pity 
on humans and saved them from obliteration by sharing with 
humankind “the brightness of fire that devises all.”23 Prometheus 
upsets the cosmic order of things; it is not for the human, frail 
and finite creature, to strive to create that which will endure. 
Zeus perceives the human’s progression towards becoming 
homo faber as an abomination. Prometheus is admonished for 
giving that which belongs to the gods “to creatures of a day.”24 
The god’s anger is not mere jealousy. He knows the human’s new 
aspirations are rooted in a dangerous lie because Prometheus 
committed more than one offense. Before giving human beings 
fire, he “stopped mortals from foreseeing doom,” and “sowed 
in them blind hopes.”25 This original folly, which provides the 
scaffolding for our major narratives of human overreach — the 
Faust plays, the Frankenstein story — leaves the human funda-
mentally deluded about her nature and bound to suffer endless 
torment as a result. 
As is Prometheus, who spends the play nailed to a rock, 
where he is condemned to remain for all eternity as punishment 
for his transgression. As visitors come and go, he bemoans his 
fate and attempts to justify his actions to whomever will listen. 
The play becomes a recitation of humanity’s accomplishments 
as Prometheus tries to make the case for his betrayal. From his 
perspective, Prometheus has given humanity a great gift. He 
found mortals “mindless  / and gave them minds, made them 
21 Aeschylus, “Prometheus Bound,” in Greek Tragedies, eds. David Grene and 







masters of their wits,” he says.26 “First they had eyes but had 
no eyes to see,  / and ears but heard not. Like shapes within a 
dream / they dragged through their long lives and muddled all, / 
haphazardly.”27 Prometheus describes human beings living “be-
neath the earth like swarming ants  / in sunless caves.”28 They 
groped their way through life, at the mercy of nature, incapable 
of design, unable to impose their will on their surroundings. 
Prometheus tutored them in the ways of homo faber — he taught 
them how to read the stars, how to domesticate animals, how 
to prophesy. Prometheus gave mortals arithmetic, written lan-
guage, medicine, and the natural sciences. He set civilization in 
motion, and saved mortals from oblivion. 
Or so he claims. One of Prometheus’s interlocutors, the god 
Hermes, listens to the Titan’s raving and, perhaps not incor-
rectly, concludes he has gone mad. Prometheus is a hero, but 
a tragic one, fatally flawed by hubris. Prometheus Bound is an 
atypical Greek tragedy in that it is almost entirely static — Pro-
metheus is being bound by servants of Zeus at the beginning of 
the play and remains bound until the play’s end. We witness nei-
ther an action nor a fall from great heights; we only hear about 
the hero’s deeds after misfortune finds him. Prometheus’s static 
position suggests that the fall of real consequence takes place 
elsewhere, that his personal fall is somehow incidental to the 
tragedy. The fall is humanity’s to take. Prometheus has indeed 
given mortals a gift, but it is a mixed blessing. He has endowed 
mortals with hubris to rival his own, setting civilization up for 
a long rise and eventual fall, the denouement of which we now 
appear to be approaching. Prometheus Bound is believed to have 
been the first play in a trilogy. Of the other two plays, only a few 
fragments of the former, Prometheus Unbound, remain. In these, 
Prometheus finds himself subjected to fresh torments; a bird of 
prey visits him each day to peck at and feed upon his liver, which 






every morning. The play that depicted Prometheus’s ultimate 
triumph over his circumstances and reconciliation with Zeus, 
Prometheus the Firebearer, has been, appropriately, lost to his-
tory altogether. All we have are scenes of suffering; redemption 
is indefinitely deferred. 
Of all the art forms, the theater is best suited to representing 
the human’s perverse relation to her finitude. Each night, the 
theater calls into being a new and wholly unnecessary world at 
great physical, material, and emotional expense to all involved. 
As Tolstoy put it, when taking into account the farthest-flung 
and most tangential of contributors, every production “requires 
the intense effort of thousands and thousands of people, work-
ing forcedly at what are often harmful and humiliating tasks.”29 
People literally destroy themselves out of devotion to the theat-
er: “these people, often very kind, intelligent, capable of every 
sort of useful labour, grow wild in these exceptional, stupefying 
occupations and become dull to all serious phenomena of life, 
one-sided and self-complacent specialists, knowing only how to 
twirl their legs, tongues or fingers.”30 This labor is real, not infre-
quently all-consuming to the point of being disfiguring, and yet 
its products are ephemeral. The world of the play melts into air 
when the curtain falls. The baseless fabric of the vision dissolves, 
the insubstantial pageant fades. “We are such stuff / As dreams 
are made on,” the theater reminds us in ritual form if not always 
in content, “and our little life / Is rounded with a sleep.”31
In the theater, even our mightiest incursions into the void 
are, self-confessedly ineffectual, doomed before they begin. The 
stage is always already anticipating being cleared to make space 
for the next show to load in. The actor playing Oedipus adopts a 
part which is not really his, struggles as if the stakes were high. 
He curses the gods for casting a shadow over his existence with 
their prophecy that he would come to ruin. He curses himself for 
29 Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 9.
30 Ibid., 4
31 Shakespeare, The Tempest, 4.1.156–58.
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the hubris that led him to believe he could root out the source of 
his people’s suffering, that led him to disregard all warnings, led 
him to trust that knowledge would elevate him and allow him to 
attain mastery, when in the end it would only lay him low. For 
Oedipus, like the actor playing him, like the thousands of people 
toiling at their often harmful and humiliating tasks to bring the 
production to fruition, an illusion constitutes the substrate of 
his endeavor. 
Everything about the theater is suffused with existential 
shame: the painted flats done up to resemble stone parapets, the 
cognac conjured from iced tea, the shabby, worn-out costume 
that only makes the actress appear elegant from a distance, un-
der the lights, if she keeps her back to the audience so no one 
sees she is being held together at the waist with safety pins. And 
yet, how wasteful, how extravagant the theater is, a diversion of 
so many resources to be consumed in the blaze of a single per-
formance before, more often than we might like to admit, fewer 
people in the audience than there are on stage. The theater is 
that rare and strange human accomplishment that understands 
itself as being made by and for “creatures of a day.” At its best, 
the theater is not deluded about its nature, origins, and destiny. 
At its best, the theater gathers artists and audience in one space 
to die together for a little while, to consciously waste, not spend, 
their time. 
Existential Shame
For Bataille, the principle of waste, or “nonproductive expendi-
ture,” steers all human feeling and behavior inexorably towards 
inefficiency and extravagance. Knowing on the deepest level, 
like prehistoric humans, that we are waste, we are paradoxical-
ly compelled to self-effacement through excess. Play, religion, 
eroticism, forgiveness, art; none of these human activities are 
necessary for survival, but they are what make life worth living 
even though (or because) they are not profitable in any con-
ventional or measurable way. To measure the success or failure 
of these pursuits according to their efficiency or productivity 
27
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would be to miss the point entirely. The effort they require is 
inherently valuable, pleasurable, meaningful. We cannot give 
back the fire; the question that remains is what we will do with 
it before the fire burns out. 
Under capitalism, however, “everything conspires to obscure 
the basic movement that tends to restore wealth to its function, 
to gift-giving, to squandering without reciprocation,” Bataille 
argues.32 Under capitalism, the expectation is that any outlay 
should yield a return on one’s investment, even though to be 
authentically human is to operate at a loss. Capitalism encour-
ages spiritual miserliness, when human beings derive pleasure, 
honor, and glory, from freely spending their resources and 
themselves. “The more costly the life-generating processes are,” 
he writes, “the more squander the production of organisms has 
required, the more satisfactory the operation is. The principle 
of producing at the least expense is not so much a human idea 
as a narrowly capitalist one (it makes sense only from the view-
point of the incorporated company).”33 Societies that privilege 
the acquisition and accumulation of wealth over its disbursal 
and consumption are sick societies. Bataille points to the pot-
latch ceremonies of certain Native American tribes of the Pacific 
Northwest as archetypical of the righteous squandering he sees 
as innate to the human. At these opulent feasts, tribal leaders 
would compete by attempting to outdo one another in extrava-
gant gift-giving. He who divested himself of the most posses-
sions would accrue the most prestige in his community. Our 
current economic system, however, privileges accumulation, 
parsimony, and the obsessive tabulation of debts, all of which, 
Bataille contends, contribute to the gradual mutilation of the 
human essence. 
The theater is where we can see this most clearly. The theater 
is a waste. The theater is a prodigious waste of time and space. 
It is also, almost without exception, a waste of money for both 
32 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 




producer and consumer. The ticket-buyer is not able to gather 
up the production and hang it on her wall if she finds it to be to 
her taste. Her purchase is gone before she has received the full 
benefit of it, and it has no resale value. The overwhelming major-
ity of theater-making must be subsidized by funds derived from 
the state or other forms of patronage, and the theater would be 
decimated in a truly free market. The theater cannot save us. It 
cannot even meaningfully shape public discourse, so unequivo-
cally marginal is the place theater occupies in our culture. Most 
people never go to the theater at all. And yet, for those afflicted 
with, or attuned to, the existential shame the theater specializes 
in, the theater is where we must go to rehearse our catastrophes, 
to atone for our excesses and our penury. “Vanity of vanities,” 





Staging Capitalism:  
Dramatic Surplus and Inefficiency
As in individual organisms, the growth of capitalist societies 
is sustained by consumption and the attendant production of 
waste. Unlike individual organisms, capitalism in its present 
state is built on the unsustainable fantasy of infinite growth. Ac-
cording to Marx, waste is not incidental to capitalism, but con-
stitutive — capitalism depends on the existence of a “surplus” 
or “redundant” population of workers, a reserve army of the 
able-bodied but unemployed.1 This surplus population allows 
for the extraction of “surplus labor,” or the measure of labor that 
exceeds what the individual worker must perform to produce 
the means of her own livelihood. This surplus labor generates 
the “surplus value” that constitutes the capitalist’s profit. While 
the proletarian’s contribution is excessive, consisting of more 
than she can afford to spare, the capitalist can enrich himself 
excessively because he controls the means of production and is 
thereby able to press the dispossessed worker into service for a 
fraction of what her labor is really worth.




Those who constitute the redundant population, this social 
waste, are often treated as though they are morally culpable for 
their position, even though their unemployment is structurally 
integral to capitalism — they are the strikebreakers-in-waiting 
ensuring that employers can keep wages low. We even crimi-
nalize unemployment with anti-loafing and vagrancy statutes 
and by making gainful employment a condition of probation 
and parole, the violation of which may result in incarceration. 
Social failings and structural inequities are transformed into 
personal failings by that piece of capitalist legerdemain Marga-
ret Thatcher availed herself of when she famously declared that 
“there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and 
women.”2 This exaggerated theory of the individual holds that 
we move through the world, each one of us, neither aided nor 
encumbered by attachments or external barriers. Saying we are 
free cannot set us free. This description erases human finitude 
and blames the victim. 
In a world in which finitude has been erased from dis-
course, not only are all limitations presumed to lie within the 
individual, all limitations are also presumed to be removable, 
surmountable by those who are sufficiently strong-willed. The 
interrelatedness of all things is forgotten. “Being an individual 
de jure,” Zygmunt Bauman writes, “means having no one to 
blame for one’s own misery, seeking the causes of one’s own 
defeats nowhere except in one’s own indolence and sloth, and 
looking for no remedies other than trying harder and harder 
still.”3 This is the “performance principle,” which Herbert Mar-
cuse understands as a self-administered authoritarian regime in 
disguise, the ethos of “an acquisitive and antagonistic society in 
the process of constant expansion,” in which “domination has 
been increasingly rationalized.”4 In such societies, the perfor-
2 Margaret Thatcher, “AIDs, Education and the Year 2000!” interview by 
Douglas Keay, Woman’s Own (October 31, 1987).
3 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (New York: 
Phaidon Press, 1964), 38.
4 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 45.
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mance principle displaces the pleasure principle, work replac-
ing enjoyment. While workers today may in general have more 
of an ability to choose the type of work they do, “their labor is 
work for an apparatus which they do not control, which oper-
ates as an independent power to which individuals must submit 
if they want to live.”5 The foreman who presided over Marx’s 
nineteenth-century factories, policing efficiency and facilitating 
the extraction of labor from the worker to enrich the capitalist, 
may no longer be ubiquitous, but only because the foreman is 
no longer necessary, Marcuse argues. Jon McKenzie asserts that 
the performance principle is something we come to internalize, 
rendering that which cannot be “rationalized” useless or exces-
sive, wasteful. “The performance principle entails the repressive 
sublimation of human desire,” as desire is chaotic and supremely 
inefficient when left unattended.6 Capitalism harnesses desire, 
reterritorializes it. 
Dramaturgies of Waste
On Western stages, the dominant dramaturgy of the nineteenth 
century was a dramaturgy of efficiency, the so-called “well-made 
play,” as developed by the French playwright Eugène Scribe and 
subsequently imitated widely in Europe and the United States. 
The well-made play was formulaic, with intricate, technically 
well-executed exchanges of plot-propelling information taking 
precedence over nuanced character development or ideas. The 
well-made play used and reused generic stories and situations 
in order to reliably provoke an emotional response in audi-
ences. As Wilkie Collins summed up the formula: “Make ’em 
laugh; make ’em weep; make ’em wait.” In the well-made play, 
there is nothing excessive; the buildup of suspense is crucial, 
but all loose ends get tied up by the time the curtain falls. As 
one admirer of the form puts it, “Each scene must make a defi-
5 Ibid.




nite contribution to the development of the action. […] [T]he 
combination of characters to be found onstage at a given mo-
ment is determined mainly by the potential for the transfer of 
information.”7 The well-made play invites the spectator to ad-
mire the choreography of bodies and operative language; the 
spectacle is exquisitely self-contained: “the primary and most 
consistent characteristic of the well-made play is the thorough-
ness with which every action, every event, even every entrance 
and exit is prepared, explained, justified.”8 
The twentieth century, however, saw the rise of playwrights 
who sought to reclaim a space for inefficiency and excess in the 
theater. As nonproductive expenditure becomes increasingly 
circumscribed in our late-capitalist lives, we increasingly see 
artists turning to it as an aesthetic strategy in their work. These 
dramaturgies of waste, as I call them, have both formal and 
ideological dimensions. Like modernism itself, dramaturgies 
of waste are characterized by the questioning and rejection of 
received forms. Early examples include playwrights concerned 
with critically re-inhabiting traditional models of dramatic 
structure. By the century’s end, however, we see playwrights 
invested in emptying or canceling out structure itself, a recla-
mation of nonproductive expenditure and an act of resistance 
against the capitalist regimes of efficiency that organize our lives 
outside the theater. Today, dramaturgies of waste have embraced 
negativity to such a degree that formlessness may become the 
twenty-first century’s legacy.
Failures of Sublimation: Harley Granville-Barker
English playwright Harley Granville-Barker cut his teeth as an 
actor in the plays of his near-contemporary George Bernard 
Shaw, and the two shared a proprietary stake in what is some-
times called the “drama of ideas.” What distinguished these plays 
7 Douglas Cardwell, “The Well-Made Play of Eugène Scribe,” The French 




from their nineteenth-century forebears was that they were 
about something, some more-or-less pressing social or political 
issue of the day. In a drama of ideas, an extended disquisition on 
theories of progress or empire put into the mouth of a charac-
ter is not a detour from or interruption of the unfolding of the 
plot — it is itself the substance of the drama. The plot is largely 
relegated to being the delivery system for that content. Char-
acters stand for particular points of view, hypotheses about the 
way the world is or should be, and their actions and outcomes 
function as tests of those hypotheses. Today, plays that proceed 
by developing a complex theme are commonplace, but at the 
turn of the twentieth century, such a deviation from the “well-
made” model represented what can be seen as a subtle shift away 
from the prevailing valorization of efficiency in storytelling and 
toward a dramaturgy of waste. Such plays offered opportunities 
for provocation, contemplation, and reconsideration. The dra-
ma of ideas introduced a mode of engaging with the theatrical 
event that defied the performance principle, calling for a slower 
speed, a more attentive ear, and potentially for an unsettling of 
settled worldviews. 
In his 1907 play Waste, Granville-Barker takes up the agōn 
between unsublimated desire and the performance principle, 
eros and civilization, rendering it as a gendered opposition. In 
the Victorian era, which drew to a close shortly before the play’s 
composition, gender roles became sharply defined, with the 
public sphere largely reserved for men and the domestic sphere 
left to women.9 People also responded to the dramatic transfor-
mation of social and economic life brought about by industriali-
zation with concern about child labor and the welfare of work-
ing families. In an increasingly hard-edged, dirty, dense, urban 
landscape, women were tasked with cultivating a soft, private, 
refined space where the bodies and souls of children and men 
could be nourished and recreated. The distinction between men 
as producers and women as reproducers took a firm hold. While 




the complementary importance of both spheres would not gen-
erally have been in question, every binary becomes a hierarchy. 




Form, convex, step, advance, semen, progress.
Matter, concave, ground — where steps are taken, holding- 
and dumping-ground. 
Man      
Woman10
Since “thought has always worked through opposition,” if the 
public sphere was where men confidently made use of their 
“higher” faculties, the domestic sphere, we are left to assume, 
was where women groped around in the dark with only their 
“lower” faculties to guide them.11 Generally incapable of subli-
mation, as Freud put it, “woman finds herself forced into the 
background by the claims of civilization and she adopts a hostile 
attitude towards it.”12 Woman becomes the dumping ground of 
culture. Patriarchy translates her negativity away as hostility.
Waste basically accepts the Freudian paradigm; it is a play 
that loathes women. More interesting for its blind spots and 
omissions than for its declarative statements, Waste follows am-
bitious politician Henry Trebell as his life unravels in the wake 
of a scandal instigated by a failure of sublimation. Trebell is an 
important man, a politician, an ostensibly progressive man. For 
much of the play, he is busy working on a bill to disestablish the 
Church of England. He is a hard-bitten materialist who consid-
10 Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, “Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/
Ways Out/Forays,” in The Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1996), 63.
11 Ibid. 
12 Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents,” in The Freud Reader, 




ers love to be “a waste of time.”13 Summarizing his perspective on 
passion, Trebell declares that “[t]here are three facts in life that 
call up emotion . . Birth, Death, and the Desire for Children. 
The niceties are shams.”14 His behavior toward women is con-
sistent with this philosophy. When the married Amy O’Connell 
confesses to him that their clandestine tryst some months ago 
resulted in a pregnancy that cannot be attributed to her hus-
band who has been in another country for over a year, she is 
frightened, despairing, indignant that by accident of biology she 
must bear this shame alone. “Oh, the physical curse of being a 
woman,” she rails, “no better than any savage in this condition 
. . worse off than an animal. It’s unfair.”15 She asks Trebell if the 
evening they spent together meant anything to him, and he re-
plies, “[l]isten. I look back on that night as one looks back on a 
fit of drunkenness.”16 She confirms, “[y]ou mean I might have 
been any other woman,” and he replies, apparently ingenuously, 
“[w]ouldn’t any other woman have served the purpose[?]”17
Amy’s enforced passivity proves intolerable. “You don’t know 
what it is to have a thing happening in spite of you,” she com-
plains to her unmoved, erstwhile lover.18 Wounded by his indif-
ference and unable to countenance bearing the child of a man 
who does not love her, Amy seeks out a doctor willing to per-
form a back-alley abortion. The dangerous procedure results in 
her death. When the scandal outs and Trebell’s colleagues learn 
that he is responsible for the whole sordid affair, they decide 
they can no longer work with him. He is ousted from their coa-
lition, his life’s work destroyed. For confused reasons, partly an 
inability to see the purpose of life now that his career is over, 
partly a desire to make his colleagues rue the day they cast him 
13 Harley Granville-Barker, Waste, in Three Plays: The Marrying off Ann 









out, Trebell kills himself. In the final line of the play, Trebell’s 
secretary bemoans the suicide: “I’m angry . . just angry at the 
waste of a good man. Look at the work undone . . think of it! 
Who is to do it! Oh . . the waste . . !”19
We are invited to recognize Trebell’s death as the “waste” of 
the play’s title, to see his death as a tragedy, the great but flawed 
man unjustly felled by a single foolish mistake. Amy O’Connell’s 
death goes largely unmourned. As recently as 2000, the critic 
John Simon dismissed the character of Amy O’Connell as 
“highly neurotic.”20 If neuroses are symptomatic of an imperfect 
ability or unwillingness to adjust to the demands of culture, she 
is a neurotic simply by virtue of her gender. The play pits the 
“masculine” virtues of detachment, order, and discipline against 
the destructively “feminine” vices of attachment, chaos, and de-
sire. Diametrically opposed and irreconcilable, “there’s no such 
thing as a sexual relationship.”21 In private life, such as it is, and 
in work, efficiency, Trebell remarks on more than one occasion, 
should be of paramount consideration. The rest is a waste of 
time. 
If Waste is about a life destroyed by a failure of sublimation, 
a fatal hiccup in a life otherwise strictly ordered in accordance 
with the performance principle, Granville-Barker’s 1905 The 
Voysey Inheritance is about a surfeit of sublimation and the ruin 
it brings to a family. The Voysey patriarch, like his father before 
him, is a financier. His firm has a reputation for expeditiously 
making money into more money. As heir apparent to the firm, 
Edward Voysey learns, however, that his father and grandfather 
have long been helping themselves to the funds other people 
have entrusted to them, speculating with their clients’ capital, 
“pocketing the gains, cutting the losses; meanwhile paying the 
19 Ibid., 342. 
20 John Simon, “Waste,” New York Magazine, March 27, 2000, https://nymag.
com/nymetro/arts/theater/reviews/2487/.
21 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 
trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 1998), 12.
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client his ordinary income.”22 By the time Edward is old enough 
to hear the truth, the firm is deeply compromised. The family’s 
homes, their fine clothes, Edward’s sister’s dowry — all of it has 
been purchased with stolen money and the elder Mr. Voysey is 
in much too deep to be able to pay it back even if he wanted to. 
He does at least claim to want to set things right. Mr. Voysey’s 
story is that he inherited this sorry state of affairs from his own 
father and has righteously dedicated his life to wrangling the 
debt down to a manageable size. Edwards later discovers that 
this is a lie, that his father did at one point manage to get the 
firm in the clear, only to begin illicitly speculating again fifteen 
years later. But Mr. Voysey has every intention, he tells his son, 
of catching up before the time has come for Edward to take the 
helm of the firm. Edward protests that if his father had really 
wanted to make amends, he would have “lived poor” and de-
voted himself to his client’s good and not to his own aggran-
dizement.23 But Mr. Voysey does not see it that way: “[w]hat has 
carried me to victory,” he asks his son, but “the confidence of 
my clients. What has earned that confidence? A decent life, my 
integrity, my brains? No, my reputation for wealth . . that, and 
nothing else. Business now-a-days is run on the lines of the con-
fidence trick.”24 Without giving his clientele the impression that 
he was enjoying considerable success, Voysey argues, he would 
never have been able to convince them to keep investing. With-
out their investments, he would never be able to turn a profit, 
and the whole corrupt edifice would come crashing down. Voy-
sey is not wrong. Capitalism itself is a kind of Ponzi scheme, 
depending on ever-increasing populations, resources, and levels 
of consumption in order to sustain itself. A cosmic confidence 
trick is all that keeps it going. There may be no such thing as a 
financier who is both successful and scrupulously honest.
22 Harley Granville-Barker, The Voysey Inheritance (Boston: Little, Brown, 





Edward takes a youthfully idealistic hard line against this 
justification, only to find himself tempted by it after his father’s 
untimely demise. To confess everything would mean not only 
hurting his own family, who have, after all, become accustomed 
to a certain style of living, but further hurting his clients as well. 
Once the truth comes out, there will be no chance of Edward’s 
recovering even the principal for anyone, but as long as no one 
knows the game he is playing, he can still hold out hope of catch-
ing up. He soon finds himself taking up the family business. The 
only adjustment he makes is that he reprioritizes recuperating 
the investments of his less well-to-do clients over those of his 
wealthier clients.
Women prove pivotal in The Voysey Inheritance. In Waste, 
Amy O’Connell stood for the hero’s tragic flaw, embodying all 
the stereotypical shortcomings of femininity, but the women of 
The Voysey Inheritance exist on a spectrum of worthlessness. At 
the end of Waste, while everyone else is lamenting the death of 
the great man, a pair of female characters spare a moment to 
reflect on what became of Amy. “When will men learn to know 
one woman from another,” one asks.25 Her companion replies, 
“[w]hen will all women care to be one thing rather than the 
other?”26 The supposed indistinguishability of women is at-
tributed not to any deficiency of male vision or attention but 
to some pernicious female conspiracy. By contrast, in The Voy-
sey Inheritance, several models of femininity are proposed. Ed-
ward’s sister Honor is introduced by a striking, gratuitously cru-
el stage direction indicating that the world would be better off if 
she were dead. “Poor Honor,” as she is called, “is a phenomenon 
common to most large families. From her earliest years she has 
been bottle washer to her brothers. While they were expensively 
educated, she was grudged schooling; her highest accomplish-
ment was meant to be mending their clothes.”27 The playwright 
goes on to tell us of Honor’s parents’ general distaste for her sex, 
25 Granville-Barker, Waste, 340.
26 Ibid.
27 Granville-Barker, The Voysey Inheritance, 30.
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then continues, “[i]n a less humane society she would have been 
exposed at birth.”28 Honor is barely tolerated, and her existence 
assumed meaningless, presumably because she has never had 
any marriage prospects and spends her time scurrying around 
fetching cigars for the men in her family. One of her brothers 
wonders aloud, “I wonder they bothered to give her a name.”29 
Honor is not an important character in the sense of driving the 
action of the play forward in a significant way. Granville-Barker 
seems to include her merely to demonstrate that there is such 
a thing as a woman who is less valuable even than a dumping 
ground. 
The other women are the products of their economic status, 
determined by their access to capital down to the way they ex-
perience desire. Beatrice, married to one of the Voysey brothers 
is asked if she married for love. She replies: “I’ve had to earn my 
own living, consequently there isn’t one thing in my life that I 
have ever done quite genuinely for its own sake . . but always 
with an eye toward bread-and-butter, pandering to the people 
who were to give me that.”30 Juxtaposed with her is Alice, Ed-
ward’s paramour, who is independently wealthy and therefore 
equipped to selflessly redeem Edward when he is at last found 
out. They will be married, she assures him, and her income will 
suffice to sustain them. Their only problem is that, should he 
go to prison, she will have to be careful not to be excessively 
proud of him. “My heart praises you,” she tells him just before 
the final curtain comes down.31 Perhaps she is proud of him for 
facing the music, though if he could avoid doing so, it seems 
he surely would. Perhaps she perversely feels as though there is 
something chic about having a spouse who has done time for 
white-collar crime.
Alice (and her money) undo the emergent morals of The Voy-







her less robustly-developed superego can always be counted 
upon to enable, forgive, and recompense. The Voyseys oversub-
limated, forgetting that the figures in their ledgers meant some-
thing tangible to actual people. Alice undersublimates, taking it 
upon herself to break Edward’s fall with sexual absolution. Here, 
rather than complement one another, eros and civilization bring 
out the worst in each other. 
Ibsen: “Life Is Work”
Henrik Ibsen elaborated on — some say perfected — Scribe’s 
well-made play, elevating the form into something substan-
tial enough to bear the weight of such complex themes as the 
problem of the individual in relationship to society. Ibsen also 
made ample use of the nineteenth century’s other major popular 
theatrical genre, melodrama. Where the well-made play privi-
leged technique and intrigue, the melodrama’s emphasis was 
on emotion. In the classic mélodrames of August von Kotzebue 
and Guilbert de Pixérécourt, the dramatic action was accom-
panied by continuous musical underscoring, which guided and 
heightened the audience’s emotional experience. Also exagger-
ated in melodrama are the stakes of the conflicts driving the 
plot. On the surface, melodramas appear to be about a family 
that can’t pay the rent or the virgin ingenue’s seduction by the 
corrupt aristocrat. The melodramatic imagination, however, 
is Manichaean, that is, perceiving the world as divided along 
the lines of absolute good and absolute evil. At its most primal, 
melodrama is just this naked conflict. As Eric Bentley argues, 
melodrama “is drama in its elemental form; it is the quintes-
sence of drama.”32 Melodrama is emotionally excessive, because 
it exceeds itself — the laughter of the moustache-twirling villain 
is not the villain’s alone but satanic laughter.  
In the nineteenth century, melodrama was also typically 
marked by the godlike intercession of “poetic justice,” which 
unfailingly ensured that the virtuous prosper while the ne’er-
32 Eric Bentley, The Life of the Drama (New York: Athenuem, 1964), 202. 
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do-wells got their comeuppance. As the genre congealed, it too 
became formulaic, working to reinforce conventional conserva-
tive values by punishing the wicked outsiders and libertines by 
the time the curtain fell, while sparing the righteously chaste 
defenders of honor, home, and country. One of Ibsen’s contribu-
tions to modern drama was the way in which he often used mel-
odrama as a kind of red herring, adopting many of the trappings 
of the form only to subvert the genre’s clearly defined polarities. 
Rather than presenting clearly delineated, internally consistent 
representatives of good and evil, Ibsen tends to make it difficult 
for his audiences to discern with any certainty who is doing the 
right thing for the right motives, the wrong thing for the wrong 
motives, or some combination of the two. There are neither true 
heroes nor villains in Ibsen, only human beings susceptible to 
venality and self-delusion, people struggling mightily with the 
various uncertainties introduced by the onset of modernity, 
people who more often than not do rash and regrettable things 
to escape the discomfort of such uncertainties. 
Like the Voysey men, the eponymous protagonist of Ibsen’s 
1896 John Gabriel Borkman is a man whose outsize ambition 
and self-regard blind him to his own needs and the needs of 
those closest to him. Borkman is another financier who illegally 
speculated with his clients’ money in an attempt to enrich him-
self. Once Borkman was caught, he lost everything and went 
to prison. The play begins eight years after he is released, but 
Borkman is still a prisoner, living separately from his unforgiv-
ing wife in their own home, never showing his face in public. 
He spends his days pacing the floor of the attic to which he has 
exiled himself. Like so many in his line of work, Borkman does 
not see himself as a thief; he is a zealous believer in the capitalist 
fantasy of infinite economic expansion. He maintains that with 
their money in his capable hands, his entire stable of unwitting 
investors would eventually have had their down payments on 
his future returned to them; Borkman planned to use the capital 
to fund a large-scale project extracting valuable minerals from 
the earth. But Borkman’s motivations are complex. He is not ex-
clusively inspired by cold self-interest. He legitimately believes 
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that if he were to once again assume control of the appropriate 
resources, he would have “the power to create human happiness 
for vast multitudes around me.”33 The son of a miner, he comes 
from humble origins and is not indifferent to the struggles of the 
working class. Even so, Borkman’s hubris eclipses in his mind 
the ethical implications of gambling with other people’s money, 
and it ultimately leads to tragedy. 
In his isolation, Borkman’s embrace of capitalism takes on 
a perversely religious dimension. He equates the accumulation 
of wealth with the attainment of “the kingdom — and the pow-
er — and the glory,” a quotation from the Gospel according to 
Matthew.34 In the biblical scene from which the phrase is drawn, 
Christ is instructing his disciples in the proper way to pray. Ad-
dressing himself to the Father, Christ avows, “[f]or thine is the 
kingdom, the power, and the glory for ever.”35 The irony of Bork-
man’s misappropriation of the locution is twofold if considered 
in the context of the Catholic Mass, during which worshipers 
still recite this doxology in response to the Lord’s Prayer. At this 
moment during the liturgy, the entire congregation has taken 
hands, symbolically joining together as one body. All hands are 
then lifted heavenward together, signifying a community of be-
lievers united in self-abnegation. Borkman’s sacrilegious rewrite 
both deposes God in favor of Mammon and erases all sugges-
tion of a communitarian ethos. 
What we call “futures trading” is big business on Wall Street 
today. This investment practice might well have appealed to 
both Borkman and his wife. Gunhild Borkman’s obsession 
with attaining a personalized “kingdom” is as keen as her hus-
band’s. Being a nineteenth-century wife and mother, however, 
her path to power and glory differs. Now that living vicariously 
through her disgraced husband is no longer an option, she has 
invested all her hopes in her son Erhart. The language of finance 
33 Henrik Ibsen, John Gabriel Borkman, in Four Major Plays, trans. Rolf 





is ubiquitous in the play even and especially when characters 
are speaking of matters of the heart, but Gunhild’s vocabulary 
is more religious than economic. Erhart, for example, presents 
Gunhild with a path to “restitution” for her wasted life.36 Her son 
will undertake the “sacred mission” of restoring the honor of the 
family. By dedicating his life to an as-yet-to-be-determined no-
ble cause — but certainly something substantive, legal, and dig-
nified — he is expected to turn a profit for his mother in some 
cosmic sense, repaying the debt she is owed by his father. 
Gunhild’s mercenary model of motherhood is contrasted 
with that of her twin sister Ella Rentheim, who fostered Erhart 
when he was a child during the worst of the fraud scandal sur-
rounding his father. Ella listens to her sister’s grand plans for 
Erhart’s future with alarm. Ella’s maternal concern manifests 
in what appears to be a less self-serving way; she just wants to 
love and be loved by Erhart and to see him happy, like (as we 
later learn) she just wanted to love and be loved by his father 
many years ago. Gunhild’s ideas about love are bound up with 
profit and possession. She adapts the avarice that drives her hus-
band in the public sphere for use in the private sphere. Ella’s 
attitude toward the young man’s dalliance with a slightly older 
local woman is blasé, romance and pleasure-seeking being the 
prerogative of the young, in her view. Gunhild, by contrast, is 
deeply threatened. Not only is Erhart frittering away his valu-
able time at dances and the like, he is also drifting into another 
woman’s sphere of influence, a woman young enough to be sex-
ually appealing but mature enough to lead him from the straight 
and narrow path Gunhild has prescribed for him. 
Before long, Ella reveals that she is not prepared to divest 
herself of her adopted son either. When she arrives at the Bork-
man’s home, it is to stake her claim not to power over Erhart but 
to his name. If he disavows the name Borkman and agrees to 
carry on the name Rentheim, then they will forever be bound 
together as mother and son, a bond Ella covets more than ever 




of Borkman, Gunhild, and Ella, but Ella’s is perhaps the most 
barren. Formerly in love with Borkman, she was rejected in fa-
vor of her sister because someone with the power to offer Bork-
man a promotion at the bank had fallen for Ella. Confronting 
Borkman, she says, “It’s ages since the two of us met […]. A 
whole lifetime between. A lifetime wasted […]. For us both.”37 
Borkman “abandoned [Ella] for higher incentives.”38
BORKMAN: I couldn’t get on without his help. And he set you 
as his price.
ELLA: And you paid the price. In full. Without a murmur.
BORKMAN: I had no choice. It was win or go under. 
ELLA: (her voice trembling, as she looks at him). Is it really 
true what you say — that I was dearest in the world to you 
then?
BORKMAN: Both then and after — long, long after.
ELLA: And still you traded me away. Bargained your right-
ful love to another man. Sold my love for a — for a bank 
presidency.39
Borkman objects to Ella’s assessment of their “wasted” lives. Per-
haps she wasted hers. She could, after all, have married the man 
who came between the two of them. And Borkman made cer-
tain that while his own family and clients’ fortunes disintegrat-
ed, she at least came out financially secure. But Ella and Bork-
man have no common vocabulary with which to productively 
discuss things like waste and necessity. “There’s no such thing as 
a sexual relationship.”40 As Borkman explains:
BORKMAN: I suppose it’s very natural for you to see this the 
way you do. You’re a woman. And so it seems, to your 
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ELLA: Yes, nothing else.
BORKMAN: Only what touches your own heart.
ELLA: Only that! Only that! Yes.
BORKMAN: But you have to remember that I’m a man. As a 
woman, to me, you were the dearest in the world. But in 
the last analysis, any woman can be replaced by another.41
Ella’s doppelgänger Gunhild ends up with the man, who doesn’t 
matter to her without the money, and Ella ends up with the 
money, which doesn’t matter to her without the man. As wom-
en, they are interchangeable and expendable. “Oh, these wom-
en!” Borkman laments, “[t]hey corrupt and distort our lives! 
They completely botch up our destinies — our paths to glory.”42 
Women distract, ensnare, draw men into a relational existence 
rather than allowing them to merely preside over their own lives 
and the lives of others. “Life is work,” Borkman tells his son, 
hoping to save him from the dangerous pull of the feminine.43 A 
familiar figure from Ibsen’s oeuvre, Borkman is an “all or noth-
ing” extremist. There can be no happy marriage of work and 
love, masculine and feminine. So he remains isolated, his emo-
tional life as much of a wasteland as those of the two women 
who loved him. As Borkman finds himself nearing death, he 
stands alone with Ella in a small clearing high in the woods. Just 
at the moment when it seems he might repent, see the error of 
his ways, tell his beloved that he was wrong to forsake her, Bork-
man instead delivers a melancholy ode to the untapped poten-
tial of his true love — rocks:
BORKMAN: I can sense them, the buried millions. I feel the 
veins of metal reaching their curving, branching, beckon-
ing arms out to me. I saw them before me like living shad-
ows — the night I stood in the bank vault with a lantern in 






set you free. But I lacked the strength for it. Your treasures 
sank back into the depths.44
So, too, have Ella’s treasures sunk back into the depths. Left 
uncultivated, her body and soul are wasted, landscapes rich in 
resources never harvested, never put to any use. But Ella was 
never looking for a return on her investment, as Gunhild was; 
Ella wanted to spend herself but found the market closed. In 
Borkman, Ibsen shows how when love and work are at odds, the 
harder of the two to quantify is often the loser. Only one cur-
rency is accepted here; the rest is waste. 
Policing Catharsis: The Passion of Politics and the Politics of Passion in Brecht
Bertolt Brecht’s expressly anti-capitalist epic theater was highly 
waste-conscious, but Brecht’s was the obverse of a dramaturgy 
of waste. Brecht instead resisted the performance principle by 
attempting to carefully regulate the economy of emotion in the 
theater. Rather than letting inflamed passions overflow or run 
to extremes as in melodrama, Brecht believed that catharsis 
was too precious a thing to waste on an aesthetic experience. 
Catharsis should rather be instrumentalized, put in service of 
altering the material abjection of the human condition. Accord-
ing to Brecht’s liberationist worldview, the basic facts of social 
reality are subject to change. Because the present conditions of 
social existence are always already the result of specific human 
actions, specific human actions can be undertaken today to will-
fully shape the conditions of social existence tomorrow.
Brecht defined his epic theater as the antithesis of Aristo-
telian tragedy, which he saw as politically enervating. The ex-
perience of catharsis purges the spectator of pity and fear, but 
for Brecht this purgation represented a waste of emotions that 
could and ought to be put to better use. Properly incited and 
channeled, pity and fear could be fomented into righteous rage 




join the revolution. Tragedy, Brecht thought, left the spectator 
drained, resigned to her fate, and prepared to tolerate even what 
ought to be intolerable. Brecht’s dramaturgy was shaped by the 
anti-fatalistic belief that the body in pain could be liberated by 
the mind, by homo faber, architect of better futures and other 
possible worlds. Brecht sought to appeal to the spectator’s intel-
lect — emotion should remain bottled up as fuel for struggles to 
come. During his lifetime, Brecht objected when his plays were 
performed in an overly emotional style, in a style that invited 
catharsis, as though each drop of incidentally spilled sentiment 
reduced the potency of his larger project. 
The irrepressibly pathos-inducing Mother Courage and Her 
Children, co-authored with Margarete Steffin, gave Brecht more 
than its fair share of trouble in this respect. Leopold Lindtberg 
helmed the 1941 premiere production, and audiences were over-
come by the sympathy they felt for the heroine, Anna Fierling, 
who loses her children one by one while roaming Europe during 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), staying alive by selling provi-
sions to soldiers of any affiliation out of a cart she drags behind 
her. Brecht thought that this empathic response demonstrated 
an inadequate exercise of the Verfremdungseffekt, or alienation 
effect, on the part of the actors and an inadequate understand-
ing of it on the part of the spectators. The ideal, Brechtian actor 
was to stand some distance apart from and comment on rather 
than be the character. Brecht frequently used humor and culti-
vated incongruity to interrupt the flow of narrative and interfere 
with emotional momentum. Suspense was to be avoided by tel-
egraphing the events of the plot using text displayed on placards 
so that audiences could focus not so much on what happened 
as on how and why it was happening. Though Brecht tried to 
make it more difficult for audiences to sympathize with Anna 
Fierling, the how and why of Mother Courage — brutal eco-
nomic necessity — has often been subsumed by the what — the 
death of the innocent. At the climax of the play, Fierling has 
only one child remaining, the mute Katrin. Katrin climbs up to 
a rooftop, begins beating a drum to warn the villagers of ap-
proaching soldiers, and is shot dead. Historically, it has proven 
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nearly impossible to stage the play’s climax without calling forth 
an emotional response.
The affective potential of the play, however, need not be seen 
as a pitfall to be avoided. In The Death of Tragedy, George Stein-
er observes that Brecht, though he would have denied it, gave 
us a new kind of tragedy, the “tragedy of waste.” In this con-
text, waste means loss, senseless destruction, meaningless suf-
fering — the waste of the capitalist system that in Brecht’s plays 
appears in human terms. Where Aristotelian tragedy generates 
pity and fear by emphasizing human helplessness — the inevi-
tability of our ultimately succumbing to forces more powerful 
than ourselves — a tragedy of waste such as Mother Courage 
presents suffering that is terrible to behold precisely because it 
is not inevitable. In a tragedy of waste, the events that produce 
the suffering are presented as avoidable, the results of human 
choices rather than divine mandate or natural law. According 
to Steiner, Mother Courage is an allegory of pure waste not only 
because the heroine loses all of her children, but because she 
learns nothing from her experience.45 There is no scene of rec-
ognition, no lamentation. The play closes with Fierling leaving 
her daughter’s body for some peasant women to bury, taking up 
her wagon again, and trundling off down the road to continue 
following the soldiers, her market, intoning, “I must get back to 
business.”46 
The “tragedy of waste” is what Steiner proposed as a possible 
survivor of what he identified as the “death of tragedy” proper 
in the Western dramatic tradition. With the West having lost 
its grasp on religious faith, Steiner argued, our culture no long-
er possesses in common an adequate shared background for 
tragedy, a shared set of myths or creeds concerning how hu-
man destiny is arbitrated by higher forces. Raymond Williams 
responds to Steiner by arguing that even if the pagan pantheons 
45 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996), 346.
46 Bertolt Brecht, Mother Courage and Her Children, trans. Eric Bentley (New 
York: Grove Press, 1955), 111.
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are in ruins and God is dead, Western peoples still share plenty 
of beliefs — the belief in the invincibility of global capitalism 
is among the most powerful. One need not be a church-going 
Protestant to endorse and strive to live by a Protestant work eth-
ic, eschewing idleness and devoting oneself to enhancing one’s 
performance, increasing one’s productivity. 
Though it is not set during wartime, Brecht’s 1943 The Good 
Person of Setzuan demonstrates that capitalist “peace” retains 
much of the violence that characterizes periods of official con-
flict. Good Person is a tragedy of waste in which the heroine 
learns something and is literally transformed by the acquisition 
of knowledge. Brecht originally intended to title the play Die 
Ware Liebe (The Product Love), reflecting his conviction that 
even love, affection, and altruism can be commodified, reter-
ritorialized by capitalism. The heroine of Good Person is Shen 
Teh, a virtuous young prostitute. The gods come to visit Shen 
Teh’s province and find that she alone has not forsaken their 
principles. Poor as she is, Shen Teh is generous and charitable, 
while greed has consumed the rest of her community. The gods 
give Shen Teh a sum of money in exchange for the hospitality 
she shows them and also to see if her virtue will hold up once 
she knows how it feels to have something to lose. Shen Teh 
buys a tobacco shop and soon finds that the more she has, the 
more her neighbors need from her. To avoid being ruinously 
exploited while struggling to manage their demands, Shen Teh 
assumes the identity of her fictional cousin, the hardheaded and 
unyielding Shui Ta, a male authority figure who has no difficulty 
saying no to those in need. She learns that capitalism loves only 
the lonely. Feminine selflessness and passionate attachment are 
liabilities Shen Teh must forsake in favor of Shui Ta’s masculine 
individualism if she is to survive. Though she has never been 
more affluent, for the first time, she is truly afraid.
A perennial problem with the scarcity mentality inculcated 
by an economics of fear is that it creates inequality from abun-
dance. A society built on fear becomes a society of anxiety once 
fear has fulfilled its function, when stability and broadly shared 
prosperity is within reach. Anxiety has no purpose or object, 
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but it cannot be reasoned away. It lingers, telling us that we are 
not safe, that we are not enough, don’t have enough, that the ca-
tastrophe is right around the corner. In Good Person, that anxi-
ety leads to the exploited becoming the exploiter. While Shui 
Ta is called into being to eliminate waste, he takes to his role 
so well that he becomes the “Tobacco King of Setzuan,” owner 
of an ever-expanding business and a factory that employs more 
than twice the lawful number of workers. Shen Teh falls in love 
with a depressed, unemployed pilot only to have him use her for 
money, get her pregnant, and abandon her. As her pregnancy 
progresses, Shen Teh struggles to conceal her femininity, even 
as the business she runs as Shui Ta becomes a more and more 
high-stakes enterprise, the pressure to perform as a hypermas-
culine taskmaster ramping ever-upwards. The transformation 
prompted by Shen Teh’s acquisition of knowledge alienates her 
from herself and ultimately leaves her crying out in vain for help 
to the sympathetic, but useless, gods. The play’s epilogue situates 
the possibility for truly revolutionary transformation in the au-
dience, asking, “[c]an the world be changed? […] You write the 
happy ending to the play! There must, there must, there’s got to 
be a way!”47 Deliberately denying the audience catharsis, Brecht 
seeks to catalyze political action with aesthetic frustration. 
Postdramatic Theater/Postideological Theater
Brechtian dramaturgy exposes the means of production to pre-
vent dramatic absorption, to train the spectator to regard the 
world outside the theater skeptically, and to furnish the specta-
tor with the basic tools of Marxist analysis. A more recent revo-
lution in Western theatrical form creates even more distance 
between theater and drama. Brechtian theater invites the spec-
tator to take a close and critical look at cause and effect, while 
what Hans-Thies Lehmann has termed “postdramatic theater” 
declines to treat narrative causation as the primary fulcrum 
47 Bertolt Brecht, The Good Woman of Setzuan, trans. Eric Bentley (New 
York: Grove Press, 1956), 141.
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of the theatrical event at all. Postdramatic theater largely does 
away with the “fictive cosmos” crucial to the coherence of much 
dramatic theater. Rather than inviting spectators to “suspend 
disbelief ” and temporarily invest in the independent reality of 
the world of the play behind the proscenium arch, postdramatic 
theater acknowledges that the theatrical event is taking place in 
time and space shared by performer and spectator, permitting 
rupture and irruptions of the real. Yet, for Lehmann, postdra-
matic theater is not a theater that exists “‘beyond’ drama, with-
out any relation to it.”48 Postdramatic theater still measures its 
distance from drama. It is still mourning and recovering from 
drama. According to Lehmann, postdramatic theater should be 
understood as “the unfolding and blossoming of a potential of 
disintegration, dismantling, and deconstruction within drama 
itself.”49
While not a unified style or movement, the work character-
ized by Lehmann as postdramatic shares a few general formal 
features. In addition to the elimination of the intact fictive cos-
mos, postdramatic theater de-hierarchizes the various theatrical 
elements that have traditionally been organized in service of the 
text. Borrowing a grammatical term, Lehmann calls this new or-
dering of things “parataxis.” Light, sound, costume, rhythm, and 
spatiality are no longer subordinated to a text as in the dramatic 
theater; they are not subordinated to anything at all, but rather 
coordinated. There is no default center, no spine. New combi-
nations of intelligences inform the composers of postdramatic 
theatrical scores.
According to Aristotle, the ideal drama should have a certain 
magnitude. A vanishingly brief drama, like an infinitesimally 
small creature in nature, lacks the duration or dimension to be 
properly beheld. On the other hand, a drama that is too long 
and sprawling cannot be embraced by the mind of the specta-
tor; the unity of the whole escapes us. “Beauty,” Aristotle tells us, 
48 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby 




“is a matter of size and order.”50 Postdramatic theater strives for 
something other than that which Aristotle, advocate of modera-
tion in all things, would have found beautiful. In postdramatic 
theater, “[t]here is either too much or too little.”51 Postdramatic 
theater tends to inundate and withhold, sometimes simultane-
ously. It runs to the extremes of form, “the wasteland of unseiz-
able extension and labyrinthine chaotic accumulation.”52 
These approaches dispel passive, total absorption and de-
mand a different type of engagement from spectators. In psy-
choanalysis, Lehmann tells us, the term “evenly hovering at-
tention” is used to characterize the way the analyst listens to 
the analysand.53 This is the kind of attention that postdramatic 
theater requires. The dramatic theater, particularly of the tidily 
packaged, Scribean variety, sought to delight, to ingratiate itself 
with the spectator. The dramatic theater was an efficient em-
ployee, but the postdramatic theater is a frequently uncoopera-
tive analysand, structurally selfish, needy, and often ultimately 
unknowable. An unusual amount of patience may be required 
with this patient. In the psychoanalytic context, “everything de-
pends on not understanding immediately.” Like the analyst’s, the 
postdramatic spectator’s perception must “remain open for con-
nections, correspondences and clues at completely unexpected 
moments, perhaps casting what was said earlier in a completely 
new light.”54 Meaning is deferred, perhaps indefinitely. 
In psychoanalysis, a session might be quiet and uneventful, 
with a recalcitrant patient offering only a cough here or a twitch 
there to give the analyst anything to go on. In another session, a 
patient might release a torrent of memories or tears or recrimi-
nations. Similarly, in the postdramatic theater, the density and 
intensity of signs may vary. The performance may try to seduce, 
disorient, repel, or remain aloof, but the spectator must do the 
50 Aristotle, On Poetry and Style, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1989), 16.






work of determining what is of import. Postdramatic theater, 
like psychoanalysis and the psyche itself, is inefficient. It gener-
ates a great deal of apparent waste in the form of either excessive 
stimuli or empty, underutilized time and space. Of course, in 
the theater, nothing is really wasted. The theater’s prodigiously 
wasteful economy of meaning can only be possible, and ethi-
cal, because time and space, the theater’s basic ingredients, are 
infinitely renewable resources — our only infinitely renewable 
resources.
Wallace Shawn’s Predramatic/Postdramatic Soliloquies
Wallace Shawn’s monologue-driven plays present a paradox 
of classification; they can be understood as either pre-or post-
dramatic. Lehmann’s precursor Peter Szondi saw postdramatic 
theater arising out of a crisis of the dialogic form, a crisis of 
confidence in the ability of the human subject to communicate 
its content in language. Lehmann noted that in postdramatic 
theater, monological and choral structures come to supersede 
dialogical structures. Shawn’s The Fever exists in this postdra-
matic space while simultaneously harkening back to the earliest 
theatrical artifacts of Western civilization, notably Prometheus 
Bound. The Fever’s action, such as it is, is narrated, not drama-
tized. It toys, however, with eliminating the fictive cosmos, al-
lowing Shawn to give voice to his own actual beliefs about his 
own actual class. 
When Shawn first staged it in 1990, he chose to perform 
The Fever in private apartments rather than in a theater, and he 
chose to perform the sole role himself. He hoped to avoid mak-
ing something that would be consumed as mere entertainment 
and to allow the theatrical event to be consumed by the real. 
Shawn has explained, “I’m trying to TELL somebody something 
that I MEAN. And you can’t do that in a theater, because if you 
put a person on stage in a theater, that person will be interpreted 
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as a character in a story.”55 The Fever has since been performed by 
other actors, but the sole speaker is unmistakably Shawn, scion 
of Manhattan literati, educated at Harvard and Oxford, connois-
seur of the finer things in life. In The Fever, he reports that his 
hitherto pleasant, privileged life begins to putrefy after he reads 
Marx, which he does “at the very same time that Communism 
had finally died.”56 Referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which 
took place just a few months before the first performances of 
The Fever, Shawn also here invokes “The End of History,” the 
essay in which Francis Fukuyama announced that the end of 
the Cold War presaged more than the end of a particular era 
of geopolitical conflict but of the end of history itself. “We may 
be witnessing,” Fukuyama wrote, “the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.”57 With the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama believed, the Western lib-
eral democratic model stands alone and vindicated because “the 
class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West.”58
The Fever questions this conclusion. The play begins as an 
account of the scales falling from its speaker’s eyes. A devoted 
lifelong student of his own thoughts and feelings — those things 
that make the speaker, he believes, an individual and an ethi-
cally solvent human being — the speaker has missed the obvi-
ous. More than his particular taste in classical music, relation-
ships with intriguing friends and cherished family, or opinions 
about politics, it is his class that makes him who he is. It is his 
class that has made it possible for him to grow up believing that 
things like his taste and opinions are special or significant at all. 
Because, as Shawn has said, “America has a blind spot on the 
issue of money and class,” in The Fever, everything but class falls 
55 Wallace Shawn, “The Art of Theater No. 17,” interviewed by Hilton Als, 
The Paris Review 201 (summer 2012), https://www.theparisreview.org/
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away. People are reduced to their class privilege, or lack thereof, 
and it becomes impossible to ignore the issue.
When the speaker of The Fever begins to become aware of 
the relationship between his pleasure and the pain of the poor 
both in his own city and in far-flung beleaguered nations con-
vulsed by revolution, he becomes afflicted by constant, vio-
lent nausea. The play begins with the speaker lurching to the 
bathroom to kneel before the toilet. He has recently received, 
as an anonymous gift, a copy of Marx’s Capital. Soon after, he 
visits a series of poor countries, where at first he cannot help 
romanticizing, aestheticizing them. He eats the ice cream that 
the wealthy people of the countries eat in glittering restaurants 
while the poor rebels are raped and tortured out of sight. One 
day, the ice cream he had been inhaling with such relish begins 
to taste bland and unappetizing. His enjoyment is gone. “I’d al-
ways said,” the speaker reflects, “‘I’m a happy person. I love life,’ 
but now there was a sort of awful indifference or blankness that 
was coming from somewhere inside me and filling me up, bit 
by bit. Things that would once have delighted me or cheered me 
seemed to go dead on me, to spoil.”59 The depression persists.
As is often the case in Shawn’s work, the body and the mind 
are not fully synchronized. The speaker is plagued by physical 
torments long before he is able to understand what is rotten on 
an intellectual or sociopolitical level. Over the course of the play, 
he confronts a chambermaid who sleeps in filth and Marxist 
revolutionaries imprisoned or murdered for their convictions, 
along with other human refuse of global capitalism. These en-
counters force the speaker to confront the fact that he is directly 
responsible for these people and has in fact produced them. His 
fate and the chambermaid’s are linked. Her existence, the filth 
she sleeps in, her ignorance and poverty are the cost of his pros-
perity. He does not own the factories. He does not set wages or 
determine the length of the working day. But his habits of con-
sumption alone render him culpable, “the end of history” not-
withstanding. “[W]e can’t escape our connection to the poor,” 
59 Shawn, The Fever, 26.
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the speaker says, because “[w]ithout the poor to get the fruit 
off the trees, to tend the excrement under the ground, to bathe 
our babies on the day they’re born, we couldn’t exist. Without 
the poor to do awful work, we would spend our lives doing aw-
ful work.”60 For Shawn, because capitalism has not liberated the 
chambermaid, capitalism has not been vindicated. The Fever 
poses a challenge to Fukuyama’s post-ideological narrative of 
world history, suggesting that ideology is most insidious when 
invisible, when we allow ourselves to be persuaded that we are 
“post” as in “beyond” rather than “post” as in “recovering from.” 
Shawn grapples with the consequences of global capitalism by 
presenting violent parables of inequality that make ideology’s 
presence in our lives starkly visible once again. 
In Marxian terms, ideology creates false consciousness, 
blinding us to the relationship between the commodities we 
purchase on the market and the exploitation of the laborers that 
produced them. “Ideology” as Althusser elaborates, “has a ma-
terial existence,” a self-reinforcing apparatus comprised of our 
actions and conventional behaviors.61 The sudden illness and 
disaffection of The Fever’s speaker can be read as a rupture in 
the fabric of this apparatus. The unraveling begins when he finds 
that he can no longer make the gestures of the good bourgeois. 
For Althusser, ideology does not, as Marx believed, simply cover 
up “the real.” Rather, “[i]deology represents the imaginary rela-
tionship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”62 
Following Lacan, Althusser understands our relationship to ide-
ology as always already bounded by language, something we can 
observe in Shawn’s internally riven monologue. The speaker is 
constituted by his capacity (and incapacity) to explain himself to 
himself, to his imagined interlocutors, and first his own friends 
in their apartments in the early 1990s performances, which 
60 Ibid., 49.
61 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben 




Shawn has described as “like a secret meeting of the bourgeois 
class, in which I would speak frankly about what we were.”63 
A plot can be teased out of The Fever, but the play is main-
ly one long scene of recognition, an unexplained awakening. 
Marx’s Capital comes out of nowhere and goes to work not on 
an intellectual level but as an emetic. Everything is as it was, yet 
suddenly everything is transfigured. Suddenly, everything is in-
tolerable. There is no event, only knowledge. The postdramatic 
theatricality of The Fever, however, lies in the impossibility of 
the self coinciding with itself, and the impossibility of the bour-
geois self seeing itself, let alone changing itself. Describing the 
experience of attending a dinner party in a posh quarter of a city 
much like New York, Shawn’s speaker broods over a distinction 
he would not have been aware of before his awakening. He expe-
riences himself as a person thinking about a dinner party, think-
ing about the complicated feelings he has about the party, about 
how he likes some of the people, but not others, likes the center-
piece, but not that woman’s dress. “But no,” he corrects himself, 
“[n]o. I see it so clearly. I see myself with my little fork — I wasn’t 
a person who was thinking about a party. I was a person who 
was at a party, who sat at the table, drank the wine and ate the 
fish.”64 The person thinking about the party is comprehensible, 
complicated, sympathetic. The person at the party is a George-
Grosz caricature of a blasé, cigar-smoking capitalist. The two 
cannot be reconciled, just as the contradictions of the speaker’s 
life, of all our lives under capitalism cannot be reconciled. The 
things he loves, the things he lives for, are the same things that 
make him, him and every member of his class, a murderer and a 
destroyer of human dignity. There is no reason why he deserves 
what he has or why the chambermaid deserves her lot, and eve-
ry day he holds onto what he has, his guilt grows. “Keeping the 
money is just a choice I’m making, a choice I’m making every 
day.”65 He could make another choice, the speaker reflects. Why 
63 Shawn “The Art of Theater No. 17.”




not give everything away? If people are starving, give them food. 
Until one is starving oneself, there is no other defensible choice. 
But the speaker knows he will never make this choice. “The life 
I live is irredeemably corrupt,” he finally concludes, “[i]t has no 
justification.”66 
If this was Brecht, such recognition would prompt a demand 
for change, but The Fever ends with the newly awakened speak-
er going back to sleep, choosing private shame over public ac-
tion. The Fever is a peculiar kind of tragedy of waste because 
the knowledge acquired by the protagonist is wasted, not acted 
upon. He learns something. He even cares. He is sickened by his 
knowledge. But Shawn takes a bracingly cynical view of such 
isolating, unactionable, liberal guilt. There is nothing ennobling 
about merely feeling bad for the poor or about merely recogniz-
ing that the life one lives is irredeemably corrupt. It is only hon-
est, another expression of the privileged, twentieth-century per-
son’s narcissistic obsession with self-knowledge. The contained, 
monologic form of The Fever reflects the solipsism of not only a 
post-ideological but a post-social world. “There is no such thing 
as society.” Without class consciousness, when the collective 
ceases to exist in the imaginary of the people, collective action 
becomes impossible, leaving only impotent, misdirected, indi-
vidual actors presiding over kingdoms of one. 
This civic atomization is explored more exhaustively in 
Shawn’s plays featuring multiple characters telling different 
versions of the same story. Evening at the Talk House, Shawn’s 
2015 play on themes similar to those of The Fever, takes place 
in a post-ideological world that has so thoroughly inoculated 
itself against conceiving of any alternative to capitalism that it 
is no longer necessary to keep capitalism’s violence entirely hid-
den from view or fully banned from polite conversation. In the 
twenty-first century, it is possible for capitalism to go essentially 
unchallenged, even when fewer and fewer of those who once 
benefited from the inequalities that capitalism produces are 




birthright, without committing atrocities with their own bare 
hands. Talk House is both a dark fantasia on the emerging gig 
economy and a referendum on the state of theatrical art, ironi-
cally reverting to a more tame, naturalistic dramaturgy even as 
Shawn is suggesting that as goes the theater, so goes civilization. 
The demise of this communal art form is imagined as a symp-
tom, or even cause, of a decadent society’s descent into barba-
rism. Talk House takes place in the once-tony private club of 
the play’s title, a favorite haunt of theater folk back when that 
endangered species roamed free. A group of them have reunit-
ed to commemorate the ten-year anniversary of a production 
they worked on together, a highlight in many of their lives. The 
fortunes of those assembled have risen and fallen unevenly in 
the ensuing years, but they quickly settle back into familiar hab-
its, trading showbiz snark and memories of the good old days. 
There is some perfunctory talk about politics, and while certain 
irregular details, such as the fact that elections are now held eve-
ry few months though one of the same two candidates always 
wins, may cause us to prick up our ears, they are not treated as 
cause for alarm.
Portents of darker developments emerge when the conver-
sation turns to how these erstwhile artists have been scraping 
together a living now that the theater no longer keeps them in 
Scotch and hors d’oeuvres. The playwright Robert and leading 
man Tom have found a measure of success working in televi-
sion, while the composer Ted and costume designer Annette 
eventually admit that they have had to take on some freelance 
work doing “targeting” for the government to supplement their 
more meager incomes.
“Targeting,” Annette insists repeatedly, is “a very simple me-
chanical process” that happens to involve identifying individu-
als destined for elimination under the state Program of Murder-
ing.67 While everyone is aware of the existence of this program, 
those whose financial circumstances have insulated them from 
67 Wallace Shawn, Evening at the Talk House (New York: Theatre 
Communications Group, 2017), 40.
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its practical operations are rather shocked to discover that their 
friends are involved in such things. Annette defends her work 
and the regular paycheck it guarantees. “I study lists of people 
and decide who has to be killed,” she explains. “Like half the 
people I know,” Ted adds.68 The murder program might be dis-
tasteful, and is for that reason handled secretly, but it is a neces-
sary evil. Annette likens dropping bombs onto people to politely 
excusing oneself from a meal and “dropping some waste into 
the toilet.”69 It isn’t the done thing to raise such topics in mixed 
company, but no one denies that they are a part of life.
That this all remains fairly abstract for most people is what 
makes it possible for the program to exist, but the specter so-
lidifies when formerly beloved actor Dick (played by Shawn 
in the 2017 US premiere) unexpectedly intrudes on their little 
party sporting a badly bruised face. He has been beaten by his 
“friends,” a warning issued for expressing unspecified objection-
able opinions, and the gossip he has to contribute has to do with 
mutual acquaintances who have recently dropped dead at din-
ner, their drinks poisoned by friends in another offshoot of the 
murder program. Before the Evening at the Talk House is out, 
another life will be claimed in this manner.
How have things reached this point? Where is the resistance? 
Tom, who hobnobs with the most powerful politicians in the 
country describes them all as very “nice.”70 The other guests are 
only concerned with their own comfort and safety. And televi-
sion ratings. When Jane, a young waitress, shares that she spent 
time in Nigeria doing some of the murder program’s actual mur-
dering, it is remarked that Robert’s show isn’t at all successful in 
Nigeria, and the conversation turns to regional tastes in frothy, 
prime-time offerings. In an introductory soliloquy, Robert ad-
mits that he does not really miss the theater, which after all is 






ing at another small group of humans.”71 This reductive, but not 
entirely inaccurate, definition sums up much of what is chal-
lenging about the theater, what makes it both vital and easily 
dismissed. It is most often a small-scale operation with a tiny 
reach compared with film and television. It asks for the sort of 
sustained and intense attention that makes intimacy possible. It 
insists on singularity — that of a character trapped in a particu-
lar set of circumstances, a director’s idiosyncratic way with time 
and space, or a performer whose heart was pounding a little 
harder on Friday than on Saturday. It also insists on community, 
however provisional. We make plays in groups, gather to watch 
them in groups. Deep knowledge of the other traverses the psy-
chic space between collaborators, and ideally a similar exchange 
traverses the proscenium. Annette says that she divides her life 
in two: life before the group’s last play together, when her world 
was shaped by the relationships she cultivated as a theater art-
ist, and life after. Now she sews alone in her apartment doing 
piecework for wealthy clients. She also does targeting. Society 
becomes possible when individuals gather together to engage 
in a wasteful communion. The new scarcity mentality precludes 
such rites. In Talk House, we see social isolation and economic 
precarity engendering a bourgeoning underclass of contract 
killers, and we see that the theater will not save us. No, even and 
especially in the West, the class issue has not actually been suc-
cessfully resolved. 
Elfriede Jelinek, Regietheater, and the Disposable Text
Scholars of postdramatic theater often emphasize the postdra-
matic’s deprivileging of the text, but the Austrian playwright El-
friede Jelinek’s plays present the special case of the fully realized, 
postdramatic text. Jelinek’s earliest texts for the theater were 
scripts, blueprints for productions. They designated charac-
ters and dialogue and provided stage directions indicating how 




with action. In their relatively conventional form, plays such as 
Clara S. (1982), Illness or Modern Women (1987), and Services 
(1994) retain readily discernible relationships to narrative cau-
sation even though each veers into grotesquerie, with women 
transforming into vampires in Illness and an orgy punched up 
with bestiality taking over the stage in Services. In these texts, 
though she does not direct her own work, Jelinek took respon-
sibility for the mise-en-scène of her plays. She would establish 
a passably naturalistic situation and then, over the course of the 
play, turn it inside-out, rendering latent violence and sexuality 
manifest. Even in her early plays she always leaves the seams of 
language showing — characters wear their speech like ill-fitting 
suits — and this obvious incongruity invites performances that 
exploit the uneasiness of the speaker’s singular physical pres-
ence trapped inside a prêt-à-porter vocabulary.
In the German-speaking theater world, however, directors in 
the Regietheater (“director’s theater”) tradition are the ones who 
typically take responsibility for ripping plays apart. Jelinek’s texts 
have contributed significantly to tutoring the current generation 
of major directors in this approach.72 Regietheater is known for 
aggressive interpretations.73 Radical cuts, interpolations, trans-
positions of time and place, and a disregard for the type and 
number of performers specified by the playwright are all com-
monplace in the Regietheater tradition. This lack of deference 
to authorial intent and the text itself is distasteful to some, but 
far from objecting to interventionist approaches to her texts, 
Jelinek has perhaps uniquely relished tussling with her direc-
tors or co-authors. In 1995, the German director Frank Castorf 
staged a version of Services which closed with a staged viola-
tion of the body of the author herself — a caricature of Jelinek 
as a huge, mechanical, sex doll, complete with blinking nipples 
and genitalia, took the stage and mumbled incomprehensibly 
72 Gitta Honneger, “Introduction” to Elfriede Jelinek, Rechnitz and The 
Merchant’s Contracts, trans. Gitta Honneger (New York: Seagull Books, 
2015), 2.
73 Karen Jürs-Munby, “Foreword” to Elfriede Jelinek, Sports Play, trans. 
Penny Black (London: Oberon Books, 2012), 30.
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for ten minutes, at once crudely sexualizing Jelinek and making 
a mockery of the long, digressive, monologic form of her texts. 
Jelinek approved. Though the choice was offensive, she said, it 
was absolutely the correct one for the play.
Embracing the fact that, within the Regietheater tradition, 
her texts were bound to be (ab)used as pretexts for the vision of 
a director, Jelinek began leaving her plays more and more open. 
Beginning with Sports Play in 1998, her prefatory stage direc-
tions have been exceedingly minimal and, in tone, ironically 
resigned to being ignored. “The author doesn’t give many stage 
directions, she has learned her lesson by now. Do what you like,” 
read Sports Play’s.74 In her 2002 “Princess Play,” Jackie, her initial 
proposal for a mise-en-scène is followed by the sardonic coda: 
“But I’m sure you’ll think of something completely different.”75 
The description of the opening tableau for her 2008 Rechnitz 
concludes more amiably with: “Of course, it can also be done 
completely differently, as always with my plays.”76 For her 2009 
The Merchant’s Contracts she is particularly blasé: “The text can 
start and stop anywhere at random. It doesn’t matter how it is 
staged… whatever…”77 Opening stage directions for her 2003 
Bambiland are comically ornery: 
I don’t know I don’t know. Just stick a knit stocking cap on it, 
the kind with a tassel on top like my dad used to wear with his 
old overalls while building our little single-family home. Never 
seen anything uglier than that. I don’t know what kind of crime 
you’d have to commit or sentence you’d have to get to get stuck 
wearing something that ugly on your head. Cut off a knit stock-
ing, tie it off at the top to form a sort of pom-pom, and stick it 
on your head. That’s that.78
74 Jelinek, Sports Play, 39.
75 Elfriede Jelinek, Princess Plays: Jackie, Theater 36, no. 2 (2006): 53.
76 Jelinek, Rechnitz and The Merchant’s Contracts, 64.
77 Ibid., 176.
78 Elfriede Jelinek, Bambiland, Theater 39, no. 3 (2009): 111.
64
WASTE
She sounds as though she has just been asked for guidance by an 
incompetent costume designer who has been pestering her for 
hints all morning. The answer she gives is characteristically con-
founding. Willfully obscure, saying too little of what is neces-
sary to efficiently convey meaning and too much of what seems 
extraneous, opaque, inappropriately autobiographical, and glib. 
“Like my dad used to wear” does not provide the director or 
reader with an objective description or image of any kind. It is a 
hopelessly personal association. The author’s affect overwhelms 
her content. Communication is subordinated to attitude.
In each of these cases, Jelinek is at once provoking directors, 
confronting them with a challenge, and surrendering to their 
authority. She provokes by writing texts that are often literally 
unstageable as written. Too long, too formless, and too impen-
etrable, her texts for the theater have been called “language 
planes” (Textflächen). “Since the drama in her texts does not 
unfold in the action,” her frequent translator Gitta Honegger 
writes, “but is buried in the language itself — quotes from liter-
ary and philosophical canons, from historical sources, popular 
culture, political speak, and the Web — it is up to the directors of 
Jelinek’s plays to cull the narrative they will stage from the 150-
odd pages of texts.”79 This type of challenge also presents enor-
mous opportunities; a director has a great deal of leeway when 
it comes to determining what in the text they would like to em-
phasize or deemphasize, criticize, mock, ignore, or cut (indeed, 
in most cases, they must cut simply to wrestle a piece down to 
a manageable scale. Einer Schleef ’s landmark 1998 production 
of Sports Play included 142 performers and lasted seven hours, 
an undertaking that very few theaters would have the resources 
to support. Regarding the necessity of imposing cuts on a Je-
linek play, the director Nicholas Stemann once said that “[y]ou 
don’t cut it with a pencil as with other theatre texts where you 
may draw some lines. No, with Jelinek’s texts you have to cut 
with a machete [einer Schleef]!”80 While the notion of the “open” 
79 Honegger, “Introduction,” 2.
80 Quoted in Jürs-Munby, “Foreword,” 33.
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or porous text for the stage has become more and more ubiq-
uitous and accepted, especially in the German-speaking area, 
Jelinek goes even further in her willingness to allow her texts 
to be treated as assemblages of waste, where nothing is deemed 
essential, no constituent part of a text deemed more important 
than any other. Chop them up and cast aside hours’ worth of 
material and so long as the texture of her texts remains, they 
still accomplish the work of imaginative resistance that they 
were designed to do, offering themselves up as metaphors for 
the very culture of overconsumption and disposability in which 
they were produced. 
The Merchant’s Contracts: Shoveling Shit
Where Shawn’s vision of late capitalism is one of violence per-
petuated by depression, Jelinek’s is one of violence perpetu-
ated by desire. In her “Comedy of Economics,” The Merchant’s 
Contracts, Jelinek takes on modern finance capitalism, where 
capital’s movements need not be tethered to anything so twen-
tieth-century mundane as the production of goods. Capital can 
now exist in a state of near-total abstraction aided by, as Fre-
dric Jameson points out, “the intensification of communications 
technology to the point at which capital transfers today abolish 
space and time, virtually instantaneously effectuated across na-
tional spaces.”81 Contracts was written in response to an Austrian 
scandal. The unscrupulous investment practices of two trusted 
Austrian financial institutions led to many small investors los-
ing their life savings. The script was completed just a few weeks 
before Lehman Brothers in the US filed for bankruptcy in 2008, 
setting off the global financial crisis and instantly enhancing the 
resonance of Jelinek’s text. “In the age of global economy,” as 
Honegger puts it, “Jelinek turned the merchant of Vienna into a 
universal comedy of errors.”82
81 Fredric Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 
(1997): 252.
82 Honegger, “Introduction,” 20.
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Necessity seemed to demand leaving Contracts more open 
than any Jelinek text to date, given the events rapidly unfolding 
in the financial sector and around the world. Director Nicholas 
Stemann developed an open-ended dramaturgy that allowed for 
the interweaving of up-to-the minute topical material so that the 
production could keep up with cascading current events. In the 
main section of the text, which Jelinek titles “The Real Thing,” 
money and those who possess the mystical power to make more 
of it, to make something from nothing, are repeatedly referred 
to as “doing God’s work.” For the 2009 premiere in Cologne, 
Jelinek wrote an epilogue taking into account the Lehman 
Brothers debacle in which she portrays speculative capitalism 
run amok, “Capitalism as Dionysus.”83 This is a different kind of 
god, a god of excess, a god who gives his blessing to those who 
risk much and lose control. “Capitalism is the only power we 
must acknowledge,” the bacchants/investors intone, “[w]e don’t 
exist without it. How else should we distinguish ourselves from 
the other? How else to use ourselves as weapons? Wouldn’t that 
mean even more violence? That without capitalism we would 
not be?”84 He moves in mysterious ways.
In subsequent productions of Contracts, different cuts, addi-
tions, and rearrangements continued to be made as the effects 
of the churning economic catastrophe continued to ripple out. 
Though the uncut text clocked in at over five hours, Stemann 
decided to make only minimal cuts. Given the staggering vol-
ume of text and the incessant revisions, actors performed with 
scripts in hand and Stemann himself directing traffic onstage. 
Sections of text were delivered at a frenetic, sometimes incom-
prehensible pace, sometimes overlapping, and in a variety of 
conflicting styles. “If it is impossible to grasp the entire text this 
way,” Honegger writes, “its frantic performance reflects the de-
gree society is able (or unable) to absorb the onslaught of stock 
market lingo (an unintelligible language for most).”85
83 Jelinek, Rechnitz and The Merchant’s Contracts, 285.
84 Ibid. 
85 Honegger, “Introduction,” 29.
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 It was to be assumed that much of the language would re-
main inaccessible to audiences, that it would be thrown away, 
wasted from a syntactical point of view, from the standpoint of 
efficient communication. As Honegger rightly points out, the 
highly specialized jargon of the financial industry is impenetra-
ble to most. The financial services sector depends on this jar-
gon alienating laymen, making them feel intimidated enough to 
turn their portfolio over to a wealth manager or their taxes over 
to an accountant. Intimidating inscrutability is good for busi-
ness — without it, few would be willing to pay a fee to someone 
who knows how to navigate the thicket and promises to score 
their client a good deal. The Textflächen of finance contribute to 
enormous discrepancies between top insiders and those whose 
money they play with. The voices in Contracts rise and fall be-
tween the small investors for whom a nest egg meant a liveli-
hood, a home, retirement and the speculators for whom the 
small investors are just another abstraction, like money. People 
don’t work. Money works. You are only as valuable as the capital 
you are willing to part with, so that your money can work for 
other people. 
One of the local scandals that inspired Contracts concerned 
the beleaguered Bank for Labor and Business, which belonged 
to the Austrian Labor Union but was purchased by an American 
company, Cerberus Capital Management, after coming close to 
collapse. This gave Jelinek a useful associative starting point. 
In Greek mythology, Cerberus is the three-headed hound that 
guards the gates of the underworld for his master, Hades. Cap-
turing Cerberus was the last of the twelve labors of Hercules, 
which he was pressed to perform in order to atone for murder-
ing his wife and children in a fit of madness. The financial crisis 
produced an Austrian echo of this fabled horror as well, and 
Jelinek duly appropriated it. In 2008 a Viennese public relations 
manager who had lost all his family’s money in toxic stocks pur-
chased an axe. He killed his wife and seven-year-old daughter, 
then drove to a neighboring town, killed his parents, then drove 
to another town and killed his father-in-law. He planned to kill 
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himself but lost his nerve after realizing that it took at least thir-
teen blows of the axe for each of his victims to expire.86 
But Jelinek does not organize the text around the capture of 
Cerberus or around the little guy who has been duped by the 
powerful exacting his revenge against all odds. Jelinek focuses 
on the fifth labor, when Hercules was sent to King Augeas, own-
er of more cattle than anyone in Greece, and told that he had to 
clean the king’s stables in a single day. Hercules told the king that 
he would perform this amazing feat if Augeas would give him 
one tenth of his precious cattle. Certain that what Hercules had 
proposed couldn’t be done, King Augeas agreed. Hercules tore 
great openings in opposite walls of the stables, dug wide trench-
es to two nearby rivers, redirecting them so that they flowed 
through the stables, flushing out all the animal waste. Though 
he had succeeded, cleaning the Augean stables was deemed not 
to “count,” because Hercules had accepted payment for his labor. 
In Contracts, the shit is debt, the buying and selling and 
leveraging of which has come to undergird much of modern 
finance. For a performance in 2010, Jelinek wrote another epi-
logue titled “You Bet! (A Sequel)” in a which a figure designated 
as “I or Another Animal” celebrates: “Isn’t that dandy, some-
thing is coming from nothing […]. The shit’s coming too, there 
it is, it always comes.”87 While the financiers are moving vast 
amounts of imaginary money around at dizzying speeds, the 
subprime mortgage crisis hits, and real people who bet on their 
real homes find that everything they thought they had is worth-
less. “[T]hat’s only human that debts turn into shit, that every-
thing turns into shit, that most of all money turns into shit, that 
money already IS shit before it’s even there, but it’s never there 
when it’s needed.”88 
86 “Lebenslange Haft für fünffachen Axtmörder” [“Life Sentence for Five-
Time Ax Murderer”], Spiegel Online, November 7, 2008, https://www.
spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/wien-lebenslange-haft-fuer-fuenffachen-
axtmoerder-a-589185.html.




In Contracts the shit keeps piling up, debt that suddenly no 
one can profit from, but in a further, grotesque twist, Jelinek has 
the sewer system that is the Augean stables that is the global 
debt market mortgaged, itself held hostage now that even the 
callous creditors have seen their money disappear. Finally, no 
one gets bailed out. There is not enough liquidity, only constipa-
tion:
Okay, it would have to pay, if the owner of the shit process-
ing plant would have to pay, but he doesn’t have to either, he 
has to take a shit, but he doesn’t have to pay. We all have to 
shit, but no one wants to pay for it and no one has to, if he’s 
already taken his shit and making a shitload, he doesn’t have 
to take any more shit, he won’t poop or pay, it’s been paid for, 
it paid for itself, and now no one will pay.89
Jelinek’s comedy of economics has antecedents in the simpler, 
more straightforwardly scatological fare that dominated the 
Parisian boulevards when mercantilism still represented a rel-
atively new world order. A short 1756 farce by Thomas-Simon 
Gueullette titled “The Shit Merchant” shows a Harlequin figure 
tricking the naïf Gilles into believing that he can make a kill-
ing selling his own excrement. Desperate for cash, Gilles makes 
a spectacle of himself touting this allegedly hot commodity 
around the fairground, crying, “[w]ho wants my shit? Money 
for my shit! It’s fresh.”90 Gilles is a figure of ridicule, but he is also 
tragic, in Artaud’s sense, reduced to the most basic and base of 
human functions. “There where it smells of shit,” Artaud writes, 
“it smells of being.”91 Must eat to shit. Must shit to eat. Capital-
ism, however complex, reveals itself in Gueullete’s burlesque to 
be modeled on this very cycle of abjection and incorporation. 
89 Ibid., 304.
90 Thomas-Simon Gueullette, “Le Marchand du Merde,” in Théatre des 
boulevards, ou Recueil de parades, ed. A. Mahon (Paris: De l’imprimerie de 
Gilles Langlois, 1756), 255. Translation mine.
91 Antonin Artaud, Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 559.
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In Jelinek’s play, “streams of capital and shit” are said to flow 
together indistinguishably. Few can separate them. Most drink 
from the wrong source and get poisoned. 
Only an elite, priestly caste can decipher the signs of collapse 
or revival; they are said to be able to read the language of God. 
In Contracts a number of Angels answer the lamentations of a 
chorus of small investors. The Angel of Justice begins to ser-
monize: “[l]abor is the source of all wealth and all culture,” she 
says, “and since profitable labor is only possible in society and 
through society, the yield of labor belongs wholly, with equal 
rights for all, to all members of society.”92 But she loses faith in 
her message half way through her speech: “None of this is true, 
not true, any of it, none of it true […]?”93 Since “wealth” has 
become an unrecognizable category, some fluctuating combina-
tion of toxic debt and abstract credit, “growth” comes to replace 
the old markers of stability and prosperity. More angels inter-
cede to palliate the Angel of Justice’s socialist logic with a ring-
ing, triumphalist battle hymn of neoliberalism:
Those are the essences, those are the essentials of a truly free 
country, all our freedoms depend upon this freedom. We 
want a totally free economy, not only because it guarantees 
freedoms, but because it is the best way to create wealth and 
prosperity for the entire country, for Europe, for the coun-
try which has our name and is us! Wealth is the single re-
source for our growth, no, for your growth, no, for every-
one’s growth, for wealth in itself is thriving, but only when it 
grows, when it increases, when it grows, right, no? Right!94
While this seraphic choir sings of eternal glory, its appearance, 
as in the Book of Revelation, is a harbinger of the apocalypse. 






War: Abjection and Oblivion 
Georges Bataille interprets the first artistic gesture as an apol-
ogy for human existence. Much of human endeavor can be un-
derstood as an extension of that impulse. Through successive 
ages of imperialism, it has appeared as though Western man’s 
greatest ambition was dominion over all things, but our present 
model of suicide capitalism suggests that the goal of ever-accel-
erating growth has always been to spend ourselves as quickly as 
possible, to destroy ourselves and cease to be. 
Before Freud accepted the death drive, he saw most self-gen-
erated impediments to human pleasure-seeking as perversions. 
These developmental detours yielded types of pleasure that ex-
isted outside normative or efficient economies of pleasure pro-
duction. Freud believed that childhood anal eroticism, a fixa-
tion on the giving or withholding of one’s waste products, could 
help explain the formation of neurotic adult personality charac-
teristics. During the anal stage of psychosexual development, a 
child prone to erotic stimulation of the anal zone may display a 
tendency to obstinately hold back his waste, sometimes waiting 
to empty his bowels until doing so will cause maximum incon-
venience for his caretaker. In this early phase of life, this exercise 
of control is one of the few available to the child. In exerting 
control over his physiological functions, the child rehearses the 
control he will later seek to exercise over other areas of his life. 
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“The contents of the bowels,” Freud says, are “treated as part of 
the infant’s own body and represent his first ‘gift:’ by producing 
them he can express his active compliance with his environment 
and, by withholding them, his disobedience.”1 The child uses 
the (mis)management of his waste products as an instrument 
of perverse control, but also identifies himself with those very 
waste products. His waste represents his first opportunity to ex-
ercise his will, to assert himself as homo faber. It is his first expe-
rience of power, both as an autonomous agent with the ability to 
refuse and as a creator of a thing of value, albeit of dubious val-
ue — Freud points out that gold, or mammon, has since archaic 
times appeared as allied with, or as a stand-in for, the feces of 
the devil. Freud also speculates that it may be “the contrast be-
tween the most precious substance known to men and the most 
worthless, which they reject as waste matter (‘refuse’),[that] has 
led to [the] identification of gold with faeces.”2 According to 
Freud, anality comes to shape the adult personality in an un-
healthy way when the child emerges from his negotiation with 
the conflicts presented during the toilet-training phase with ei-
ther anal-retentive or anal-expulsive tendencies, either too par-
simonious or overly unregulated in his behavior. It is the con-
flict itself, however, that is formative — man comes to esteem 
himself first through denial and abasement, through a confron-
tation with himself as a creator of that which is vile. 
Julia Kristeva reads this primal gift-giving as the archetypi-
cal site of abjection, the process of constructing identity via the 
casting-off of that which is considered so repugnant or intoler-
able that its proximity infringes on the subject’s sense of self, 
threatening dissolution and incoherence. “What is abject,” she 
writes, “is not my correlative, which, providing me with some-
one or something else as support, would allow me to be more 
or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only one qual-
1 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, ed. and trans. 
James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 52.
2 Sigmund Freud, “Character and Anal Eroticism,” in The Freud Reader, ed. 
Peter Gay, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton & Co., 1989), 297.
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ity of the object — that of being opposed to I.”3 Abjection plays 
a critical role in ego-formation on both the individual and the 
cultural levels. We abject various racial, religious, and sexual 
others to shore up the integrity of the unmarked I. Those con-
strued as waste products are not discarded, but rather must re-
main present in the imaginary as crucial to personal or cultural 
integrity. This integrity is contingent on boundaries, division, 
retention, and control — anal-retentive personality characteris-
tics that stand in sharp contrast to the primal yearning Bataille 
sees in the artifacts of prehistoric man, who experienced the 
individuation of his species with shame. Early man’s emerg-
ing distance from the animal world, the barrier sealing him off 
from nature, gave him pain, not comfort. Though we may have 
forgotten the origin of that pain, Bataille would argue, one has 
only to behold the orgy of self-destruction we have made of the 
modern world to see that everything in the human still aches 
to return to insentience. “Today’s man suspects the inanity of 
the edifice he has founded, he knows that he knows nothing,” 
Bataille writes, “and, as his ancestors concealed their features 
with animal masks, he summons the night of truth wherein the 
world that has ordained his pretension will cease being clear and 
distinct.”4 The “night of truth” is war; if barriers must exist, man 
will annihilate them through violence. 
Heiner Müller, Hapless Angel
In a famous passage from his “Theses on the Philosophy of His-
tory,” Walter Benjamin describes the Klee painting Angelus No-
vus, which 
shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away 
from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are 
3 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1.
4 Georges Bataille, The Cradle of Humanity: Prehistoric Art and Culture, 
trans. Stuart Kendall (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 80.
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staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how 
one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the 
past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awak-
en the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a 
storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which 
his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.5
A progressive theory of history holds that human history is 
marching inexorably towards the good, toward liberty and jus-
tice for all. Fukuyama’s theory of history is in this sense progres-
sive. Benjamin wonders whether the costs of so-called progress 
are really worth the benefits. In Benjamin’s bleak vision, the 
call of progress tears us away from the work of healing, reinte-
gration, of making “whole what has been smashed.” The angel 
wants to repair the disastrous errors of the past, but the storm 
of progress bears him backward into the future to witness new 
disasters piling onto the old. The heap of debris grows much 
faster than anyone could possibly sift through it to bring out the 
bodies, but even if that were not the case only an angel could be 
expected to awaken the dead, the waste of history.
Heir to Brecht’s legacy, the East German playwright and di-
rector Heiner Müller did not share his artistic progenitor’s faith 
in revolutionary progress. His vision of history owed more to 
Benjamin. In a 1958 piece of text called “The Hapless Angel,” 
Müller revisits Benjamin’s Angel of History:
Behind him the past washes ashore, piles debris on his wings 
and shoulders, with the noise of buried drums, while before 
him the future dams up, impresses itself down on 
5 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zorn, 
ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 257–58.
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his eyes, bursts his eyeballs like a star, twists his words into a 
sounding muzzle, chokes him with its breath. For a time one 
can still see the beating of his wings, hear into the roar the 
landslide coming down before above behind him, louder the 
more furious his futile movement, sporadic as it languishes. 
Then the moment closes down over him: standing, buried 
by debris quickly, the hapless angel comes to rest, waiting 
for history in the petrification of flight glance breath. Until 
the renewed roar of mighty beating wings propagates itself 
in undulations through the stone and announces his flight.6 
In Müller’s version, the angel is not merely forced to behold the 
ugly spectacle of the wrecked past’s waste piling up in the name 
of progress; he is being buried alive by it. What is more, the an-
gel is being pulverized from both sides. Not only the past, but 
the future, oppresses him. Brecht adopted the writings of Marx 
and Lenin as gospel; he believed that the coming global socialist 
utopia would deliver all of suffering humanity to salvation. Mül-
ler’s faith in alternatives to capitalism was undermined by the 
gap between the utopian ambitions of communist movements 
and the gruesome reality of what the Soviet experiment pro-
duced. For the Hapless Angel, the way forward is dammed, the 
future as irredeemably damned as the past. Benjamin’s Angel 
experienced progress as a storm; he does not know or dream of 
where he is being borne. He is powerless, but at least he is spared 
the torture of imagination. In contrast, Müller’s Angel’s eyes ex-
plode as expectations, aspirations, unrealized plans accumulate. 
Blind and immobilized, the angel, like progress, is gridlocked. 
His wings flap uselessly. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Müller returned to the image 
once again with a short poem he titled “Hapless Angel 2.” Here, 
the Angel is unmoored, unknown, and unknowable:
6 Heiner Müller, “Hapless Angel,” cited in Helen Fehervary, “Enlightenment 
or Entanglement: History and Aesthetics in Bertolt Brecht and Heiner 
Müller,” New German Critique 8 (1976): 93.
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Between city and city
After the wall the abyss
Wind at the shoulders the alien
Hand at the lonely flesh
The angel I still hear him
Yet he has no face anymore but
Yours that I don’t know7
The Angel, like the speaker of the poem, suffers from rootless-
ness, isolation, and lack of either identity or direction. Long 
skeptical about revolutions and critical of revolutionaries, Mül-
ler recognizes that without a cause projecting him into a future, 
the angel is lost.
Revolution as Theater/Theater as Revolution
Modern tragedy, Raymond Williams posits, is grounded in the 
awareness of the need for continuous revolution. To be modern 
is to be in the midst of constant flux, a permanent state of shat-
tering and rebuilding. To see this state as tragic is to take into 
account the violence and destruction, the inevitable waste that 
revolution entails. In the postmodern era, we are afflicted with 
what Kristeva calls “postmodern forgetting.” Facing a crisis of 
subjectivity and a crisis of knowledge, we struggle to maintain 
an unequivocal link to our cultural stories, to the truth of past 
atrocities. We buckle under the unbearable lightness of ahisto-
ricity. Nietzsche tells us that 
in the smallest and greatest happiness there is always one 
thing that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting, or, in 
more learned phrase, the capacity of feeling “unhistorically” 
throughout its duration. One who cannot leave himself be-
hind on the threshold of the moment and forget the past, 
who cannot stand on a single point, like a goddess of victory, 




and, worse still, will never do anything to make others hap-
py.8 
But the practice of “active forgetting,” advocated by Nietzsche, 
can be either the instrument or the downfall of those engaged 
in the modern project of revolution. “Revolution” can mean an 
insurrection, but the word can also be used, as Kristeva uses it, 
to refer to a turn, an instance of revolving completed by a return 
to one’s original position.
When questioned on the subject, Müller was known to scoff, 
“[r]evolution? After the next ice age.” Müller based several of 
his own most nihilistic plays on Brecht’s optimistic, utilitar-
ian Lehrstücke plays. Variously translated as “teaching plays,” 
“learning plays,” or “didactic plays,” the Lehrstücke were intend-
ed to be performed only by and for groups of workers engaged 
in the process of educating themselves. They were to be tools for 
cultivating revolutionary consciousness, not aesthetic objects to 
be passively consumed. As Andrzej Wirth and Marta Ulvaeus 
describe it, in the Lehrstücke project, “two utopian concepts 
meet: the theater as metatheater, and society as changeable. […] 
[T]heater should function without an audience, society with-
out classes.”9 No longer would the proscenium divide those who 
produced from those who consumed, perniciously duplicating 
the oppressive social dynamics of the world outside the theater. 
The Lehrstücke erase the divide between producers and con-
sumers. The worker/performers own the means of production 
and labor for their own benefit, no one else’s. The plots of the 
plays pose intellectual and moral dilemmas analogous to those 
workers might be expected to confront on the road to revolu-
tion. They conclude with a resolution intended to be instructive, 
an outcome to be emulated. The Lehrstücke are plays that are ex-
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, trans. Adrian 
Collins (New York: Cosimo, 2005), 6.
9 Ardrzej Wirth and Marta Ulvaeus, “The Lehrstück as Performance,” TDR: 
The Drama Review 43, no. 4 (1999): 113.
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pected to perform a function, rather than merely be performed. 
Theirs is a functionalist dramaturgy.
In Brecht’s The Measures Taken, for example, four commu-
nist agitators return from China and relate to their central com-
mittee in Moscow the sacrifice they found it necessary to make 
in order to complete their mission successfully. The action of 
the play is related, not enacted. In China their young fifth com-
rade, so distressed by the injustice he witnessed, was moved to 
shortsighted, indiscreet acts of compassion that threatened to 
jeopardize their contingent’s larger goals. Ultimately, with his 
assent, the agitators decide to protect their cause by shooting 
the young comrade and disposing of his body in a lime pit. The 
central committee commends them for having done the right 
thing under the circumstances. 
Müller responded to The Measures Taken in 1970 with Maus-
er, a relentlessly bleak, cyclical variation on Brecht’s themes. 
Barred from being either performed or published in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR), Mauser also focuses on the 
problem of the loyal revolutionary who goes rogue. Loyalty is 
not an all-or-nothing proposition; in Brecht’s play, the young 
comrade believes so deeply in his party’s cause that he cannot 
delay the instant gratification he experiences helping the down-
trodden for the sake of later, larger victories for the oppressed. 
In Müller’s version, a revolutionary charged with killing en-
emies of the revolution becomes so zealous in discharging his 
duties that the violence spins out of control. He begins killing 
for the pure love of killing and must finally agree to be killed 
himself for the sake of the revolution. Like The Measures Taken, 
Mauser is designed to be performed without an inactive audi-
ence. It is a play for doing, not for seeing. In a note appended to 
the published text, Müller explains that Mauser 
is not a play for the repertoire; […] Performance for an audi-
ence is possible if the audience is invited to control the per-
formance by its text, and the text by its performance, through 
reading the Chorus part, or the part of the First Player (A), or 
if the Chorus part is read by one group of spectators and the 
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part of the First Player by another group of spectators — the 
text not read by each group should be blotted out in the 
script — or through other devices; and if the audience’s reac-
tion can be controlled through the non-synchronism of text 
and performance, the nonidentity of speaker and performer. 
The proposed distribution of the text is variable, the mode 
and degree of variants a political choice that has to be made 
in each individual case.10 
The first part of this instruction is straightforward enough. Mül-
ler more or less explains the way a Lehrstück works. The piece is 
not to be performed for a traditional, passive, segregated audi-
ence. The second part is more ambiguous, the notion of the au-
dience’s reaction being “controlled” feels vaguely sinister and de-
cidedly un-Brechtian. Brecht used “the non-synchronism of text 
and performance” to cultivate the estranging Verfremdungsef-
fekt, but Müller’s work is addressed to a pre-alienated audience. 
He does not seek to use his “teaching plays” to teach through ap-
peals to reason. Instead, he carries the dialectical process to the 
point of absurdity and collapse. Mauser is a crushingly elliptical 
text. Though Müller leaves it to the performer/spectators to cast 
themselves in various roles, we always come back to the play’s 
refrain: “DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION.” The play 
is a machine, grinding into gruel its initially distinct speakers. 





– Chorus(The Performers of Three Farmers)
– Chorus(A)
10 Heiner Müller, Mauser, in A Heiner Müller Reader: Plays, Poetry, Prose, ed. 




The casting choices may initially seem meaningful, with guilt 
being apportioned unequally among the speakers, some bearing 
more responsibility than others, some representing the prag-
matic perspective and others held up as exemplars of a fallacy. 
The play begins as a fairly lucid dialogue between the Chorus 
and A, the revolutionary, being indicted for his misconduct:
A: I have done my work.
CHORUS: Do your last one.
A: I have killed for the Revolution.
CHORUS: Die for her.
A: I have committed a mistake.
CHORUS: You are the mistake.
A: I am a human being.
CHORUS: What is that.11
By the time we receive an answer to this question, it is consider-
ably less clear who is on whose side, who is speaking on whose 
behalf, who is indicting whom, on what grounds and to what 
purpose. According to the text, the chorus volunteers the de-
layed response itself. “A man,” the chorus says, “is something 
you shoot into / Until Man will rise from the ruins of man.”12 
The individual must be destroyed so that the collective might 
thrive. The real must be annihilated so that the ideal might arise. 
Violent as the imagery is, this poetic assessment sounds like 
the sort of slogan that could conceivably be endorsed by sane 
people in desperate times who take seriously their dreams for 
a better tomorrow. But Müller puts into the mouths of each of 
his designated speakers a related refrain that topples the Tatlin-
esque tower of progressive pipe dreams into the blood-soaked 
soil: “[k]nowing, even the grass / We must tear up so it will stay 
green.”13 This, of course, is madness. 





The American sculptor Justin Matherly adopts this line as the 
title for one of a series of his pieces fashioned from concrete and 
ambulatory equipment. This particular sculpture consists of a 
vaguely humanoid mass of concrete perched precariously on a 
pair of hospital-style walkers. The patient is not intact — only 
a pair of hollowed-out stumps of thighs attached to a scarred, 
bulging torso remain. Already denuded of its organicity by 
the material (concrete being, eloquently, a kind of man-made 
stone), what remains of this “body” has been fused to what ap-
pear to be woefully inadequate mechanical substitutes for that 
which has been lost. The form of the sculpture is based on the 
Belvedere Torso, the famous fragment of ancient Greek sculp-
ture that profoundly influenced Michelangelo and other Renais-
sance artists when it was brought to the Vatican in 1523. What 
Michelangelo so admired about that piece was the sense of ten-
sion and internal struggle it captured. During the Renaissance, 
humanism flourished as Europe emerged from the Dark Ages 
and rediscovered the art and writings of classical antiquity. As 
interest in the general value and goodness of the human gradu-
ally overtook the narrow religious focus of medieval scholasti-
cism, man was “reborn” as the center of the known universe. 
The Enlightenment idea that through the application of their 
powers of reason men were destined to become the “masters 
and possessors of nature” followed.14 Under the stewardship 
of mankind in its rush to realize this goal, what we call nature 
has not fared well. This is despite the fact that, as posthumanist 
thinkers have shown, human beings are not in any meaning-
ful way separate from nature, a category of our own invention, 
nor have we managed to escape the deleterious effects of our 
attempts to exert dominance over it. Matherly’s useless mass of 
wrecked flesh reflects on the foundering of the Cartesian propo-
sition, the breakdown of the anthropocentric worldview.
Like the play from which it is transposed, Matherly’s sculp-
ture is a queasy-making admission that humankind has lost 
14 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations (New York: The 
Liberal Arts Press), 45.
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control. The rampaging revolutionary “A” in Mauser loses it by 
hubristically assuming too much control. “DEATH TO THE EN-
EMIES OF THE REVOLUTION” becomes a suicide slogan when the 
speakers start to become confused and conflated — A(Chorus) 
and Chorus(A)? — and it becomes clear that there are ultimately 
only enemies of the revolution. Loyalty expires. Killing becomes 
“a science,” “work like any other work,” and “daily bread.”15 Jon-
athan Kalb observes that in this post-Stalinist nightmare, the 
factory, that once-glorified symbol of the revolutionary Soviet 
state, becomes a slaughterhouse. “Here the vision is of produc-
tion and death, production of death.”16 The revolution tears up 
grass and grinds up bodies, laying waste to man and insensate 
matter alike. Even more so than Mother Courage, Mauser can 
be described as an allegory of pure waste. No new Man grows 
out of the ruined bodies of men, no new city on a hill out of the 
ruins of the old, no hope out of despair. Revolution as a turn or 
return is a zero-sum game, but no one profits in Mauser. Not 
even a little cache of blood money remains to be divided among 
the victors. It is impossible even to tell who the victors are or if, 
indeed, there are any. 
Bonnie Marranca calls Müller’s Lehrstücke “unlearning 
plays.”17 Revisiting his source material again and again, canni-
balizing Brecht’s texts and his own in as many ways as he knows 
how, Müller gives the impression that, like Beckett, he can-
not rest until he has devoured language with language. Where 
Beckett courts silence, Müller is after a total denaturing of lan-
guage. Both orbit aporias, but where for Beckett memory is, like 
speech, emptied out, Müller’s utterances are shards of literary 
allusions, ideological statements, and images of violence, der-
eliction, and disgust breaking off and tumbling down from the 
slag heap of German history. Heidi Schlipphacke asserts that, 
pace Kristeva, Germany and Austria suffer from “precisely a lack 
15 Müller, Mauser, 98, 96, 100.
16 Jonathan Kalb, The Theater of Heiner Müller (New York: Limelight 
Editions, 2001), 53.
17 Bonnie Marranca, Ecologies of Theater (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 71.
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of ‘forgetting.’”18 In these countries where the historical break 
of the Holocaust occurred, marking their regression to premo-
dernity, national identity remains onerously intact as compared 
with the rest of globalizing, postmodern Europe. In Germany 
and Austria there is too much history, too much memory, too 
much of the “I” and its painful associations. Müller plays the 
role of a sadistic psychoanalyst who puts his traumatized patient 
on the couch, dragging them through the hell of recollection 
and ripping them apart without having any intention of putting 
them back together again. Even Freud cautioned against full-
blown, psychotic individuals submitting to analysis — the pro-
cess of self-excavation is difficult and painful, and patients have 
a tendency to get worse before they get better. Sifting through 
the detritus of Germany’s collective unconscious, Müller never 
arrives at a moment when the possibility of recovered integrity 
seems within reach for his analysand. Instead, his plays fre-
quently “give up” on themselves, pivoting to an imagined other 
for salvation. 
In Müller’s The Task, this “other” is, broadly construed, what 
used to be called the Third World. Written nine years after 
Mauser, The Task is another version of The Measures Taken, but 
its agitators are beset not by an excess of zeal, but by a sense 
of exhaustion, redundancy, and nullification. Three emissaries 
from the French National Convention — Galloudec, Sasportas, 
and Debuisson — are sent to colonial Jamaica to incite a slave 
rebellion against the British just as the coup of 18 Brumaire is 
taking place at home. With Napoleon ascending to power, ef-
fectively ending the French Revolution, the mission drifts. “The 
revolution has no home anymore,” Debuisson says, “what we 
believed to be the dawn of freedom was maybe only the mask 
of a new, even more hideous slavery.”19 But on the precipice of 
this aporia, the uncountenanceable thought that the struggle 
18 Heidi M. Schlipphacke, Nostalgia after Nazism: History, Home, and 
Affect in German and Austrian Literature and Film (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2010), 75.
19 Heiner Müller, Hamletmachine and Other Texts for the Stage, ed. and trans. 
Carl Weber (New York: PAJ, 1984), 98.
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might have been in vain, Debuisson attempts to re-center the 
revolution by designating for it a new homeland. He dreams of 
walking through a run-down, minority neighborhood in New 
York and seeing omens of the next iteration of the struggle rise 
up like hallucinations on the city sidewalk. A golden serpent 
represents Asia. A radiant blue serpent represents Africa. These 
will be the next frontiers of the revolution. Debuisson has had 
enough of seeing his loves Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity 
whored out, dragged through “all the sewers of this world, […] 
all the brothels.”20 Pure revolutionary ideals have been used to 
justify all manner of atrocities. Equality has been embraced by 
every repressive regime. Fraternity has been exploited by mur-
derers everywhere. Every dictator has put his lips to Liberty’s 
breast. “For a thousand years our three loves have been laughed 
at,” Debuisson laments, “now I want to sit where they laugh, free 
to do anything that’s to my taste, equal to myself, my own, and 
no one else’s brother.”21
Dead ends and disillusionment culminate in scornful ab-
dication and satanic laughter. As Baudelaire put it, laughter is 
“born of Man’s conception of his own superiority. Since it is 
essentially human, it is also essentially contradictory, that is 
to say it is at once the sign of infinite grandeur and of infinite 
wretchedness.”22 For Baudelaire, laughter as an expression of su-
periority to nature is the pride that goeth before destruction, 
as the haughty spirit before a fall. There will ultimately be no 
safe outside space set aside for retired insurrectionists to remain 
aloof, to laugh from a distance as the colonized world convulses. 
Though the speakers in The Mission maintain somewhat more 
characterological continuity than those in Mauser they are still 
the mouthpieces of a dizzying range of contradictions. Debuis-
son is blasé, even cruel one moment, laughing satanically at the 
dirty, brown people scrambling up behind the Europeans to set 
20 Ibid., 99.
21 Ibid.
22 Charles Baudelaire, The Essence of Laughter and Other Essays, Journals, 
and Letters, ed. Peter Quennell (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 117.
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Revolution 3.0 in motion, then he is confiding tremblingly to 
his comrades that he is “afraid […] of the beauty of the world. 
I know very well,” he says, “it is the mask of treason. […] I am 
afraid […] of the shame to be happy in this world.”23 The impul-
sive, unruly compassion of Brecht’s young comrade has aged, 
grown into jaundiced, unactionable shame. Happiness is be-
trayal for Debuisson because it perverts time and space. It is the 
point at which myth becomes history. Embodied man is only 
hopeful because he is always forgetting, in Nietzsche’s sense, al-
ways in the present tense. Müller ends the play with Debuisson 
retreating into the temporary eternity and the finite infinity of a 
lover’s embrace. Like Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, Betrayal 
is a woman. Debuisson covers his ears and succumbs to the em-
brace of betrayal, who throws herself on him “like a heaven, the 
bliss of the labia at dawn.”24
Woman is the horizon, the vanishing point. “In Müller’s 
work,” Bonnie Marranca observes, “Woman is spirit, nature, 
womb, Plato’s cave, the black hole in space, a prison, a snakepit, 
a one-way street. She is also the landscape of utopia, his grand 
theme.”25 By making Woman into everything, he reduces her 
to nothing. Conjured as a dream or a nightmare, the reality of 
whatever she might be will always seem crude, mean, offensive. 
In Müller’s work, “Woman, like nature,” Marranca argues, “is 
made to embody the ideology of the eternal feminine, passive, 
fated. But nature is not a still life, nor is the earth a receptacle.”26 
When Woman finally speaks, in defiance of this enforced sym-
bolic passivity, she must cut through centuries of images that 
have been projected onto her by men. 
23 Müller, Hamletmachine, 100.
24 Ibid., 101.




Elfriede Jelinek: Trümmerfrau of Language
Elfriede Jelinek suffers from acute anxiety and seldom leaves 
her home near the edge of the Vienna Woods. When she won 
the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2004, she did not attend the 
ceremony, citing agoraphobia, instead delivering her address via 
a tape she sent to the Swedish Academy. In the speech, titled 
“Sidelined,” she asks, “what happens to those, who don’t really 
know reality at all?”27 As a writer, she goes on, she exists on the 
sidelines. On the one hand, she can see better from there — dis-
tance provides perspective. On the other hand, the true fullness 
of human life is beyond her grasp. Jelinek has always perceived 
herself to be several degrees of separation removed from reality. 
Only in recent years have her physical circumstances come to 
reflect this symbolic distance. Though her concerns encompass 
her native Austria’s involvement in the Holocaust and its after-
math, the ravages of global capitalism, and the destruction of 
the environment, Jelinek’s earliest works for the theater were fo-
cused on the subjugation of women and women’s complicity in 
their own oppression. Throughout her career, this critique has 
been at the core of her work. Jelinek consistently takes the posi-
tion that, since misogyny has from the beginning comprised the 
substrate of language itself, misogyny cannot be overcome with-
out a new approach to language. According to Lacan, language 
is the domain of phallic exchange. Women do not have access 
to the symbolic order the way men do because “a woman […] 
is not considered a subject.”28 Where a male writer can wield 
language as an instrument, a weapon, as a means of making di-
rect contact with reality, and even as a means of shaping reality, 
women will always be operating within a discourse that was de-
signed to exclude them. Women do not exchange; they are ob-
jects of exchange. “When a man speaks,” Jelinek says, “he speaks 
27 Elfriede Jelinek, “Sidelined,” lecture, Nobel Prize Summit at the Swedish 
Academy, Stockholm, Sweden, December 7, 2004, http://www.nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2004/jelinek-lecture-e.html.




the discourse of authority. When a woman speaks, she does not. 
But what she can do is what I am doing, that is, to deal with this 
speechlessness, […] if, as a woman, you don’t have the right to 
speak, you’ve got to pick up the rubble. I am a Trümmerfrau of 
language.”29
Here Jelinek identifies herself with the women who cleared 
out the rubble from bombed-out cities after World War II. 
Working with found materials, shattered, damaged materials, 
Honegger writes that “Jelinek’s strategy of quoting is a form of 
ready-made speech acts taken from trashcans and the canon. 
[…] Jelinek does not discard anything from the garbage heap 
of words, which she spreads on her flat surfaces.”30 Following 
Bataille, creation is always already a process of waste manage-
ment, managing one’s own excess. For Jelinek, the woman writer 
self-conscious of her status as woman writer, writing is a matter 
of managing the waste of others. Already, as a woman, speak-
ing in a foreign tongue, Jelinek finds herself doubly estranged 
by her social isolation. A self-confessed TV junkie, she relies on 
watching copious amounts of television for information about 
“reality.” Everything is secondhand but also garishly buffed and 
polished, exaggerated, sped up, and underscored. Rather than 
making her less equipped to grapple with the complexities of 
the world she writes about, Jelinek’s hypermediated existence 
lends itself to acute observation of the machinations of what is 
fast becoming our post-truth reality. Jelinek gives voice not to 
firsthand existential shame — existence is something she might 
say she has largely managed to avoid — but to the perspective of 
the horrified spectator. 
Bambiland and the Society of the Spectacle
“When man’s need for miracles is not satisfied,” Bataille writes, 
“it transforms itself into a passion for destruction, being at cer-
29 Ibid., 29.
30 Gitta Honegger, “Introduction” to Elfriede Jelinek, Rechnitz and The 
Merchant’s Contracts (New York: Seagull Books, 2015), 2.
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tain moments the only possible miracle, preferable to boredom, 
be that as it may.”31 War is the miracle humanity conjures for 
itself to hasten the erasure of its own excesses. War dazzles even 
as it decimates. “Such is the intensive employment of modern 
means of destruction: it is incontestable, prodigious, sensation-
al,” says Bataille.32
The war that is the subject of Jelinek’s 2003 play Bambiland 
is always already mediated, a war experienced via a screen even 
by many of those on the front lines, inflicting most of the casu-
alties. The world of Bambiland takes place in what Baudrillard 
calls “the desert of the real,” a place beyond “real” and “artifi-
cial,” a place where representation precedes reality, where the 
map precedes the territory. Baudrillard died in 2007, before the 
extent of the US’s covert drone strike program was revealed, but 
since the Gulf War he had often worried in print about “virtual 
warfare,” war as spectacle, and the distancing, desensitizing ef-
fects of conducting a war that plays like a video game or action 
film. 
“The politics of theatre is a politics of perception,” Lehmann 
writes, “To define it we have to remember that the mode of per-
ception in theatre cannot be separated from the existence of the-
atre in a world of media which massively shapes all perception.”33 
In Bambiland, war is delivered to us in the form of an enter-
tainment juggernaut of TV news images. Statistics, unattributed 
quotations, associations, digressions, puns, and pop culture de-
tritus all run together in one long unbroken monologue. Bam-
biland has no designated characters and practically no stage di-
rections. The play’s excess and its intentional formlessness evoke 
the torrent of waste produced by advanced capitalism and the 
wars that must be fought to sustain it. The central recognizable 
figures of Bambiland are the architects of the Iraq War. Taking 
Aeschylus’s The Persians as a (very) loose model, the play is nar-
31 Bataille, The Cradle of Humanity, 104.
32 Ibid. 
33 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 185.
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rated as though being watching on television by someone in a 
semi-comatose state as “the mighty Master of War,” probably 
Cheney, is “marching his menfolk onward, […] it’s just part of 
our culture that we eventually get around to exercising a certain 
degree of force.”34 Jelinek depicts the conflict as “blood for oil” 
crusade fought by ignorant, pugnacious conquistador-cowboys 
on behalf of a nation of “clients. Consumers. Customer Kings.”35 
The waste of oil is ironically treated as more of a calamity than 
the waste of a life. Compare:
Where did all that oil go, unspent? Burning. Burning. Explo-
sives set round the rigs where the oil wells up, where it goes 
up in flames and goes to waste. It’s impossible to imagine, 
and hard to foresee. And anyone who might manage to spare 
himself from drowning in that tear-soaked sea of salt, the 
least we shall do is to kill him. You can set fire to our homes, 
set fire to our icons, just keep your fires off our oil and our 
television sets!36
with:
So many men laid to waste! What a waste — surely, I could 
have used the one or the other of them. My garden could 
have used one, or my walls, which need painting, could have 
used one of them too. And my bed sure could use something 
better than lonesome old me.37
The narrator/ventriloquist/viewer cannot empathize with the 
images on the screen for more than a few blinks before ego-
centric fantasies resume control. Lehmann argues that, however 
“true to life” the image conveyed by the high-speed contem-
porary media apparatus, “produced far from its reception and 






received far from its origin, it imprints indifference onto eve-
rything shown.”38 Fact and fiction alike are “dramatized” to the 
point where everything acquires an identical veneer of irreality. 
The graphics and audio effects used to turn presidential debates 
into rock-’em, sock-’em showdowns are identically to those used 
to punch up the World Series or Super Bowl.
An image is flat and unbreachable, textureless — one can 
purchase it but not get purchase on it. One is forced to con-
sume it wholesale. This “seductive eyewash,” as Jelinek puts it, 
anesthetizes viewers. However violent or ecstatic the imagery, it 
cannot rouse viewers from their coma of complacency.39 
Rhetoric — language become image — can do the same. As 
Hannah Arendt writes, “Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to 
conventional, standardized codes of expression […] have the 
socially recognized function of protecting us against reality.”40 
In Bambiland, the true motivation behind the war is kept hid-
den behind an impenetrable wall of such rhetoric, which Jelinek 
parodies mercilessly: 
Look, people, the basic principle is that we are the only ones 
with any real principles: Ours is the only country where the 
individual counts anymore because every individual is an en-
tity unto himself. […] Every human individual counts. Every 
human individual counts his money. Some count more, oth-
ers count less. Dick Cheney counts more, we count less.41 
Jelinek catches American political discourse in its many hypoc-
risies and contradictions. “It only works when both are the same. 
But both people are different. This is the whole basis for our civi-
lization — that people are different. It’s just that those sand nig-
gers don’t see it that way,” and periodically folds her own more 
straightforwardly caustic commentary in as well: “[w]ill you fi-
38 Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, 185.
39 Jelinek, Bambiland, 113.




nally deal a deathblow in the war against the alpha-male type as 
a model for humanity!”42 For Jelinek, this model stands not just 
for violence, but for those narrowly capitalist values of “individ-
ualism” and “efficiency” that have motivated the US’s frightening 
transformation from a democracy into a corporatocracy. 
Bambiland stretches on like a discursive desert. There is no 
real sense of progress being made, of victory approaching, or 
even of sense gradually accreting. Voices that seem as though 
they cannot possibly be human praise self-targeting smart-
bombs and “advanced surveillance systems that take the human 
eye out of the act of seeing.”43 The “climax” comes near the end 
of the play when God Himself makes an appearance. Rather 
than pass judgment or issue a command, He promptly com-
mences with fellating an American warhead. While narrating 
this experience, He reaffirms the American mandate, uncon-
vincingly explains that “our side” is justified in killing thousands 
of people, including civilians, with imprecise, hyper-destructive 
cluster bombs because doing so enables us “to keep our losses 
at an absolute minimum.”44 God wonders “whether we’ll ever 
be satisfied,” though it is not clear whether He is thinking of the 
greed of Americans or of His fellatee and the threat of lockjaw.45 
The capitalist, by definition, can never be satisfied — growth 
demands constant escalation — and the capitalist, by definition, 
must count only her own losses before considering those of 
the enemy. Bambiland presciently anticipates Donald Trump’s 
“America First” style of nationalism and commitment to run-
ning the country “like a business,” where generating profits for 
a handful of top shareholders takes precedence over any other 
mission. The military-industrial complex is the only real “win-
ner” in Bambiland, forcing even God and Country to submit. 
The play ends when God’s hoplophilic blowjob does: “Finally, 
42 Ibid. 
43 Colin Mannex, “Preface to Elfriede Jelinek’s Bambiland,” Theater 39, no. 3 
(2009): 107.




he shoots his wad. I thought he was never going to come,” Our 
Father says. “So. Now that’s the end of that.”46
Rechnitz and the Exterminating Angel of History 
The Persians, Bambiland’s chief dramatic intertext, is considered 
to be the oldest surviving play in the history of theater. Like 
Bambiland, it is a history play. As Aeschylus did in writing The 
Persians, with Bambiland Jelinek was chronicling history practi-
cally in real time, dealing with current events as they were still 
unfolding, but she frequently makes a point of revisiting closed 
cases, digging up buried histories, especially contentious ones. 
Generally, history is written by the victors, but Jelinek is com-
mitted to (re)writing history from the perspective of the van-
quished, from the perspective of those whose voices and even 
traces have been erased from the official record. 
The relationship of Jelinek’s Austria to the ascent of the Nazis 
before the Second World War is part of a particularly conten-
tious national history. After the war, while Germany itself was 
carved up into externally administered segments and forced to 
undergo an extensive “de-Nazification” process, Austria was 
able to downplay their complicity and contributions to the Hol-
ocaust by claiming that they were merely Hitler’s first victims, 
the targets of the aggressive foreign policy of the Nazis. This 
was a convenient fiction, now referred to as the “victim myth” 
(Opfermythos). In fact, when Hitler marched into Vienna after 
the 1938 annexation (Anschluß) of Austria, he was greeted with 
a parade. Austria has never entirely let go of the victim myth, 
which began to give way to a more accurate picture of the period 
between 1938 and 1945 only after many years and tremendous 
international pressure. Not until 1998 did Austria even appoint 
a committee to begin addressing questions of restitution dating 
from the war years. 
Jelinek’s Rechnitz confronts the gaps in official historical nar-




an town on the Hungarian border in 1945. Rechnitz castle was 
owned by Count and Countess Bátthyany and served as a resi-
dence for local Nazi leaders during the war. On March 24, 1945 
the Countess threw a lavish party. In attendance was Rechnitz’s 
Gestapo chief, Franz Podezin, who was also rumored to be the 
Countess’s lover at the time. During the party, Podezin received 
orders to pick up 200 Jewish inmates deemed too sick or weak 
to work who were being transported to Rechnitz by train from 
a nearby forced labor camp in Kőszeg. They were put up at the 
castle’s stables and shot by party guests, to whom guns had been 
distributed during the festivities. To this day, the site of the mass 
grave has not been found.47 The case has been a highly contro-
versial issue in Austria ever since. Residents of Rechnitz boy-
cotted the investigation. In 1946 a witness was murdered and 
“other witnesses died in mysterious accidents.”48
Jelinek’s play is subtitled “The Exterminating Angel,” a refer-
ence to Luis Buñuel’s 1962 film of that title. In Buñuel’s film, a 
dinner party held at a mansion for an upper crust group turns 
darkly surreal when at the end of the evening the guests find 
themselves unable to leave the music room to which they have 
retired for some after-dinner entertainment. There are no physi-
cal barriers preventing them from leaving, but despite hunger, 
serious illness, and crushing despair, the power of some collec-
tive hallucination keeps them trapped in the room for many 
weeks. The spell is only broken when, by some chance, the group 
finds themselves arranged in precisely the same physical config-
uration they were in on the evening of the party. Repetition and 
remembrance set them free, though there are casualties; some of 
their number do not make it out of the mansion alive. 
Jelinek portrays the elite group turning mass murder into a 
party game that night in the Rechnitz castle as suffering from a 
collective hallucination by denial of their own, a collective hal-
47 Honegger, “Introduction,” 6.





lucination that has never been dispelled because remembrance 
continues to be forestalled. Jelinek has described the process of 
writing Rechnitz as an attempt to “write a play around a blind 
spot.”49 To do this, she assembles a chorus of messengers, who 
offer competing descriptions of that fateful evening of March 24 
as well as competing philosophies of truth and the transmission 
of traumatic memory. 
In classical Attic tragedy, from which Jelinek habitually bor-
rows characters, scenarios, conventions, and motifs, the voice of 
the messenger is one we trust implicitly. The dramatis personae 
and the audience rely on messengers to convey in language what 
is not representable in images. In Rechnitz, the accounts of the 
messenger(s) are continuously interrupted with slippery quali-
fications that undermine confidence in their veracity: “I tell it 
how it is, I tell you what I was told, literally.”50 Which is it? “I 
saw it with my own eyes, at least I think they were my own.”51 
No eyewitness seems to trust their own perceptions. Eventually 
the chain of information becomes so vexed that it can no longer 
be said with any certainty that there were any eyewitnesses pre-
sent at the event in question at all. Everyone wants to disavow 
responsibility:
[S]he started to shoot, the countess, the reports contradict 
one another already, what’s going to happen next, and most 
importantly, to whom? And she kept shooting, the countess, 
bang, bang, she shot them down, and she shot and shot, or 
did she not shoot at all? Did she just shoot off from the cas-
tle? And we confused it with her usual freewheeling antics 
and our far-fetched semantics (remember now, we weren’t 
there).52
49 Elfriede Jelinek, quoted in Honegger, “Introduction,” 11.





If all of history is reduced to semantic gymnastics, the guilty 
can never be brought to justice. The undead appear frequently 
throughout Jelinek’s oeuvre, a continuing reminder that the 
dead cannot rest in peace until the truth about their murder-
ers is known. For Jelinek, the combination of Austria’s disincli-
nation to acknowledge its sordid past and the global drift to-
wards a post-truth media landscape accelerated by technology 
portends disaster. Like Buñuel’s well-coiffed society types who 
descend into savagery and derangement when trapped in the 
echo chamber of their mutually-reinforcing delusions, the mes-
sengers of Rechnitz have lost the ability to think for themselves. 
They have conceded their right to move, shape, and write his-
tory — history, rather, moves them, as Fukuyama imagined it 
would. As Jelinek puts it in one passage, they have their heads 
up history’s ass:
[T]his story can’t be true, says the historian, who did a colo-
noscopy on history from the other end as it were, but it stayed 
dark […], makes no difference anyway, he would have seen 
only darkness from any direction. He wouldn’t see a thing, 
even if it were shown to him in a picture, because he is used 
to finding out everything from pictures.53 
A generation raised on finding everything out from pictures 
stands even less of a chance of being able to read between the 
lines of official histories, those written by the victorious, the 
powerful, those who can afford to buy the truth:
In every proper history the wealthy, the stuffed man, the 
stuffed-up man has his representative, who handles all his 
stuff and takes care of his shit, I mean he has to take care 
of all the shit in place of his master. History only tunes its 
instruments, but it rarely gets to play. Life is very long. But 
today is one of those days history is playing with us as if life 




bring history in tune with us. Our testimonies must hit the 
right tone and we should all sing to the same tune. No, we 
never get it right and no one listens to us anyway. So the story 
should be looked at in peace and quiet”54
When Lehmann describes the ways in which contemporary 
mass media severs actor from action and speaker from speech, 
he could well be describing the dramaturgical mechanism of 
Rechnitz: “[w]e have the impression that individuals are report-
ing to us, but in fact it is collectives, who for their part represent 
nothing but functions of the medium.” 55 Their language speaks 
them. No one is an originator. No one owns truth or meaning. 
Everyone is only a messenger, not responsible for or intimately 
associated with the content of what they have to deliver. “On the 
one hand,” Lehmann observes, “the medium releases the send-
ers from all connection with the emitted message and, on the 
other hand, it occults the viewers’ perception of the fact that 
participation in language also makes them, the receivers, re-
sponsible for the message.”56
Jelinek presents questions of historical fact and responsibil-
ity as irretrievably “occulted” in Rechnitz. Rather than doing the 
necessary work of sifting through the layers of obfuscation and 
deception that have accumulated over the years since the Rech-
nitz massacre and other wartime atrocities, she sees countries 
with Nazi pasts doubling down on tried and true strategies for 
misdirection, once again looking for scapegoats in the form of 
outsiders, immigrants, and refugees. Grimacing at the image of 
Austria exported to attract tourism — idyllic, Alpine, dirndled 
in The Sound of Music style — she strikes at the violence under-
girding this Hollywood stereotype. “I am sure you want to know 
more about the so-called Europa Warranty,” a speaker ventrilo-
quizing a travel agent says, “which we added to your package, 
so you won’t be scared — it guarantees that Europe’s hot springs 
54 Ibid. 




function free of harmful germs of foreigners, but only if no 
foreigners are let in.”57 Tourism comprises nearly nine percent 
of Austria’s gross domestic product, and if the truth is bad for 
business, there will always be ways of massaging that truth into 
something that will look better on the brochure. 
Planned Obsolescence: Death of a Salesman
The US emerged from the Second World War without the Teu-
tonic burden of “too much memory.”58 The experience of sav-
ing the world from the scourge of fascism left Americans with a 
Bambi-esque belief in their country’s innocence and righteous-
ness. The belief that America is an unequivocal force for good in 
the world has long motivated our foreign policy. The idea that 
the world needs our intervention if global order is to be main-
tained has made it easier for the public to accept the death tolls. 
In the post-WWII period when the US was experiencing a period 
of unprecedented economic prosperity, this faith in American 
exceptionalism was at its apogee, but Arthur Miller turned his 
attention to those the American dream had left behind in his 
1949 Death of a Salesman. Affluence is a form of potential en-
ergy and, as Bataille observes, “excess energy provides for the 
growth or the turbulence of individuals.”59 While, socially and 
politically, Americans were focused on growth, Miller saw tur-
bulence. 
The motif of waste is dominant throughout Death of a Sales-
man. Willy Loman is plagued by planned obsolescence, a recent 
capitalist invention that ensures that everything from the refrig-
erator to the car is constantly breaking down and needing to be 
replaced. Willy’s frustration with this type of systemic wasteful-
ness has to do not with “excess” desire — waste as the product 
of effort over-spilling the capacity of consumption — but with 
57 Jelinek, Rechnitz and The Merchant’s Contracts, 88.
58 Schlipphacke, Nostalgia after Nazism, 75.
59 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Zone Books, 1991), 1:128.
98
WASTE
material waste and the enervating perpetual maintenance work 
it requires. Willy is just barely able to keep his house from fall-
ing down around his ears, but he is not in forward motion. He is 
not advancing professionally, financially, or personally. He has a 
passionate and volatile relationship with the stuff his dwindling 
commission enables him to buy, and he contradicts himself con-
stantly, sometimes within the space of a few lines, never appar-
ently noticing a pattern. At first, his new Chevrolet is “the great-
est car ever built.”60 Just a few years later, Willy is railing, “that 
goddam Chevrolet, they ought to prohibit the manufacture of 
that car.”61 
Nevertheless, the Lomans persist in their belief in in the 
integrity of advertising. When Willy fumes about their brand-
new refrigerator needing repairs, Linda soothes him by remind-
ing him that the company that manufactures it has “got the 
biggest ads.” “I know,” he says, somehow reassured, “it’s a fine 
machine.”62 An advertisement works, when it works, by creating 
anxieties that it promises can be assuaged simply by purchasing 
a particular product. It generates new wants, and if it succeeds 
in convincing the consumer that those wants are needs, the ad-
vertisement is a success. In a post-Mad Men era, the Lomans’s 
faith in the institution of advertising seems comically naive, but 
the transformations the advertising industry underwent during 
the 1940s had thoroughly conditioned Americans to be so trust-
ing.
Because the business of advertising absorbs resources with-
out producing anything strictly necessary, in times of scarcity 
advertising budgets once presented an obvious opportunity for 
trimming the fat. This was the case during the First World War, 
when many manufacturers reoriented their operations in order 
to produce war materials instead of consumer goods and backed 
off of advertising nonessential products for the duration of the 






crisis. Things changed, however, during the Second World War 
when US companies increased spending on advertising from 
$2.1 billion in 1941 to $2.8 billion in 1945.63 Even companies who 
couldn’t afford to meet pre-war levels of demand due to the di-
version of crucial resources invested heavily in advertising to 
keep their products tantalizingly alive in the minds of their past 
and future customer bases. When they didn’t have anything to 
sell, corporations ran ads encouraging Americans to buy war 
bonds — flaunting one’s patriotism was good for business, too. 
The government itself got into advertising in a way that blurred 
the lines between public service announcement, propaganda, 
entertainment, and private profit. The corporate brand was well 
on its way to attaining the status of quasi-religious icon that it 
now enjoys. “Think of the brand,” Naomi Klein writes, “as the 
core meaning of the modern corporation, and of the advertise-
ment as one vehicle used to convey that meaning to the world”64 
As the corporation takes its place at the center of American 
public life, the human inclination towards wastefulness is sup-
pressed, and the principle of producing at the least expense be-
comes the “meaning” not only of the corporation, but of our 
individual lives as well. 
The more successful a company is at insinuating itself into 
the public consciousness as humane (Google’s motto: “Don’t 
be evil.”) or at least human-centered (Facebook’s stated goal of 
connecting the world), the better it often is at diverting power 
away from actual humans. The insidious rise of the ostensibly 
benevolent corporation began in earnest during the Death of a 
Salesman era. In the 1940s, for example, the then-behemoth-in-
the-making Walt Disney Company had yet to establish itself as 
an effective synonym for family-friendly Americana, but it was 
already working with the government to produce training and 
propaganda films for the US Army and Navy. Some were dry, 
63 “1940s War, Cold War and Consumerism,” Advertising Age, March 28, 
2005, http://adage.com/article/75-years-of-ideas/1940s-war-cold-war-
consumerism/102702/.




technical affairs initially shown only to audiences of service-
men, but some were widely distributed zany romps trafficking 
in crowd-pleasing racial stereotypes featuring beloved cartoon 
characters like Donald Duck holding his own against the Nazi’s 
(1943’s “Der Fuehrer’s Face,” “Education for Death”) or the Japa-
nese (1944’s “Commando Duck”). In one ingenious example of 
Disney’s exploiting the inroads it had already made into the psy-
che of the average American, the company repurposed the dis-
tinctive actor Fred Shields, who had voiced the character of the 
supremely authoritative “Great Prince of the Forest” in 1942’s 
Bambi, deploying him as a narrator in a cartoon short called 
“The Spirit of ’43” exhorting Americans to pay their taxes.65 
These tax dollars, Bambi’s father told the nation, would fund the 
crucial manufacturing of “machine guns, anti-tank guns, long-
range guns, guns, guns, all kinds of guns!” Every dollar spent 
for something you didn’t need rather than saved to “pay your 
taxes” was, catchily, “a dollar to help the Axis.” Serving as the US 
government’s cuddliest propagandist lent the company a kind 
of gravitas that would have been difficult to acquire had they 
remained strictly purveyors of entertainment. 
Disney was not above pressing its mice into service for lesser 
goods, too. A 1939 animated short called “Mickey’s Surprise 
Party” is perceptually indistinguishable from any other Dis-
ney cartoon of the era until the last thirty seconds or so, when 
it is revealed to be a commercial. The short opens with Min-
nie Mouse in full, aproned, domestic splendor, chirping as she 
mixes up a bowl of dough, “[w]e’re gonna surprise Mickey with 
some cookies like his mother used to make.” But alas, it is not to 
be. By the time an amorous and hungry Mickey arrives, a series 
of disasters in the kitchen have rendered the cookies inedible. 
Minnie collapses into operatic sobs, wailing, “I wanted to make 
those cookies like your mother used to make, and now they’re 
all burnt up!” To console her, Mickey laughs, “[o]h, my mother 
used to burn ‘em all the time.” The little lady is inconsolable. 
65 J.D. Connor, lecture in the course “The Art of Disney,” Yale University, 
New Haven, Fall, 2015. 
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Still intent on salvaging their romantic date, Mickey dashes out 
to the store and returns with a box of Nabisco™ products. “Oh, 
Mickey! Nabisco! Lorna Doone! Social Teas! And Oreos!” she 
coos, each product arousing her more than the last. “Yeah, my 
mother used to buy ‘em all the time,” Mickey says. Reassured 
that a simple trip to the supermarket can elevate her to the status 
of primary love object in her beau’s eyes, Minnie covers Mickey 
in kisses. Nabisco products cure Oedipal anxieties and leave 
young couples with more free time for canoodling. 
The fact that “The Spirit of ’43” and “Mickey’s Surprise Party” 
were both very recognizably Walt Disney productions reflects 
the burgeoning importance of the brand as icon, in the devo-
tional sense. Indeed, the words we most frequently see associ-
ated with the word brand itself are “trust,” “loyalty,” and “faith.” 
“Disney invented the game” of modern branding, Klein writes, 
but spawned a host of imitators, all of whom hoped to inspire in 
consumers a fervor once reserved for things like religious faith 
or patriotism.66 Death of a Salesman was written at a moment 
when the place of religion in the American public conscious-
ness was undergoing an important transformation. Before the 
Second World War, with the country mired in the Great Depres-
sion, religious movements such as the Social Gospel, which took 
direct aim at economic inequality and other capitalist ills, expe-
rienced a resurgence. After the war, Christianity was rebrand-
ed as inherently capitalist and enlisted in the struggle against 
“godless communism.” Religion became patriotic and capital-
ism became religious. Like other objects of religious devotion, 
a corporate brand stood for something. Brands are supposed 
to encapsulate and communicate values. Americans have per-
haps never been as trusting, faithful, and loyal to their country 
as they were in the Death of a Salesman era. With the war won, 
the bounty of a robust economy, and the comforts of hearth and 
home waiting to be enjoyed, a sense of optimism, even invinci-
bility, was practically compulsory. What more could they pos-
sibly want? In this exceptional country peopled by heroes and 
66 Klein, No Logo, 156.
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innocents, the notion that the economy is rigged, that there exist 
among us malevolent forces and individuals who do not have 
the interests of the majority at heart was not a fashionable idea. 
More likely, if hardship struck or a flicker of doubt troubled an 
otherwise peaceful mind, one was more likely to look inside the 
self for the source of the failure, to commit to playing the rigged 
game harder, better. 
Miller pointedly does not specify what it is that Willy sells, 
but he likely attempts to do unto others just what those mislead-
ing advertisements do to him. The functions of advertising and 
salesmanship are the same; both consist of pushing products 
that people do not really need, products that will soon be gar-
bage. One of Willy’s many blind spots prevents him from seeing 
that he is perpetuating the same capitalist swindle that leaves 
him feeling as though he’s desperately running from month to 
month just to stay in the same place. Of course, the most diffi-
cult lesson for Willy to learn is that under capitalism, he himself 
will ultimately be reduced to the status of waste and discarded. 
When he ceases to be productive, he is unceremoniously fired. 
“You can’t eat the orange and throw the peel away,” he implores 
his boss Howard.67 But of course you can. And of course How-
ard does.
Phallic Coprophilia: Norman Mailer’s Ancient Evenings and Matthew Barney’s River of 
Fundament
Over half a century later, American exceptionalism having tak-
en some hard knocks, the sculptor Matthew Barney seized on 
waste as a symbol of rebirth and regeneration for his 2014 sym-
phonic film, River of Fundament, in which, as one critic put it, 
“[w]estern civilization’s foundation is also humanity’s anus.”68 A 
five hour opera scored by Jonathan Bepler, the project has also 
67 Miller, Death of a Salesman, 59.
68 Christopher Knight, “Matthew Barney’s ‘River of Fundament’? Well, It’s 





been shared with the public in the form of exhibitions of objects 
made for the film and during the filmmaking process, a way 
of foregrounding the residue of the film, giving its own waste 
products an afterlife. Shot in New York, Los Angeles, and in the 
contemporary wasteland of Detroit, where the decline of the 
American automobile industry becomes both Barney’s central 
subject and metaphor for American masculinity (or America as 
masculinity): the possibilities of the open road, speed, power, 
mobility, the virile wonder of heavy machinery transforming 
base metals into a muscle car. The film is earnestly worship-
ful of these things, never connecting them to, for example, the 
unsustainable levels of pollution generated by car culture. For 
Barney, waste is infinitely fecund. If life is woman’s gift to the 
world, waste is man’s. While aggression is everywhere in River of 
Fundament, the world Barney renders is not consumed by a war 
of all against all; homoerotic violence is elevated to the level of 
religious ritual, giving form and meaning to all social life. 
While the film’s libretto borrows from Walt Whitman, its 
principal source is Norman Mailer’s Ancient Evenings. The 
novel is a narration of narration, a story of stories being told 
over the course of a long dinner in Ancient Egypt, and narra-
tive coherence is not one of the film’s priorities — visual coher-
ence is. Early in the film, the penis and the turd are symboli-
cally conflated, with each precious package depicted wrapped 
in gold foil. Barney spatially transposes Mailer’s story but does 
not make a clean temporal break. Ancient mythology and itera-
tions of archaic deities are very much present in Barney’s con-
temporary America, beginning with a wake for Mailer shot in a 
replica of the dead author’s apartment. Supra- and supernatural 
characters from the novel arrive drenched in shit to mingle with 
what’s left of the late-twentieth century quintessentially New 
York culturati — Fran Lebowitz, Elaine Stritch, real-life writers, 
artists, and musicians playing themselves. They burst into song 
at irregular intervals as guests dine on maggot-infested hors 
d’oeuvres made from produce fertilized by the Pharoah’s feces 
and discuss Mailer’s legacy. Barney originally conceived of the 
piece as a work for the stage, and indeed, it can be seen as a piece 
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of postdramatic theater, with Mailer’s text serving as a reservoir 
of images upon which to draw in order to create something that 
ultimately far surpasses its source material.69 
Kate Millett characterized Mailer as “a prisoner of the virility 
cult” and as a man whose “powerful intellectual comprehension 
of what is most dangerous in the masculine sensibility is exceed-
ed only by his attachment to the malaise.”70 This critique is not 
immediately discernible in the visual discourse of River of Fun-
dament and in the conversations that float around the two sar-
cophagi occupying prominent places in Mailer’s library during 
the depicted wake: “[t]hat’s one of the greatest innovations of 
Normal Mailer, proclaiming his own brilliance,” someone says. 
Ancient Evenings is a novel about sodomy and coprophagy, life 
and death. Menenhetet I, obsessed with immortality, manages 
to secure his own infinite insistence by mystically climbing into 
the womb of a lover during sex in order to be reborn. Barney’s 
film finds a grotesque analogue in having a young “Norman” slit 
open the belly of a dead, bloated cow and bury himself inside, 
closing the first act of the three-part film. Norman will achieve 
two rebirths but fail a third time. Woman, the Feminine, is po-
sitioned in both Mailer’s and Barney’s projects as vessel and in-
animate object, but perhaps more productively as the “piss and 
shit” between which we are all born.71
The Feminine is irrelevant in Mailer’s universe unless it exists 
to serve as a passageway to eternity or a novel tourist destination 
for men being sodomized and through this experience becom-
ing acquainted with their own submissive homosexual desires. 
After hundreds of pages of hyper-macho, orgiastic fighting and 
fucking, the first detailed description of a vagina is treated as an 
obscenity, something Menenhetet only feels comfortable speak-
ing of since “the boy,” our narrator, is presumed to be asleep.72 
69 Matthew Barney, Q&A session following screening of River of Fundament, 
IFC Center, New York, December 6, 2015.
70 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 
314.




The anus, however, is treated with a kind of transcendent, uni-
versal reverence. Menenhetet tells us that: 
In Khert-Neter, there is a river of feces deep as a pit. Across 
it, the dead must swim. The Ka of all but the wisest, most pre-
pared, or the most courageous, will expire in that river, weep-
ing for their mother. They have forgotten how they came out 
of her. Between piss and shit are we born, and in water do we 
die the first time, slipping off to death on the release of our 
waters. […] [S]hame and waste may be buried in shit, but so 
is many a rich and tender sentiment as well. […] How then 
can this cauldron of emotion be no more than a burial cham-
ber? Is it not also part of the womb of all that is yet to come? 
Is not part of time reborn, by necessity, in shit? Where else 
can be found those unresolved passions which — frustrated, 
unworked, maniacal — must now labor twice as hard to ger-
minate the future?73
John Scanlan defines waste as “dead matter.”74 For Mailer’s an-
cient Egyptians, death is not the full stop that it is for modern 
mortals, and thus they are able to see more clearly the power of 
this “dead matter.” It is by dining on bat feces that Menenhetet (or 
“Norman” in Barney’s film) learns how to recycle his soul — by 
recycling lover into mother. “Excrement is full of all that is too 
despicable for us, but it also may contain all that we cannot af-
ford to take into ourselves — all that is too rich, too courageous, 
or too proud for our bearing.”75 Bataille holds ancient Egypt up 
as the pinnacle of what he calls “societies of consumption” as 
distinguished from societies of acquisition. Where today we are 
spiritually miserly, meager, the Ancient Egyptians were capa-
ble of building the pyramid, most prodigious and prodigal of 
tombs. Bataille and Mailer would have us see in such glorious 
extravagance possibilities attainable even by those of us whose 
73 Ibid., 69–70.
74 John Scanlan, On Garbage (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 115.
75 Mailer, Ancient Evenings, 207.
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relationship to death and time does not include the existence of 
an afterlife. For the Ancient Egyptians, it seems, we cannot, or 
do not use up our various potentials in a single lifetime — our 
bounty is as boundless as the sea. For modern humans, it seems 
we never have enough; people die full of regret, having fallen 
short, having lost the race, having failed to recoup, filled with 
bitterness that the world didn’t deliver all that it once promised. 
In taking death as merely a light suggestion, Mailer’s characters 
are less inclined to save themselves; potentially infinite chances 
lie before them, at least for the men. 
Mailer flips conventional models of time that associate the 
masculine with linearity and the feminine with cyclicality — the 
narrator’s mother Hathfertiti interjects at one point that 
“[w]omen search for the bottom of their grief. If they can find it, 
they are ready for another man. Why, if I were ever to weep for 
a lover and learn that my sorrow was bottomless, I would know 
he was the man I must follow into the Land of the Dead.”76 This 
idea of terminal grief is also a vision of excess, but shows woman 
revealed to herself not in infinitely repeatable acts of love or war, 
but in bereavement. Man is born to lay waste. Woman is born 
to lose. 
River of Fundament builds to an epic struggle between two 
“gods” vying for rule. A contemporary stand-in for Horus tricks 
a version of Set into eating Horus’s semen, after which a battle 
is staged in a dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, with hun-
dreds of spectators looking on. The film’s parallel narrative, fol-
lowing the reincarnations of the iconic American automobile, 
culminates here, too. We begin with the 1967 Chrysler Crown 
Imperial, a car Barney chose because of its reputation for being 
virtually indestructible. The Chrysler is transformed into a 1979 
Pontiac Firebird Trans Am, the last, best, example of the original 
muscle-car generation. At the end of the battle between Horus 
and Seth, the car is reborn again as a 2001 Ford Crown Victoria 
Police Interceptor, the vehicle of choice for twenty-first-century 




sive power of the state, not the uninhibited machismo of the 
cowboy, and it mirrors Norman’s inability to survive into a third 
self. War between equals gives way to state-sponsored violence. 
The scale shifts, and the individual will is subsumed by the col-
lective. These transfigurations and failed transfigurations reveal 
a self-destructive undercurrent to an apparently megalomania-
cal strain of American virility. The desire to dominate becomes 




Crisis of Imagination: The Anthropocene
 
The anthropocentric sense of life has been shaken. 
[…] There is a universal feeling, a universal fear, that 
our progress in controlling nature may increasingly 
help to weave that very calamity it is supposed to 
protect us from, that it may be weaving that second 
nature into which society has rankly grown.
 — Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics1 
With the advance of globalization, the question of where and 
how the US and other developed nations dispose of their waste 
has become increasingly vexed. Centuries of colonial and neo-
colonial exploitation have left much of the developing world po-
litically, economically, and infrastructurally crippled. It has also 
become clear that these same developing nations will bear the 
early brunt of the detrimental effects of climate change brought 
about by the more developed nations’ unrestrained greenhouse 
gas emissions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Impoverished African countries are the most vulnerable to dev-
astating droughts and low-lying, coastal, Southeast Asian coun-
tries to floods. We have entered what many scientists have come 
1 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 1973), 67.
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to refer to as the “Anthropocene,” the proposed designation for 
the present geological epoch, one in which human activity has 
made the most lasting impact on the changing planet, acidify-
ing the ocean, altering the atmosphere, and bringing about mass 
extinctions of plant and animal species.2 In 2018 the United Na-
tions’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a re-
port describing the disastrous effects of allowing the atmosphere 
to warm just 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 
2040, as we are currently on track to do: food shortages, the dis-
persal of invasive species, the loss of biodiversity, melting polar 
icecaps, rising sea levels, the spread of disease, and an increase 
in catastrophic isolated extreme weather events.3 In essence, for 
a child born today, the world will likely have been consumed by 
fire, flood, and tempest by the time she comes of age. According 
to the un report, we can avoid such an outcome only by totally 
and immediately transforming the world’s economy. Even once 
coal power is eliminated, existing emissions will linger in the 
atmosphere and continue to cause damage for years. 
It is all but inconceivable that we will transform the world’s 
economy quickly enough. Any hope we had evaporated with the 
election of Donald Trump, who has said that the notion of cli-
mate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese to make US 
manufacturing less competitive.4 The US has contributed more 
than any other country to the atmospheric carbon dioxide that 
is responsible for rising temperatures, but in 2017, Trump an-
nounced his intention to withdraw the US from the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change, “absent the identification of terms that 
are more favorable to the American people.”5 He has devoted 
2 Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature 415 (2000): art. 23. 
3 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Global Warming of 1.5°C, https://
www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/.
4 @realDonaldTrump (Donald J. Trump), Twitter, November 6, 2012, 
2:15pm, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385; 
Twitter, January 29, 2014, 1:27am, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/428414113463955457.
5 Jane A. Leggett, “Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris 




his presidency to eviscerating regulations designed to promote 
conservation domestically and frequently promises that his ad-
ministration will “bring back coal.” During the G7 summit in 
August 2019, as the Amazon rainforest burned, Trump declined 
to even make himself available for a meeting on climate change 
attended by the other six world leaders present.
In his book The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the 
Unthinkable, Amitav Ghosh argues that the impending climate 
catastrophe represents not so much a crisis of nature as a crisis 
of culture. Climate change poses a problem so enormous that 
the human imagination is confounded by it, with few artists able 
to address its consequences or imagine possible alternatives to 
our current suicide run. It is a reality that only becomes real 
when it is too late, when one’s home is already underwater. The 
government of Maldives, whose 350,000 inhabitants live on a 
collection of coral islands an average of just 2.1 meters above sea 
level, staged one of the most powerful performance art pieces 
about climate change to date when in 2009, cabinet members 
in scuba gear held a meeting underwater to sign a document 
calling on all countries to cut their emissions in preparation for 
a un climate change conference in Copenhagen. Their plea read:
We must unite in a world war effort to halt further tempera-
ture rises. Climate change is happening and it threatens the 
rights and security of everyone on Earth. We have to have a 
better deal. We should be able to come out with an amicable 
understanding that everyone survives. If Maldives can’t be 
saved today, we do not feel that there is much of a chance for 
the rest of the world.6
The imbalance between those nations responsible for produc-
ing the bulk of the waste and the nations now struggling most 
6 “Maldives Government Highlights the Impact of Climate Change — By 





desperately with its disposal was, perhaps inadvertently, under-
scored by Holoscenes, an ambitious project that Lars Jan’s com-
pany Early Morning Opera installed in Times Square in June 
2017 as a part of the World Science Festival. Without explicitly 
citing it as an influence, Holoscenes echoed the aesthetics of the 
Maldives cabinet meeting/performance at considerably greater 
expense. The performance took place inside a twelve-ton aquar-
ium in the middle of the pulsing heart of the consumerist West 
(it costs companies millions of dollars monthly to rent adver-
tising space on some of Times Square’s larger LED screens). A 
rotating cast of individual performers entered the empty aquar-
ium and began going about some piece of daily business such as 
reading a newspaper, making the bed, or tuning a guitar. Then 
a powerful custom hydraulic system would gradually flood the 
aquarium and the performers would struggle to complete their 
tasks as the water rose above their heads. 
The title Holoscenes puns on the warped, slice-of-life vi-
gnettes presented by the performers in shifts and the Holocene, 
the geological epoch. According to the International Commis-
sion on Stratigraphy, the body of geologists charged with deter-
mining the absolute ages of the earth’s rock layers, the Holocene 
began approximately 11,700 years ago and encompasses the en-
tire history of human civilization up to and including the pre-
sent. Other scientists believe that the Holocene has come to an 
end, and the philosopher Timothy Morton has suggested that 
the Anthropocene began with the invention of the steam engine 
in 1784.7 The stated aim of Jan’s project was to offer “an elemental 
portrait of our collective myopia, persistence, and for both bet-
ter and worse, adaptation” in the face of climate change.8 While 
the piece successfully conjured a vision of a future that might 
find wealthy New Yorkers inconvenienced by a soggy morn-
ing Times, it failed to take into account the irony of concocting 
7 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 4.




such an extravagantly wasteful ecologically-minded spectacle. 
In terms of environmental and aesthetic impact, the Maldives 
cabinet’s performance is clearly superior, even if they lacked the 
resources to put together a production on the scale of Jan’s. 
This imbalance is not accidental. When Lawrence Summers 
was vice president of the World Bank, he wrote a memo sug-
gesting that since many countries in the less-developed world 
“are vastly under-polluted,” wealthy nations such as the US 
could afford to pay poor countries to accept toxic waste prod-
ucts that we would prefer not to have decomposing in our own 
backyards.9 While the unequally distributed effects of pollution 
almost certainly pose the greatest long-term challenges for the 
planet, other forms of global inequality are not merely a thing 
of the future. Sixty-million tons of food (approximately $162 bil-
lion worth) are wasted each year in the United States.10 One-
third of all the food produced in the world is never consumed. 
This wasted food would be more than sufficient to feed all of the 
world’s 870 million hungry people.
Chekhov and His Discontents 
Anton Chekhov’s 1898 Uncle Vanya marks the beginning of 
Western theater artists’ attention to issues of ecology. Chekhov’s 
plays are also early exemplars of a dramaturgy of waste in that 
so much of what is of interest transpires in what goes unspoken, 
missed, squandered. There is often a kind of hole in Chekhov’s 
dramaturgy: dramatic activity is organized around non-events 
rather than events. The Cherry Orchard’s Lopakhin never pro-
poses to Varya. The Three Sisters’ Prozorov women never make it 
to Moscow. The thematic tug of war between love and work, eros 
9 Michael Perelman, Transcending the Economy: On the Potential of 
Passionate Labor and the Wastes of the Market (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 
7.
10 Ron Nixon, “Food Waste Is Becoming Serious Economic and 





and civilization, is the crux of Chekhov. Here, the latter is always 
reached for as a kind of palliative for the former. This agōn be-
tween pain and boredom, loneliness and disgust, is always pre-
sent. Where love (or the dream of it) is, like life, fleeting, work 
is, like death, permanent. Love flourishes only at the expense 
of work. Because work must eventually resume, love must end. 
All dreams suffer a similar fate in Chekhov. While issues 
of ecological waste and climate destruction are not the central 
concern, they loom over several of the plays, foreshadowing the 
havoc soon to be visited on a world privileging short-sighted, 
unsustainable rates of growth, productivity, and consumption. 
In Uncle Vanya, Astrov is a doctor who tends to the ailments of 
his fellow human beings, people whose pain can only be alle-
viated temporarily. He also thinks about longer-term interven-
tions into the suffering of the world. In his spare time, Astrov 
maps the countryside, comparing the footprint of the forests 
in successive generations and noting with concern the effects 
of deforestation and other manmade affronts to nature. He is a 
vegetarian. He plants trees. He is an early environmentalist with 
an alarmingly prescient outlook on the trajectory of human life 
on earth:
All our great woodlands are being leveled, millions of trees 
already gone, bird and animal habitats destroyed, rivers 
damned up and polluted—and all for what? Because we’re 
too lazy to look for other sources of energy! […] You have 
to be a barbarian to burn all that beauty in your stove, to 
destroy something that can never be replaced. We were born 
with the ability to reason and the power to create and be 
fruitful, but until now all we’ve done is destroy whatever we 
see. The forests are disappearing one by one, the rivers are 
polluted, wildlife is becoming extinct, the climate is changing 
for the worse, every day the planet gets poorer and uglier. It’s 
a disaster!11
11 Anton Chekhov, Uncle Vanya, in The Plays of Anton Chekhov, trans. Paul 
Schmidt (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 217.
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An overemphasis on productivity and short-term profit lay 
waste to the unquantifiable. Astrov embodies the best ideals of 
homo faber. His conservation work is intended to benefit subse-
quent generations, to spare what is beautiful in the world from 
waste, from being trampled over by successive generations of 
laborers unable to spare a thought for the future. 
Invoking the limitations of “shallow” ecology as contrasted 
with “deep” ecology, Una Chaudhuri finds that Astrov’s (and 
Chekhov’s) vision falls short. Articulated by the Norwegian phi-
losopher Arne Næss, the concept of “shallow ecology” focuses 
on short-term fixes without questioning the consumption-
oriented values and methods of the industrial economy that 
threaten the planet. These palliative measures might include the 
adoption of recycling programs or more stringent standards for 
automotive efficiency. “Deep ecology” refers to a radical reap-
praisal of humankind’s place in and relationship to the environ-
ment, learning to see the environment in terms of its intrinsic 
value, not as merely a repository of resources of potential value 
for human use.12 It emphasizes the pressing need for restruc-
turing society according to a philosophy that ascribes to every 
living thing the same dignity, importance, and right to exist that 
we automatically ascribe to human beings. “For all his innate 
love of the forest,” Chaudhuri argues, “Astrov cannot read his 
eco-maps ecologically, as a visual narrative of the ongoing de-
struction of nature by human beings; rather, he reads them as 
records of cultural deficiency.”13 For him, the only transcendent 
virtue is “beauty,” and his ecology, Chaudhuri says, “supports the 
fiction — convenient to a consumerist economic system — that 
nature is an eco-machine, a virtual factory pouring out a stream 
of raw materials to be transformed into commodities.”14
But beauty is not the enemy, and the pursuit of beauty need 
not be rejected as reifying a harmful division between nature 
12 See Arne Næss, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, 
trans. David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
13 Una Chaudhuri, “‘There Must Be a Lot of Fish in That Lake’: Toward an 




and the human. If we understand beauty to require a beholder, 
then indeed, it would appear that Astrov’s dream is to have all 
the earth handsomely arrayed before spectators like himself, 
those refined enough to appreciate nature as a work of art. But 
beauty is not beauty because it is beheld. The sort of beauty As-
trov is after is Kantian, “purposiveness […] without any repre-
sentation of a purpose.”15 What Astrov adores about the forests 
is that they exist for their own sake, perfect unto themselves. 
They do not seek to be other than what they are. Unlike human 
beings, trees are not twisted up with anxiety about the meaning 
and purpose of their lives. Any purpose they have aside from 
being itself is projected onto them from without. Humans chop-
ping them down and converting them into useful products is 
what destroys their beauty. The trees are unplagued by the de-
sire to shape the landscape according to their vision and will 
and, accordingly, will never be beset by the shame of having de-
stroyed something with a stronger claim to existence than them. 
For this, Astrov envies and admires them. 
Human beings, on the other hand, demand more. They are 
forever making improvements, forever raising their standards, 
and they create for themselves lives that increasingly require 
more work to be sustained. Work occupies a central place in 
the imaginations of Chekhov’s characters. It is scourge and sal-
vation and everything in between, different things to different 
people, but always fundamental. Inquiring about the time As-
trov invests in tending to the forests, Yelena asks, “it’s important, 
I suppose, but doesn’t it interfere with your real occupation? Be-
ing a doctor, I mean?” to which Astrov responds, “my real oc-
cupation? God only knows what that is.”16 Yelena, assuming that 
only the work one does for money can be a “real” occupation, 
is the opposite of inspired, industrious Astrov. She is constantly 
complaining of ennui. “If I don’t find something to do, I’ll die of 
boredom,” she says.
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (London: 
Macmilland & Co., 1914), 90.
16 Chekhov, Uncle Vanya, 216.
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SONYA: There’s plenty to do. You just have to want to do it.
YELENA: Like what?
SONYA: Help out around the place, or go teach school, or go 
be a nurse. Isn’t that enough? Before you and Papa came, 
Uncle Vanya and I used to take the flour to the market 
ourselves.
YELENA: I don’t know how to do those things. Besides, I’m 
not interested. Going out to teach the poor, nursing them, 
all those high moral ideals — that only exists in books. 
What do you expect me to do, run out and teach, just like 
that?
SONYA: Frankly, I don’t understand how you can not do 
something. You’d get used to it after a while.17
For Sonya there is never any question of whether to work or 
what to do. “We’ll take whatever fate sends us,” she tells Vanya 
in her closing speech, “[w]e’ll spend the rest of our lives doing 
other people’s work for them, we won’t know a minute’s rest, 
and then, when our time comes, we’ll die. And when we’re dead, 
we’ll say that our lives were full of pain, that we wept and suf-
fered, and God will have pity on us.”18 
Soviet ideologues have interpreted the play as an allegory of 
imminent class struggle, offering readings that identify Sonya 
as the lumpenproletarian who has partaken of the opiate of the 
masses and mistakes herself for some kind of martyr. For her, 
taking Christ as her pattern, life has meaning precisely because 
she has been persecuted and exploited. Yelena is the useless, 
decadent bourgeois, and Astrov, the revolutionary. He sees his 
medical practice as being relatively inconsequential, the treat-
ment he provides for the suffering of individual men and wom-
en as being woefully short-term, compensatory, inadequate to 
the larger challenges of his age. He is prepared to dedicate him-
self to working towards a goal that may not be achievable in 





Astrov’s great love is not humanity, neither the bourgeoisie nor 
the workers. As Bataille’s prehistoric man revered the animals 
he painted with greater care than he took with his self-portraits, 
Astrov reveres the trees, sees them as superior beings, perceives 
himself and all his kind as waste polluting their domain. This 
may be the deepest ecology of all.
“The Economy is the Crisis”: Ibsen and Ostermeier’s Enemy of the People
While Ibsen is not a deep ecologist, the plot of his An Enemy 
of the People (1882) also turns on questions of environmental 
waste, public health, and the priorities of civilization. After the 
play’s titular “enemy” Doctor Stockmann discovers that his 
town’s public baths have been dangerously contaminated, he at-
tempts to make his findings public. Expecting to be hailed as 
a hero for blowing the whistle, Stockmann instead finds him-
self assailed from all sides by members of the community intent 
on preventing such a disclosure out of concern for the possible 
repercussions on the town’s tourism economy. His brother and 
principle antagonist Mayor Stockmann opens the play trumpet-
ing that said baths “will become the very life-principle of our 
town.”19 The brothers were both instrumental in the creation of 
the baths. The doctor is more of an idea guy, while the mayor 
was the one responsible for working out the practical details. 
Theirs is a fraternal quarrel which complicates the relationship 
between capitalism and self-interest. The mayor is a proponent 
of what will be referred to in another place and time as “trickle-
down” economics. “The taxes for public welfare have been cut 
by a comfortable margin for the propertied classes,” he explains, 
“and will be still more if we can only have a really good summer 
this year — hordes of visitors — masses of invalids who can give 
the baths a reputation.”20 The mayor appears to represent the 
19 Henrik Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, in Four Major Plays, trans. Rolf 




voice of common sense. The ailments and injuries of others are 
inarguably good for business. For the propertied classes.
During Doctor Stockmann’s first tête-à-tête with his brother 
we learn that the two men are of different temperaments. The 
Mayor makes no attempt to conceal his disapproval of his broth-
er’s extravagant lifestyle. Offered roast beef and a hot toddy on 
an evening visit, he demurs in favor of bread, butter, and tea as 
“it’s healthier in the long run — and a bit more economical too.”21 
He is faintly repulsed by his brother’s newfound joie de vivre. 
“I’ve been feeling so buoyant and happy,” Doctor Stockmann ex-
claims controversially, “I can’t tell you how lucky I feel to be part 
of this life that’s budding and bursting out everywhere. What an 
amazing age we live in! It’s as if a whole new world were rising 
around us!”22 Having suffered through the pecuniary anxieties 
of the protracted adolescence that is graduate school, followed 
by a stint working a less lucrative job in a provincial town, Doc-
tor Stockmann at last finds himself in a position to live large. 
While the doctor’s drinking buddies fancifully aspire to being 
“Vikings” and “pagans,” Mayor Stockmann efficiently conveys 
that he finds his brother’s fondness for entertaining guests over 
meat and liquor to be both wasteful and immoral.23 This petty 
contest primes us for the real conflict; Doctor Stockmann is 
planning to publish an article about the baths, making public 
the contamination he has discovered. His motives are not en-
tirely pure — the doctor’s article will be an indictment of his 
brother’s implementation of the plans for the baths but will leave 
his own contribution, the general, sweeping vision, unsullied.
Doctor Stockmann is confident in his ability to persuade 
the town to rally behind him in part because he has faith in 
the “independent press.” The motives of the press, however, are 
not entirely pure either. An editor tries to coerce Doctor Stock-
mann’s daughter Petra into a romantic relationship on pain of 






editors who are so very enthusiastic about publishing the doc-
tor’s exposé are more interested in driving up readership with 
sensational material than with the actual public health crisis at 
hand. After languishing for some time at a sleepy local news bu-
reau, the prospect of a “big scoop,” whatever the consequences, 
is their primary motivator. Doctor Stockmann is also compro-
mised by a conflict of interest between his sense of altruism and 
his ego. As the newspapermen are reviewing the proofs of his 
article, Stockmann cannot help but interject about the “parade” 
the townsfolk might be tempted to throw for him and how he 
hopes to be able to enlist all available help in quashing such a 
spectacle. His integrity is called into question when he reveals 
himself to still be, at heart, the underachieving little brother, 
hungry for recognition. 
By Act Four, Doctor Stockmann has outgrown his ambitions 
as an environmental crusader; he has evolved into a radical phi-
losopher, a self-styled, Nietzschean Übermensch. Effecting spe-
cific changes in his local community no longer appeals to him; 
he has bigger fish to fry, namely the transvaluation of all values. 
But at the town hall meeting he convenes, we hear speculative 
murmurs in the pre-show audience about how there might be 
a concealed “strain of insanity” in the family or about how “the 
man drinks.”24 Afterwards, Stockmann is paid a startling visit 
by his father-in-law Morten Kiil, a wealthy man whose not very 
eco-friendly tannery sits just upstream from the polluted baths, 
itself apparently responsible for much of the contamination. Kiil 
has just purchased newly cheap shares in the baths, sinking all 
of Mrs. Stockmann and the children’s inheritance money into 
the very business venture Stockmann has spent the play trying 
to destroy. If he wants to guarantee the financial security of his 
family, Stockmann will have to renege on his crusade. The ab-
stract good of clean water for all must be balanced against the 
concrete evil of poverty for one’s own family. 
The talent of the visionary is the ability to perceive the ab-




den that must be borne by the realists working to preserve the 
existing order, which the visionary too often forgets requires 
constant vigilance and effort just to maintain. At the end of Ib-
sen’s play, after the entire Stockmann family has been put out of 
their jobs and ostracized for its patriarch’s politically bungled at-
tempt at whistle-blowing, Stockmann comes to the triumphant 
conclusion that “the strongest man in the world is the one who 
stands most alone.”25 His specific act of civic magnanimity is 
relinquished in favor of a great utopian project of progressive 
education, which he will pursue in the new world. Ibsen takes 
care to suggest, however, that this new visionary undertaking 
also stands a good chance of foundering on the shoals of reality. 
“Ah, come here, Katherine,” Stockmann says to his wife, full of 
pride and hope, “look at that sunlight, how glorious, the way it 
streams in today. And how wonderful and fresh the spring air 
is.” “Yes,” she responds, “if only we could live on sunlight and 
spring air, Thomas.”26 The “new world” beckons, but in the new 
world, freedom is equated with “free” enterprise. Stockmann’s 
wife and child will have to subsidize his refusal to capitulate to 
the will of the masses by living in poverty. 
Ibsen wrote Enemy of the People immediately after his icono-
clastic play Ghosts was met with a storm of reactionary criti-
cism, and he almost certainly saw parts of himself in Doctor 
Stockmann. The saviors of the people will be perceived as en-
emies if they advocate for radical change, even if it is necessary 
change. But Ibsen is critical of Doctor Stockmann’s deficiencies 
as a politician. Stockmann may welcome instability as a creative 
opportunity, but to achieve anything, he must understand that 
the majority will never respond well to the threat of chaos. 
In his 2012 Schaubühne production of Enemy of the People, 
German director Thomas Ostermeier drives into this latent 
theme of the democratic political process. With large-scale eco-
logical catastrophe presenting a far more pressing concern than 





frame-breaking debate on the state of contemporary capitalism, 
with spectators encouraged to square off against the performers 
and each other. Ostermeier augments and updates Stockmann’s 
town hall speech with references to the 2008 financial crisis: 
“The economy isn’t in crisis. The economy is the crisis!” He also 
rails against the over-prescription of productivity-enhancing 
drugs such as Ritalin, European austerity programs, and the dis-
integration of the public sphere. As the production remains in 
the repertoire and tours, the catalogue of contemporary mala-
dies evolves and expands. 
Even as originally written by Ibsen this scene violates the 
economics of production by demanding a crowd of people on-
stage in a play that otherwise calls for only nine actors. Drama-
turgically speaking, Ostermeier’s town hall scene is a “wasteful” 
moment. If no one in the audience chooses to speak up, or if 
what they have to say is banal, irrelevant, or badly expressed, 
Ostermeier runs the risk of seeing his taut drama go slack. This 
was partially the case when the production toured to the Brook-
lyn Academy of Music in 2013. When large groups of strangers 
(the Harvey Theater seats 874) attempt to engage in open dia-
logue about their collective priorities, the result cannot but be 
somewhat chaotic. The voices that come to dominate are seldom 
the voices of the most informed. Complex and unfamiliar ideas 
take more courage and charisma to introduce successfully. It is 
easier to build consensus around negative observations than 
around positive proposals, easier to generate applause by calling 
for revolution than by laying out a plan for precisely how to bal-
ance the competing demands of economic development and en-
vironmental protection. Critique therefore carries the day, and 
it begins to become clear why policymaking is best conducted 
behind closed doors by a handful of specialists. Still, time-con-
suming as it is, articulating what a community does not value 
is a key step on the way to articulating what a community does 
value. The Times critic Charles Isherwood felt that the Brook-
lyn iteration of Ostermeier’s town hall scene “derailed” the pro-
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duction.27 But in creating a space for the messy, inefficient, and 
at times boring process of politics in a democratic society, Os-
termeier eloquently demonstrates that wasted time is the price 
that should and must be paid to control the ecological waste 
threatening the townspeople of Ibsen’s play, and, now, all of us. 
The shortsighted prioritization of efficiency and profits quickly 
turned will be far costlier in the long run. To survive, we must 
all become visionaries, capable of perceiving the abstract as con-
crete. Deep down, however, it seems we do not wish to survive.
Despoiled Shores
Heiner Müller’s 1981 Despoiled Shore Medea-material Landscape 
with Argonauts is a landscape play in Gertrude Stein’s sense. It 
is not that the landscape is a character; the play is a landscape. 
As such, it asks spectators for a different kind of engagement. 
Rather than presenting a human audience with representations 
of themselves to identify with, empathize with, project onto, the 
landscape play asks spectators to wander through, removing 
human subjectivity from the center of the event to the great-
est extent possible. In our anthropocentric world, the landscape 
play offers spectators the increasingly unfamiliar opportunity to 
experience themselves as incidental. 
In Despoiled Shore, unpardonable crimes against human-
ity are set beside crimes against nature. The modern world 
is a wasteland strewn with “torn menstrual napkins,” “dead 
fish,” “[c]ookie boxes,” and “[f]eces.”28 It is populated by “chil-
dren lay[ing] out landscapes with trash,” “dead negroes,” and 
“[z]ombies perforated by advertising spots.”29 Müller, who regu-
larly works with scraps of the classics, chooses Euripides’ Me-
27 Charles Isherwood, “An Ibsen Who Rages over Ritalin and Economic 
Austerity Plans,” New York Times, November 7, 2013, https://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/08/theater/reviews/a-contemporary-enemy-of-the-people-at-
the-harvey-theater.html.
28 Heiner Müller, Hamletmachine and Other Texts for the Stage, ed. and trans. 




dea as an intertext here, giving us as our primary recognizable 
human being a mythological mother known for murdering her 
own children for spite. She is our image, the one we pretend 
we cannot see as we continue murdering the futures of subse-
quent generations, bringing the earth ever-closer to uninhabit-
ability. Müller’s stage directions note that the third part of the 
play, “Landscape with Argonauts,” “presumes the catastrophes 
which mankind is working toward. The theatre’s contribution 
to their prevention can only be their representation. The land-
scape might be a dead star where a task force from another age 
or another space hears a voice and discovers a corpse.”30 Earth’s 
star has gone out. The undead survivors of the twentieth cen-
tury who linger on are phantoms, beams of light that were ex-
tinguished long before they entered our field of vision. It is too 
late to put things right: “The youth of today ghosts of / The dead 
of the war that is to happen tomorrow  / YET WHAT REMAINS 
IS CREATED BY BOMBS.”31 Humankind has fully relinquished 
control of its destiny to the technologies of destruction it has 
wrought. When Müller speaks of planned obsolescence, he re-
fers to television sets and to bodies slated for the expiration in 
the predicted nuclear holocaust. Müller melds Medea with the 
despoiled landscape in this play; she speaks univocally with 
the earth. “A woman is the familiar ray of hope / BETWEEN THE 
THIGHS / DEATH STILL HAS HOPE” is her dark manifesto.32 Hope 
for death? For an escape from death? This mother/earth refuses, 
as Bonnie Marranca puts it, to be “eternal,” a utopia. She will no 
longer be an inexhaustible trove of resources for man, for chil-
dren, for the imaginary of an exhausted civilization.
Pathological Superiority: Grasses of a Thousand Colors
Wallace Shawn has observed that, pace Darwin, humans “still 






part of nature.”33 As a species, we have developed certain ex-
traordinary abilities, and throughout history we have been more 
or less exultant about those special abilities and all that they 
have allowed us to accomplish. “Then in the twentieth century,” 
Shawn says, 
it became clear that our special abilities made us capable 
of something unknown among the other species of the 
world — we seemed to have the ability to exterminate our-
selves. Now in the twenty-first century, we see that our spe-
cial abilities enable us to extinguish all living things and life 
itself. So the period of crowing about the marvelousness of 
our species has sort of come to an end.34
This stubborn and pernicious conceptual divide between nature 
and the human is perpetuated by capitalism. Jason Moore ar-
gues that the Anthropocene is still not specific enough a term to 
describe the epoch of self-destruction in which we are currently 
living, proposing “Capitalocene” as a preferable alternative that 
takes into account capitalism’s accumulation strategy: “Cheap 
Nature. For capitalism, Nature is ‘cheap’ in a double sense: to 
make Nature’s elements ‘cheap’ in price; and also to cheapen, 
to degrade or to render inferior in an ethico-political sense.”35 
Donna Haraway goes further still, suggesting “Chthulucene” as 
a better name, one that deprivileges the tragic human story and 
acknowledges that there was life before us and will be life after 
us. Our demise is not the end, only perhaps an end. The Chthu-
lucene is made up of “ongoing multispecies stories and practices 
of becoming-with in times that remain at stake, in precarious 
times, in which the world is not finished and the sky has not fall-
33 Wallace Shawn, “The Art of Theater No. 17,” interview by Hilton Als, 
The Paris Review 201 (Summer 2012), https://www.theparisreview.org/
interviews/6154/wallace-shawn-the-art-of-theater-no-17-wallace-shawn.
34 Ibid. 
35 Jason W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the 
Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2016), 2–3.
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en—yet.”36 Even if our time is up, we can and should still work 
to improve the lot of those other beings. To ignore our kinship 
with them is to insist on bringing what we call the natural world 
down with us. In his Grasses of a Thousand Colors Shawn ima-
gines a world finally expiring after suffering through the long 
illness of this imposed nature/society binary.
Grasses is narrated mainly by Ben, played by Shawn in the 
2013 Public Theater production. Early on, Ben informs us that 
his own dick is his best friend, perhaps his only real friend. The 
most significant relationship Ben has with a separate life form is 
his intense, sexual relationship with a cat named Blanche. The 
play juxtaposes narrated scenes of wild, interspecies, orgiastic 
rites with piecemeal hints at the novel method the human race 
has found for exterminating itself. In addition to being a man of 
rather peculiar sexual predilections, Ben is a megalomaniacal 
scientist who doesn’t see himself that way. His optimistic gen-
eration of fixers and improvers “solved” the problem of food 
scarcity by engineering a set of biological and ecological modi-
fications that made it possible for animals (and, we are left to 
assume, humans) to live off the flesh of their own kind and to 
multiply at accelerated rates. Ben’s scientific contributions to the 
new cannibalistic world order have made him wealthy — and 
backfired spectacularly. With the food chain disrupted, animals 
are dropping dead in droves and humans are heading in that 
direction, incapacitated by increasingly frequent bouts of vom-
iting. Such eventualities were made to seem not at all improb-
able by rhyming real-world events that began appearing in the 
news after Grasses premiered — half of the endangered Saiga an-
telope population mysteriously dying in the space of two weeks 
in Kazakhstan in 2015, for example. As Elizabeth Kolbert dem-
onstrates in The Sixth Extinction, by the end of the twenty-first 
century, human activity will have resulted in the elimination 
of twenty to fifty percent of all living species on earth. Grasses 
presents an impressionistic picture of the Anthropocene (or 
36 Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 55.
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Capitalocene or Chthulucene) period unfurling; the fact that 
“humans change the world” is our distinction if not our honor.37
Though in Grasses, Ben is presented as the principle architect 
of this cataclysm, he disavows all responsibility, and the play in-
stead focuses on his extensive erotic adventures and misadven-
tures. With world hunger vanquished, it seems overpopulation 
no longer presents the threat it once did, and the libidinously 
turbocharged planet seems determined to go down in a blaze 
of orgasmic glory. The basic drives — for food and sex — have 
been thrown out of whack. Perhaps the body revolts at the sug-
gestion that it could experience both hunger and sexual desire 
for the same kind of creature. In Grasses it is as though sex (in 
all kinds of surreal and occasionally unvisualizable configura-
tions) comes rushing in to fill the void left by nourishment of 
the caloric variety. The farther the human race gets from “na-
ture” or the “natural order,” the closer humans are, perversely, 
drawn back to it. The play ends in a swamp of abjection, and 
it ultimately becomes impossible to distinguish between the 
human and the animal. In the Public Theater production, pro-
jections of Julie Haggerty, the actress playing Ben’s wife Cerise, 
show her slowly morphing into a cat (the cat?) as she sends mes-
sages from a refuge in the countryside where she has fled to es-
cape the horrors of the pandemic. All that remains is the residue 
of humanity, the traces of the destruction the human species 
has left in its wake. Just before the end of a play, Cerise/Blanche 
shows Ben a photo album, the book of his life, a record of his 
legacy. The photographs show only “black landscapes, covered 
with — naked? — well, they were dead animals, I guess, cats and 
other animals, but the bodies were misshapen, bloated, the skin 
was broken.” Shortly thereafter, Ben adds his own corpse to the 
pile. In contrast to the violent, painful deaths of the animals, 
Ben’s demise is depicted as peaceful, welcome, even beautiful; 
Cerise/Blanche leads him out to an open field and soothingly 
explains as he lays himself down that “while vomiting was awful, 
37 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2014), 266.
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and suffering was awful, death in itself was a trivial process, […] 
She herself had been through it a number of times, and it was 
literally nothing.” Blanche/Cerise seems to exist on some kind of 
magical morphological continuum that transcends the confines 
of time and space. She is woman, animal, dead, alive, animate, 
inanimate, past, present, and future. Ben is bounded by his 
body, wholly identified with his penis and its hopes and dreams. 
“Most things,” Blanche/Cerise continues, “aren’t alive in the first 
place, and they never were, […] it’s not particularly tragic to be 
a chair or a rock, and obviously the spark of life which occasion-
ally flares up will inevitably go out, and it’s not a problem, and it 
doesn’t call for a hysterical response.”38 Human, Shawn posits in 
Grasses, is a kind of generalized hysterical condition, rather than 
a superior, or even distinct, kind of organism. 
What has long been considered superior about the human 
species ends by tipping over into its opposite. As Benjamin’s an-
gel of history confronts us with the products of human progress, 
the waste of progress, Grasses stages the terminus of human 
evolution, suggesting the possibility that perhaps humanity has 
been merely a great cancerous growth that spread, devouring 
everything its path. Aware on some level that we are sick, that 
we are a sickness, we divide and divide, seeking to keep at least 
one group between ourselves and the animals with whom we 
must deny kinship. Only the need for food and the need for sex 
persist as constant reminders that we are made of the same stuff. 
We need the lie but feel ashamed for needing it, so are always on 
the lookout for those whose repudiation of animality, of nature, 
can be identified as insufficient, flawed, and therefore subhu-
man. 
Posthuman Otherness
Woman has historically been seen as closer to animality and 
therefore less human than Man. For Aristotle, women were 




prone to shame. Throughout the medieval period, women were 
believed to have “weak intellects.”39 For Freud, the trouble was 
that women took a “very circuitous path” to psychosexual devel-
opmental maturity and were consequently left only imperfectly 
capable of sublimation. The gendering of Shawn’s radical gesture 
towards the posthuman in the figure of Blanche/Cerise recalls 
Müller’s treatment of Medea or The Task’s lady Liberty. Like 
Müller’s men, Shawn’s Ben epitomizes a particular totalizing, 
ossified, outmoded genre of male subjectivity, one that is shown 
in Grasses to be a contributing cause of the end of life on earth. 
In the final moments of Grasses, as in Despoiled Shore, Woman’s 
otherness is sought out as a last resort — only after the white, 
bourgeois, heterosexual male narratives appear to have exhaust-
ed themselves. This is a dramaturgical move at least as old as 
Faust, drawn ever-onward and -upward by his “eternal” femi-
nine. Having long interpreted their experiences through those 
of men, the ones that get written down and called “neutral” or 
“universal,” women are always already (at least) bilingual. An 
authentic encounter with alterity, Emmanuel Levinas writes, is 
the most revealing experience of our own humanity that it is 
possible to have; we experience ourselves as profoundly respon-
sible for the other, “infinitely responsible.” It is a responsibility, 
he writes, “to which I am wanting and faulty. It is as though I 
were responsible for his mortality, and guilty for surviving.”40 
In psychoanalytic terms, survivor’s guilt emerges from the self 
perceiving itself as excessive, unjustified, and somehow existen-
tially unjust — waste, a remainder rendered meaningless with-
out those to and for whom he was responsible. When Woman 
is simply called in to clean up after the men have made a mess 
of things, we see “responsibility” flowing, again, in just one di-
rection, and from the Levinasian perspective it is precisely the 
wrong direction. Finally, they each in their own way arrive at a 
39 Teresa of Ávila, Book of My Life, trans. Mirabai Starr (Boston: New Seeds 
Books, 2007), 89.




reconciliation of Levinas’s dictum that “ethics precedes ontol-
ogy” and the possibilities of posthumanism. A posthumanist 
worldview admits that the human is not the center of exist-
ence. Humans have never been entirely distinct from animals, 
and they are coming to more closely resemble machines with 
each passing day. Individual human beings are forged in the dif-
ferentiating crucibles of culture and history. The posthumanist 
takes the view that there is nothing universal about the human 
essence and that, therefore, humanism is both theoretically and 
practically incoherent. Fukuyama may have been right. But if 
we are post-history, it is not because we are post-ideology but 
because we are post-human.
Rachel Rosenthal’s Ecofeminism
A growing body of research suggests that climate change skepti-
cism is bound up with antifeminism. Climate change deniers 
perceive that the real threat is to a certain kind of modern in-
dustrial masculinity and not to the environment.41 Egalitarian 
concern for the latter is seen as feminine, while the observation 
of a hierarchical separation between humans and nature is seen 
as more masculine. The ecofeminist performance artist Rachel 
Rosenthal thematizes this strand of misogyny, harnessing her 
myriad experiences of otherness to conjure transformative em-
pathy for the earth. If women have been thought to derive their 
superior compassion — their intuition of the interconnected-
ness of all things — from their experience of realized or poten-
tial maternity, Rosenthal deconstructs this essentialism. She 
does not celebrate the pleasing or pleasurable aspects of wom-
anhood. Instead, she elevates the difficult, and even mortifying 
dimensions of occupying her queer, female-gendered body. It is 
her suffering that connects her with the suffering of the world, 
and she claims the earth as her kin while distancing herself from 
41 Jonas Anshelm and Martin Hultman, “A Green Fatwā? Climate Change As 
a Threat to the Masculinity of Industrial Modernity,” NORMA: International 
Journal for Masculinity Studies 9, no. 2 (2014): 85.
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the conventional signifiers of femininity. In Rosenthal’s 1990 
solo piece Pangaean Dreams: A Shamanic Journey, she overlays 
a meditation on the sundering of the original single continent 
of the earth, Gaia, with autobiographical rage and revelations 
having to do with the more humiliating and revolting aspects of 
being female. Rosenthal engages in a dialogue with the chronic 
pain that plagues her, rendering that pain as a character she calls 
the Autonomous Being. She places her broken body in conver-
sation with the broken world and finds affinity in their shared 
finitude. 
Performing solo into her seventies, Rosenthal asked specta-
tors to confront the specter of the aging female body in a way 
seldom required of them. Our culture has turned the post-
menopausal female body into a kind of memento mori. Wil-
liam Viney has argued that when we consign an object to the 
garbage can, we are situating ourselves within a narrative of 
“use-time.” As something becomes waste, “[m]atter, and thus 
time, becomes organized in relation to our activities of human 
use and non-use, by a temporal separation structured by what 
is considered unproductive and uninhabited.”42 Rosenthal rec-
ognizes that this temporal separation is applied to the bodies 
of women and their perceived expiration dates as well. In her 
piece L.O.W. in Gaia, Rosenthal identifies herself as the “Crone,” 
hated by all because her body, unable to bring forth life, conjures 
death. Even while the evidence of female fertility in the form of 
menstrual blood is among the most feared and loathed of hu-
man waste products, the infertile female is herself consigned 
to the category of human waste. For the Crone reminds us, as 
Rosenthal puts it, not of heroic or “meaningful” death, but of 
the decidedly unglamorous deaths most of us die, preceded by 
disease and decrepitude, a slow slide into mortifying passivity 
and obsolescence. Rosenthal uses her dying body as a metaphor 
for the dying earth, a victim of masculine violence, attempted 
commodification, and exploitative technologies. 




Stifters Dinge: Posthuman Theater
Samuel Beckett is quoted by one of his biographers as saying that 
“[t]he best possible play is one in which there are no actors, only 
the text. I’m trying to find a way to write one.”43 The German 
composer and director Heiner Goebbels may have come closest 
to achieving Beckett’s dream with his 2007 performance instal-
lation Stifters Dinge, a play for a posthuman world. Inspired by 
the writings of the nineteenth-century Austrian writer Adalbert 
Stifter, the piece is performed by five mechanized pianos on a 
dynamic set that evokes the world without us. Goebbels is less 
interested in Beckett’s formal perfection than in the implications 
for culture of the self-inflicted extinction of the human being. 
Stifter’s writings are distinguished by their tremulously vivid 
and detailed descriptions of the natural world. Long passages 
tracing the changing light reflecting off of a glacier, the veins of a 
leaf, or the texture of a stone assume more narrative prominence 
than any account of human action or awareness. The revulsion 
Stifter felt for industrial modernity manifested itself in his texts 
as a profound reverence for things, animate or inanimate. His 
landscape writing created a context for letting the diverse insen-
tient beings of the world be, to let being itself be, as Heidegger 
would put it. As capitalism advances and accelerates, pulver-
izing and clearing that which cannot be commodified, Stifter’s 
humble, elegiac observations rescue things from being captured 
and either exploited for profit or destroyed. Cradled in his re-
ceptive consciousness, things become eloquent, their very lack 
of subjectivity elevating them to a plane of existence surpassing 
perfection, the plane of the sublime.
Goebbels translates Stifter’s prose for the stage into music and 
images that invite the spectator to reduce her customary pace to 
the speed of insects, growing moss, melting snow. The sounds 
43 Walter Kerr, “The Love between Beckett and Actors Isn’t Mutual,” New 





issuing from the disemboweled pianos include harsh sounds of 
machinery, snatches of Bach melodies, mysterious percussion, 
and recorded human voices speaking or singing across time 
and space in a variety of languages. A long, recorded passage 
of Stifter’s prose is played, describing the sound of thousands of 
frozen tree branches rattling against one another like so many 
bells chiming. The first and last time we see human beings is 
when two unobtrusive technicians dressed in black enter at the 
top of the show to sprinkle what appears to be salt or sand into 
shallow troughs covering the floor of what we would call the 
“playing space” in a different kind of production. The techni-
cians leave, and hoses fill the troughs with water. The mise-en-
scène is then dominated by rippling smoke on water, projected 
images of landscape paintings, and the slow, eerie movement of 
entire set. The elaborately mutilated player pianos sit on plat-
forms out of which barren trees also grow, and this whole appa-
ratus gradually glides on a track towards the audience, until it is 
just feet from the first row. Its approach feels like the imminent 
end of the world. But then, unexpectedly, the trees and pianos 
recede, eventually resuming their original position upstage. 
As we witness this movement, we hear the recorded voice of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss say, “I don’t believe there is any reason” to 
have faith in humankind. The trees and the music of the icicles 
cracking and falling from their branches will persist even after 
we have exterminated ourselves. The spectator, the excess, the 




Debt and the Refugee
 
In Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts, Zygmunt Bauman 
argues that, along with traditional industrial waste, refugees, 
migrants, the chronically unemployed, and other such groups 
of “undesirables” are “the waste of globalization.”1 The fate of 
this “human waste” is the price necessarily paid for what we call 
progress. It no longer makes sense to speak of discrete refugee 
crises; it seems likely that we have entered a period of perpetual 
refugee crisis. If the legacy of colonialism and Western military 
intervention in the developing world were not enough to create 
massive instability and displacement, the intensifying climate 
crisis has begun the process of rendering the earth uninhabit-
able. As we wait for the water wars to begin in earnest, popula-
tions facing extreme weather and increasingly unreliable access 
to vital natural resources will continue to uproot their families 
and set out for lands perceived to be more stable, more wealthy, 
and generally better equipped to withstand the approaching ca-
tastrophe. 
The mass human “waste” produced by this malignant tri-
ad — imperialism, war, and ecological disaster — is regularly 
invoked by right-wing politicians as a hostile enemy force that 
1 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (New York: 
Polity Press, 2003), 5.
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has arisen independent of Western activities. In September of 
2015 as the European Union was staring down an accelerating 
refugee situation, Polish MEP (Member of the European Parlia-
ment) Janusz Korwin-Mikke took to the European Parliament 
floor to rail against welfare policies perceived as facilitating the 
influx of migrants:
If we were to abolish social benefits, there wouldn’t be any 
people coming to Poland and the whole Europe [sic] just to 
live off of handouts. People willing to work are valuable, but 
they are being sent back to their countries and we take in 
those unwilling to work. This is a ridiculous policy that re-
sults in Europe being flooded with human garbage.2
“Let’s state this clear,” he continued for emphasis, “human gar-
bage that does not want to work. The America [sic] built its pow-
er because it took in immigrants willing to work and did not give 
any handouts. We are ruining Europe.”3 Around the same time, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron warned of a “swarm of 
people coming across the Mediterranean.” Donald Trump pre-
fers to describe asylum-seekers and migrants in terms of floods 
and flows, though he has also used the term “shithole coun-
tries” to describe their homelands.4 By metaphorically linking 
the refugee with plague, pestilence, and filth, such language de-
individuates and strips its referents of human qualities, making 
it easier to incite xenophobic fear.
The contagion visited by the dirty outsider, at best a useless 
freeloader, at worst a violent menace, has become a danger in-
voked constantly by the Western liberal democracies Fukuyama 
2 BreakingNews, “Deputy Describes as ‘Human Garbage’ Syrian Refugees 




4 Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., “Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging 
Words for Haiti and Africa,” New York Times, January 11, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/us/politics/trump-shithole-countries.html.
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extols. When refugees are not being linked to literal human 
waste, they are often discussed in terms of waste management 
or elimination. After the Obama administration announced in 
2015 that the us would take in at least ten thousand Syrian refu-
gees over the following year, the New York Times reported that 
at a hearing to address community concerns about the coming 
influx in one South Carolina town, 
a woman asked if the refugees could be sent home on “troop 
ships.” A man asked if they could be sent on a plane to Saudi 
Arabia. When he was told that they could not, his frustration 
mounted. “Do we shoot them?” he asked, to laughter and ap-
plause. “Come on! I mean, this is crazy.”5
White Americans alarmed by the changing demographics of 
their communities found their champion in a man hitherto a 
stranger to politics aside from his sole credit as high-profile 
propagator of the “birther” movement, designed to delegitimize 
the first black president by calling on Barack Obama to release 
his birth certificate. Ostensibly motivated by the desire to verify 
that Obama was in fact born in the United States, the goal of 
birtherism was to remind Americans that, no matter where they 
were born, how accomplished or how devoted to public service 
they are, black people are not “real” Americans. Donald Trump 
kicked off his bid for the Republican presidential nomination 
by conjuring the threat of the violent, amoral immigrant as he 
articulated his vision for “making America great again,” opining 
that
[w]hen Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the 
best — they’re not sending you. They’re sending people that 
have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems. 
5 Richard Fausset, “Refugee Crisis in Syria Raises Fears in South 





They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rap-
ists. And some, I assume, are good people.6
Trump later called for an outright ban on Muslims entering 
the United States. Ignoring the irreversible damage automation 
has done to unskilled workers in the US manufacturing sector, 
Trump instead redirected the anger of Rust Belt Americans star-
ing down increasingly precarious economic futures toward the 
Chinese, whom he often characterized as “stealing our jobs” 
and, contrary to longstanding conservative orthodoxy, Trump 
campaigned on a platform of trade isolationism.
The nationalist and nativist resurgence, with the attendant 
calls for razor wire fences and walls, followed a predictable pat-
tern, coming on the heels of a financial crisis that had bedeviled 
Europe and the US since 2008. The European Union had ap-
peared to be teetering on the precipice of dissolution during the 
Greek debt crisis, and then in the June 2016 “Brexit” referendum 
Britons voted to abandon ship. And then Trump won.
Once he took office, Trump’s administration instituted a 
“zero tolerance” policy for illegal immigration, meaning that 
anyone crossing the border unlawfully would be prosecuted to 
the full extent of a law only selectively enforced under previ-
ous administrations. At the same time, many designated ports 
of entry were closed to asylum seekers attempting to enter the 
US legally. As a result, thousands of children were separated 
from their parents at the border separating the US and Mexico. 
Parents were dispatched to be prosecuted and deported while 
their minor children were forcibly taken from them by US Cus-
toms and Border Protection and held in chain-link cages. Newly 
unaccompanied infants and toddlers were sent to one of three 
“tender age shelters” in southern Texas. The response from the 
international community was swift and damning. United Na-
6 Alexander Burns, “Choice Words from Donald Trump, Presidential 
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tions High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hus-
sein called on the US to end the practice, explaining that “the 
American Association of Pediatrics has called this cruel practice 
‘government-sanctioned child abuse’ which may cause ‘irrepa-
rable harm,’ with ‘lifelong consequences’.” The thought that any 
State would seek to deter parents by inflicting such abuse on 
children is unconscionable.”7 
In response, the US withdrew from the Human Rights Coun-
cil. While Trump officially ended the policy of family separa-
tion by executive order in June 2018, and a federal judge ordered 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to reunite the children 
with their parents by the end of July 2018, the deadline came and 
went with many children remaining in limbo. Some affected 
families spoke no English or Spanish, only indigenous languag-
es, making translation more difficult, and of course many of the 
“tender age” detainees had no access to language of any kind. 
Having already deported hundreds of parents back to countries 
such as Honduras and Guatemala, the Trump administration 
had no immediately apparent way of locating them or recon-
necting them with their children. By the summer of 2019 Bor-
der Patrol was still detaining thousands of children at a time in 
overcrowded facilities without adequate food or access to show-
ers or toothbrushes. Holocaust survivor Yoka Verdoner wrote 
that the border separations were “as evil and criminal as what 
happened to me and my siblings as children in Nazi Europe.”8
7 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, “Opening Statement and Global Update of Human 
Rights Concerns by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid 
Ra’ad Al Hussein at 38th Session of the Human Rights Council,” United 
Nations Human Rights Council, June 18. 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23206&LangID=E.
8 Yoka Verdoner, “Nazis Separated Me from My Parents as a Child. The 





Fassbinder and West German Schuld
Without endorsing the equivalence Verdoner suggests in her 
comparison, it is clear that the two atrocities shared a symbolic 
language. The Holocaust was a tragedy of waste made possible 
by the conversion of great swaths of humanity — Jews, commu-
nists, so-called “gypsies,” homosexuals, the disabled — into lit-
eral and metaphorical waste, garbage to be disposed of in order 
to cleanse and strengthen the surviving Aryan race. For Nazi 
functionaries to send their victims to the gas chamber, the Jew’s 
status as a human had first to be comprehensively undermined. 
She was no longer an individual but a unit of rubbish. Acquiring 
the power to enact this transfiguration in one’s mind was a part 
of an S.S. officer’s on-the-job training. In Life Unworthy of Life: 
Racial Phobia and Mass Murder in Hitler’s Germany, James M. 
Glass relates how 
Franz Stangl, commandant of Treblinka [in German-occu-
pied Poland], described the moment he began to think of the 
Jews under his supervision not as humans, but as “cargo”: 
“I think it started the day I first saw the Totenlager [burial 
pits] in Treblinka. I remember Wirth [who oversaw exter-
minations in Belsen, Sobibor, and Treblinka] standing there, 
next to the pits full of blue-black corpses. It had nothing to 
do with humanity — it couldn’t have; it was a mass — a mass 
of rotting flesh. Wirth said, “What shall we do with this gar-
bage?… I rarely saw them as individuals. It was always a huge 
mass.”9
West German playwright and filmmaker Rainer Werner Fass-
binder was born in 1945, just weeks after the end of the Second 
World War, making him a part of the first generation of Ger-
mans to fully grapple with their nation’s guilt. Fassbinder made 
no attempt to represent the Holocaust directly, an aesthetic en-
9 James M. Glass, Life Unworthy of Life: Racial Phobia and Mass Murder in 
Hitler’s Germany (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 9.
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deavor many judge to be either impossible, obscene, or both. In-
stead, Fassbinder assiduously ferreted out the underlying anxi-
eties that made the rise of fascism possible, paying particular 
attention to those that survived the Second World War and con-
tinued to plague West German society. The Endlösung or “Final 
Solution” was not, after all, conceived as a meaningless inferno 
of waste but as an efficient way to make Germany great again by 
purging it of “unproductive” members of society. The surviving 
German valorization of efficiency, Fassbinder worried, might 
prove more insidiously deadly than overt anti-Semitism. 
In his 1975 play Garbage, the City, and Death, Fassbinder uses 
grotesquely amplified, stereotypical characters and attitudes to 
foreground the racially directed, economic fears that served as 
a pretext for the consolidation of Nazi influence and eventu-
ally for the Holocaust. The Jewish people have variously been 
blamed for the worst excesses of capitalism, communism, and 
anything else for which insecure societies have required a scape-
goat throughout human history. Jews have been suspected both 
of orchestrating the Bolshevik Revolution as part of a conspir-
acy for world domination and, more commonly, of siphoning 
capital away from “productive” members of society with their 
supposedly usurious lending practices and generally mercenary 
way of life. Even Marx, himself ancestrally Jewish, was con-
vinced that “[m]oney is the jealous god of Israel, beside which 
no other god may exist. Money abases all the gods of mankind 
and changes them into commodities. […] Money is the alienat-
ed essence of man’s work and existence; this essence dominates 
him and he worships it. The god of the Jews has been secularized 
and has become the god of this world.”10 If is to some degree 
true that Jews have historically gravitated to professions such as 
banking and law, this is in large part due to millennia of anti-Se-
mitic restrictions placed on the rights of Jews to own property, a 
precondition for the pursuit of occupations traditionally seen as 
more “wholesome” or productive, such as agriculture. Promul-
10 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx–Engels Reader, ed. 
Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 50.
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gating the stereotype of the urban, nomadic, parasitic Jew who 
lacks the properly moral and patriotic connection to land and 
country was one of the ways in which the Nazis were able to sow 
the suspicion and fear they needed to win their propaganda war 
against the Jewish people.
In Garbage, the City, and Death Fassbinder hypostatizes 
the persistent German paranoia about Jewish economic influ-
ence after the Second World War. Seyla Benhabib has observed 
that making the character of the Nazi in the play a transvestite, 
“someone who becomes something at night that he is not during 
the day,” reflects the way Fassbinder saw West German society, 
where he found “fascism lurking beneath the complacent exte-
rior of technocratic capitalism.”11 One character rails against the 
threat posed by another figure identified only as the Rich Jew:
He’s sucking us dry, the Jew. Drinking our blood and blam-
ing everything on us because he’s a Jew and we’re guilty. I 
rack my brains and I brood. I tear at my nerves. I’m going 
under. I wake up nights, my throat like it’s in a noose, death 
stalking me in person. My reason tells me they’re just images, 
myths fromthe pre-history of our fathers. I feel a sharp pain 
on my left side. My heart, I ask myself? Or the gallbladder? 
And it’s the Jew’s fault. Just being there he makes us guilty. 
If he stayed where he came from or if they gassed him I’d be 
able to sleep better. They forgot to gas him. […] He’s always 
one step ahead and all he leaves us is charity. Garbage, worth-
less objects.12
Forty years after it was written and nearly eighty years after the 
Holocaust, Garbage is still considered too incendiary for any 
11 Seyla Benhabib, Andrei Makovitz, and Moishe Postone, “Rainer Werner 
Fassbinder’s Garbage, the City and Death: Renewed Antagonisms in the 
Complex Relationship between Jews and Germans in the Federal Republic 
of Germany,” New German Critique 38 (1986): 17.
12 Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Garbage, The City and Death, in Plays, ed. 
Denis Calandra (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 
180.
143
DEBT AND THE REFUGEE
theater to risk a production in Germany. In part because of the 
public outcry elicited by the play’s premiere, much of the criti-
cism of Garbage has focused on the question of whether the play 
is itself anti-Semitic. But as the equally provocative German 
theater-and-filmmaker Christoph Schlingensief put it, some-
times a sick society needs strong medicine:
As the son of a pharmacist, what I often say is that my fa-
ther cured people with minute amounts of poison. He gave 
them poison so that their bodies could right themselves. And 
I think that’s how we should understand images of Germany. 
When I’m making a film I would like to know what disease 
I’m dealing with.13
The offensive elements of Garbage function as minute amounts 
of inoculating poison, intended to treat the disease of lingering 
German anti-Semitism. The economic anxiety that Fassbinder 
hits on in the play is intentionally elided with another, much 
more profound anxiety. After the Holocaust, will the German 
not be “in debt” to the Jew forever? The crime is of such pro-
portions that German guilt can never be expiated. The sym-
bolic slippage between monetary and moral debt is particularly 
potent in German as the word Schuld means both “debt” and 
“guilt.”
In interrogating the prejudices and predilections that turned 
Germany against its Jewish population, Fassbinder finds that 
many of the same violent, exclusionary impulses that led to the 
Holocaust persist in the form of “everyday fascism.” Spiritually, 
Germany is internally riven, divided against itself, sadomaso-
chistic. The German hates the Jew not because the Jew is Other, 
but because the German is the Jew. The Jew is part of her. So 
the Jew must be punished, tortured, exterminated. Other vul-
nerable groups suffer as a result of the same (il)logic. The man 
hates the woman, the heterosexual the homosexual, the native 




the immigrant. Garbage features a cast of characters made up of 
criminals, prostitutes and other sexual “deviants,” and uncouth 
foreigners. A character identified only as the “Dwarf ” completes 
the menagerie. He is drawn to vulnerable outsiders, “B people” 
or “subway people,” people who live much of their lives “under-
ground” either to protect themselves from scorn and violence or 
because they have been left out or pushed out by the dominant 
culture. What these marginalized groups have in common is the 
ability to attract the revulsion of mainstream society, which per-
ceives them as unproductive leeches on its otherwise healthy, 
productive body. Defending himself against charges of anti-
Semitism during the Garbage controversy, Fassbinder advised 
his critics to consider the consistent support for oppressed mi-
norities demonstrated throughout his oeuvre.
Indeed, one of his earliest plays, Katzelmacher (which trans-
lates as “Cock Artist”), is a pure parable of xenophobia’s evils. 
Written in the vein of Marieluise Fleißer and Ödön von Hor-
váth, playwrights who engaged critically with the Volksstücke 
(“Folk Play”) tradition in the 1920s and ’30s, Katzelmacher ex-
plores the ways in which the poisonous atmosphere of insular, 
provincial life abrades language and thought. In Katzelmacher, 
a small, homogenous German town is shaken when a Greek 
named Jorgos arrives as a guest worker. Animosity blossoms 
instantly. Fassbinder weaves together sexual and economic ri-
valries to illustrate the multiple levels on which fear of the other 
tends to operate. Jorgos’s roommate Bruno, a native, plants the 
first seed of panic and intrigue in the community:
BRUNO: He’s “foreign labor.”
ERICH: What that?
BRUNO: Like I said, “foreign labor.”14
In Germany, the term used here, Fremdarbeiter, has strong neg-
ative connotations and was in widespread use during the Nazi 
14 Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Katzelmacher, in Plays, ed. Denis Calandra 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 80.
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period. After the war, it was replaced by the term Gastarbeiter or 
“guest worker,” which is now used in all official contexts. Fass-
binder’s characters struggle with the terminology and perceived 
threat of competition:
ERICH: What’s that supposed to mean? Don’t we have enough 
workers?
BRUNO: A Greek from Greece.
ERICH: No way. That ain’t fair no how.
BRUNO: Right.
ERICH: We work too. Plenty.
PAUL: He cut in on you yet, with Elisabeth?
GUNDA: Where’s he sleep?
BRUNO: My room.
ERICH: Your room. How come?
BRUNO: There was a bunk, that’s how come.
PAUL: Did he talk to you, yet?




GUNDA: With you there?
BRUNO: He doesn’t know any better.
ERICH: What’s he look like?




BRUNO: In the cock.15 
This disclosure sends Gunda, the sole woman in their clique 
present, running straight to Jorgos. But Gunda later character-
izes their subsequent sexual encounter as a brutal rape, presum-
ably in an attempt to shield herself from the censure of the envi-




In Katzelmacher, Jorgos ultimately falls victim to such rage. 
The local men disparage him for many things — he can’t speak 
German, doesn’t bathe, is a communist, and is taking their jobs. 
An exchange regarding this last fear anticipates economic im-
balances that will later be exacerbated by accelerating globali-
zation, but the winners and losers don’t stack up the way the 
natives assume they do:
BRUNO: [The boss] says it’s better for business.
ERICH: If he stays.
BRUNO: Right, because it’s true.
GUNDA: How come?
BRUNO: Because we produce more now, and she only pays 
him six hundred fifty marks. He sleeps in my room and 
she deducts a hundred fifty marks for that.
GUNDA: A hundred fifty. That’s allowed?
BRUNO: Right. And for food another hundred eighty. That 
comes to three hundred thirty marks. She pays him three 
hundred twenty marks.
ERICH: Not bad.
BRUNO: That’s what the man from the foreign labor depart-
ment in Munich told her. You have to do it that way be-
cause then it’s more productive because they’re here and 
the money stays in the country.
ERICH: So that’s how it is.
BRUNO: Right. It’s a trick. For Germany’s sake.16
Today it is no longer nations, which at least ostensibly answer 
to their body politic, but rather multinational corporations, 
which answer only to their shareholders, that get to keep the 
big money. 
The townspeople in Katzelmacher do not or cannot articulate 
what it is that fuels their blind and murderous resentment of 
the stranger in their midst, but after Jorgos has slept with every 
woman in the play, the men savagely beat him (after first en-
16 Ibid., 92.
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tertaining the possibility of castrating him) in an act of dumb, 
brutish, male jealousy. Jorgos is no choir boy — he has a fam-
ily back in Greece and is betraying his wife with every woman 
in town — but when Fassbinder made the play into a film, he 
played the role of Jorgos himself, indicating a special affinity for 
the character.
The gender dynamics Fassbinder perceives as motivating 
xenophobia have been on display during the recent European 
refugee crisis, when the issue of women’s safety was once again 
taken up as a justification for the nationalistic backlash against 
Arab and North-African asylum seekers in Germany. In an in-
cident on 2015–2016 New Year’s Eve at Cologne’s central train 
station, as many as a thousand women were, reportedly, sexually 
assaulted by groups of men who appeared to belong mostly to 
the refugees’ demographics. Troubling as the allegations were, 
the response was worse: right-wing traditionalists tend to ex-
hibit concern for the rights of women only when they can be 
used as a cudgel to advance other aspects of a conservative 
agenda. Wherever xenophobia flourishes, wounded masculinity 
is transformed into skepticism about the possibilities of cultural 
integration. Calls for racial purity soon follow. 
Sarah Kane’s Blasted and the Bedrock of Sexual Difference 
Sarah Kane’s Blasted depicts the explosive entrance of a refugee 
figure as the return of what the West has repressed, but the play 
is also a poetic indictment of violence in all its forms. Blasted 
unequivocally embraces Levinas’s concept of “infinite responsi-
bility,” making no attempt to conceal the cost. Set in an expen-
sive hotel room in the middle of a war zone, the first half of the 
play is dominated by Ian, a tabloid journalist who dredges up 
gory “human interest” stories with the potential to sell papers. 
We overhear him dictating one about an attractive young British 
woman being gruesomely murdered by foreigners while abroad. 
Sensational journalism, however, is only a cover for his real oc-
cupation, which involves driving getaway cars and covertly dis-
posing of bodies for the government. 
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The respect Ian feels is his due is entirely contingent on con-
testing the humanity of others. Kane quickly establishes him 
as racist (“Hate this city. Stinks. Wogs and Pakis taking over”), 
contemptuous of the disabled (“Retard isn’t he? […] Aye. Spaz. 
[…] Glad my son’s not a Joey”), and homophobic (“Hitler was 
wrong about the Jews who have they hurt the queers he should 
have gone for scum them”).17 In the first few minutes of the play, 
he commands Cate, his young, simple-minded lover to perform 
oral sex on him. When she refuses, he assumes that it is because 
he stinks, having been sweating in the heat, and soon he will 
hop in the shower to remedy the situation. His stink, as he sees 
it, is something that can be washed away with a bit of hot water, 
not like the stink of the “Wogs” and “Pakis,” which is somehow 
inherent, evidence of their repulsive animality. It does not occur 
to him that Cate wants nothing to do with his penis, because he 
has just insulted her and everyone she cares about and is gener-
ally making a macabre spectacle of himself — death seeps from 
his pores. Ian does not, apparently, exclude himself from his 
contempt for humanity, cheerily quipping about how he’s slowly 
killing himself as he chain-smokes and swills gin (he has already 
had one tar-saturated lung removed and is working steadily on 
cirrhosis of the liver). 
IAN opens the door. There is a bottle of gin outside on a tray.
IAN brings it in and stands, unable to decide between gin and 
champagne
CATE: Have champagne, better for you.
IAN: Don’t want it better for me.18
Ian projects himself into this future, one in which he is suc-
ceeded, devoured by the next generation, he is spending him-
self quickly, too quickly, but there is no joy in his expenditure. 
Kane’s Phaedra’s Love depicts a Hippolytus who masturbates 
compulsively and indiscriminately into socks, men, and wom-
17 Sarah Kane, Blasted, in Complete Plays (London: Methuen, 2001), 4, 5, 19.
18 Ibid., 17.
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en, including his besotted stepmother Phaedra, without himself 
experiencing the slightest flicker of pleasure. Ian indulges his 
vices in much the same way. When he speaks of his children, it is 
only with bitterness: “Who would have children. You have kids, 
they grow up, they hate you and you die.”19 Children represent 
for him an investment without return, with an extra, nihilistic 
turn of the screw. For Ian, death is the meaning of life, the logi-
cal extension of its always-already illogical trajectory.
The first time in Blasted when we are given intimations of 
an alternative way of being is a reference Ian makes to his ex-
wife, who apparently left him for another woman, quite prob-
ably contributing to some of his vehement aversion to homo-
sexuality. As Ian tells it, “I loved Stella till she became a witch 
and fucked off with a dyke.”20 As women not dependent upon 
men, witches, “spinsters,” and lesbians are commonly conflated 
and regarded with suspicion in patriarchal societies. Ian worries 
intermittently that Cate may have the makings of a lesbian, or 
as he puts it, a woman capable of “sucking gash.”21 And when 
he is not worrying about her being too sexual, inappropriately 
sexual, he is worrying about her not being sexual enough. When 
she rejects his quasi-marriage proposal, he tells her she’ll have to 
leave her Mum one day. 
CATE: Why?
IAN: (Opens his mouth to answer but can’t think of one.)22
He can’t think of an answer because he is the reason. Ian is the vi-
olence of patriarchy personified — bonds between women must 
be destroyed if he is to survive. Bonds between female lovers are 
threatening because they remove from circulation two women 
who ought to have remained active as the currency exchanged 







they are the building blocks of the alliances that could one day 
challenge the law of the father. In Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of 
Radical Feminism, Mary Daly describes the intellectual scaffold-
ing of European witch trials in the fifteenth through eighteenth 
centuries that claimed the lives of untold hundreds of thousands 
of women. Daly cites medieval authorities who maintained that 
“[a]ll witchcraft comes from carnal lust which is in women 
insatiable.”23 Discussing the practice of female genital mutilation 
in Africa — where not the whole woman, but only the most of-
fensive part of her is disposed of — Daly argues that infibulation 
(the most extreme form of clitoridectomy) is in some ways the 
ultimate expression of a patriarchal obsession with purity that 
cannot countenance a desire as unruly as female desire. Freud 
believed that women are less adept at sublimation, that is, chan-
neling libidinous energy into “higher” forms of cultural produc-
tion — they are less discreet, less discrete, and less obsessed with 
the useful, the productive, and the proprietary. The imbedded 
value judgment in this assessment has been turned on its head 
by feminists such as Daly. Cate is also a witch, a Lesbian (which 
Daly capitalizes to suggest more than a sexual orientation, but 
a woman who has discovered the power of authentic relation-
ships between women in their myriad forms), and a “spinster” 
(a woman who has declined to exchange her sex/power for ma-
terial compensation). Despite the nightmarish paces the play 
puts him through, the only moment when we see Ian at a real 
loss is when Cate describes what it feels like when she orgasms. 
Cate is a kind of holy fool, reminiscent of Dostoevsky’s Prince 
Myshkin in The Idiot — both characters experience what appear 
to be epileptic seizures.
IAN: When I’m with you I can’t think about anything else. 
You take me to another place.
23 Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1978), 180, citing Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, The 
Malleus Maleficarum, trans. Montague Summers (New York: Cosimo, 
2007), 47.
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CATE: It’s like that when I have a fit.
IAN: Just you.
CATE: The world don’t exist, not like this.
Looks the same but — 
Time slows down.
A dream I get stuck in, can’t do nothing about it.
One time — 
IAN: Make love to me.
CATE: Blocks out everything else.
Once — 
IAN: Make love to you.
CATE: It’s like that when I touch myself.
IAN is embarrassed.
CATE: Just before I’m wondering what it’ll be like, and just af-
ter I’m thinking about the next one, but just as it happens 
it’s lovely, I don’t think of nothing else.24
Cate exists in an intensely saturated and dangerous patriarchal 
space throughout the play but ruptures the threadbare tapestry 
of violence when she reemerges into the ruined space with a 
baby girl a desperate woman on the outside has entrusted to her 
care. There is no food, and the baby soon dies, but Cate prays 
for her:




IAN: What are you doing?
CATE: Praying. Just in case.
IAN: Will you pray for me?
CATE: No.
IAN: When I’m dead, not now.
CATE: No point when you’re dead.
IAN: You’re praying for her.






IAN: Can’t you forgive me?
CATE: Don’t see bad things or go bad places — 
IAN: She’s dead, Cate.25
Ian eats the baby at the end of the play, the grotesque terminus 
of his mercenary trajectory. He wastes nothing and lays waste 
to everything. Like a black hole, he devours everything with 
which he comes into proximity, whereas Cate gives excessively, 
when nothing is required. They ought to be a perfect match, but 
they do not share a lexicon; communication is impossible. Ian’s 
“love” for Cate is expressed in terms of brutalization. He tries to 
manipulate her, shame her into sex, and when she proves intrac-
table, he rapes her. Ian is principally motivated by fear, the heart 
of capitalism and patriarchy. The two systems share an acquisi-
tive logic, a scarcity mentality even in times of abundance, and a 
siege mentality even in times of peace. Cate laughs at Ian when 
he panics and ducks for cover after an engine backfires outside:
CATE: It’s only a car.
IAN: You. You’re fucking thick.
CATE: I’m not. You’re scared of things when there’s nothing 
to be scared of. 
What’s thick about not being scared of cars?
IAN: I’m not scared of cars. I’m scared of dying.
CATE: A car won’t kill you. Not from out there. Not unless 
you ran out in front of it. (She kisses him.) What’s scaring 
you?
IAN: Thought it was a gun.
CATE: (Kisses his neck.)
Who’d have a gun?
IAN: Me.
CATE: (Undoes his shirt.)
25 Ibid., 58.
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You’re in here.
IAN: Someone like me.26
If one assumes that the world is populated by people such as 
Ian, fear is reasonable. But Cate is a Spinster and as such seeks 
to cultivate relationships based not on competition, coercion, or 
recompense but on mutuality, trust, and love freely given with-
out expecting anything in return — or waste, as Ian might call 
it. In response to Cate’s repeated insistence that killing is wrong 
under any circumstances, Ian scornfully tries to set her straight, 
“[c]an’t always be taking it back down letting them think they’ve 
got a right turn the other cheek SHIT some things are worth 
more than that have to be protected from shit.”27 Such rhetoric 
has long been a staple of American politics — the conviction that 
the world is safer when the United States has the most powerful 
military in the world is recited like an article of faith. Continu-
ing his disquisition on the existential threat posed to America 
by those Mexicans, Donald Trump argued during presidential 
debates that “we either have a country, or we don’t.”28 After the 
November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, many American gover-
nors reacted immediately, announcing that they would refuse to 
accept any of the Syrian refugees Obama had previously pledged 
to welcome into the US. The perverse love triangle of Blasted 
would be incomplete without the unnamed darker-skinned sol-
dier who forces his way into Ian and Cate’s room, bringing the 
war with him. In the second part of Blasted, the soldier’s arrival 
explodes the form of the play — Ian’s insulated world of room 
service and a victim who can’t defend herself is thrown open to 
the threat of victims turned vindictive, turned more villainous 
than Ian himself. 
The surrealist tone the play takes on when the soldier appears 
and the fact that he shares no stage time with Cate suggests that 
26 Ibid., 28–29.
27 Ibid., 32–33.





he is more a phantasm conjured by Ian than a character meant 
to be seen as possessing an independent existence of his own, 
the feverish nightmare of a guilt-ridden imperialist who knows 
that his hour has come. The soldier is an overdetermined figure, 
the conflation of refugee and terrorist that has become so popu-
lar in nationalist discourse. Ian has used the world as his dump-
ing ground, taking for granted that the waste he generates will 
be disposed of as discreetly and reliably as it is when he flushes 
the toilet. Žižek describes this type of magical thinking:
In human dwellings, there is an intermediate space which is 
disavowed: we all know it exists, but we do not really accept 
its existence — it remains ignored and (mostly) unsayable. 
The main content of this invisible space is of course excre-
ment (in the plumbing and sewers), […] Of course we know 
well enough how our excrement leaves the house, but our 
immediate phenomenological relation to it is more radical: it 
is as if the waste disappears into some netherworld, beyond 
our sight and out of our world. […] This is why it is most 
unpleasant to observe one’s excrement coming back up from 
the pipes into the toilet bowl — something like the return of 
the living dead.29
Like the living dead, the soldier returns, and Ian passes through 
an exceedingly unpleasant ordeal — the final passages of the 
play show Ian in tableaux of increasingly extreme abjection. He 
becomes the most helpless of the helpless cast-offs that he has 
exploited over his lifetime, ending his life in a pile of rubble, rain 
pouring down on him through a hole in the ceiling. The luxury 
hotel becomes a wasteland. The wreckage that has been piling 
up on the periphery of his life consumes the center. The world 
that he made is ruined, has ruined him. 
29 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (New York: Verso, 2011), 259–60.
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Charges: Amnesty and the Unforgivable
In “You Bet,” the epilogue to The Merchant’s Contracts, Elfriede 
Jelinek draws a comparison between the loss of westerners’ 
homes in the 2008 recession and the predicament of the per-
petually homeless outsider, the refugee. “No one takes them into 
their home,” Jelinek writes, noting that the westerner who has 
been exploited by the market is seen as a victim while the for-
eigner exploited by the market remains an enemy to be feared. 
He will only bring property values down: 
As much as we try to persuade him, no man would take in 
strangers, they could kill him, fuck his wife, marry her even, 
and stay in his house, where the other gets pampered by ev-
eryone else here, who now are family to the intruder, the one 
who wasn’t here before. Lost the house he once owned, which 
is deserted now, vandalized, gutted, who would buy it now? 
Without pipes, without warmth and water and electricity and 
sewer connection?, no one will buy something like that and if 
anyone did, he’d buy another better house, without the poor 
homeless one in front of the door polluting the air with him-
self, the dispossessed.30
These doubly dispossessed become the subject of Jelinek’s 
Charges (The Supplicants), her 2013 play about the European ref-
ugee crisis. In Charges, Jelinek parodies the discourse of the xen-
ophobe: “[t]hey produce volcanoes of shit and dirt and waste,” 
she writes, “it looks as if a mountain of waste had exploded, go 
ahead take a look at the mess they make and something like this 
to live among us now, and for good?”31
Subtitling the piece after Aeschylus’s drama of that title, Je-
linek invokes the chorus of Danaids that functioned as the an-
cient play’s protagonists. In The Supplicants, after fleeing forced 
30 Ibid., 294–95.




marriage to their Egyptian cousins, the Danaids beg King Pelas-
gus of Argos for amnesty. They throw themselves at his mercy 
according to hiketeia, a formal custom of supplication that has 
been called a “ritualization of reciprocity.”32 While the individual 
being petitioned is not bound to grant the request, a rejection 
amounts to creating a serious rupture in the fabric of civil so-
ciety, which is based on the honoring of one’s debts. The an-
thropologist and activist David Graeber proposes that the moral 
stigma we have become accustomed to attaching to the debtor 
is at odds with the more fundamental meaning of indebtedness. 
“Everyday communism,” he suggests, is the foundation of all hu-
man sociability. Graeber argues that we want and need to incur 
various kinds of debts and have others be in debt to us; such 
connections ensure that our relationships have a future.33 When 
two friends go out to dinner and one picks up the check, saying, 
“you get the next one,” the friends part ways assuming that there 
will be a “next one.” When two friends go out to dinner and split 
the check down to the last cent, the friends part ways confident 
that, should they never see one another again, no one could ac-
cuse either of them of defaulting on a financial obligation. Once 
the ledger is clear, a partnership can be dissolved, but, as Grae-
ber and Aesychlus show, human beings are not built for such 
radical individualism.
In The Supplicants, King Pelasgus initially denies the Dan-
aids protection. He sees them as a potential threat, worrying 
that they come from the land of the ferocious Amazons. The 
Danaids attempt to persuade the king that they and he are de-
scended from the same ancestor, but the King remains skeptical. 
Eventually the Argive people collectively decide to take in the 
refugees. This appeal to common humanity is central to Jelinek’s 
contemporary revision as well. She picks up on the dominant 
media language used to describe refugees, the way they are gen-
32 John Gould, Myth, Ritual, Memory, and Exchange: Essays in Greek 
Literature and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 24.
33 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (New York: Melville House 
Publishing, 2014), 96.
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erally referred to as a monolithic, homogenous mass “stream-
ing,” “flowing,” or “flooding” into the developed world. “The 
suffering people,” she writes “are falling like water off the cliff, 
down the butte, into the chute, over the mountains, through the 
sea, over the sea, into the sea, […] they drown, they crash, they 
suffocate in cold storage wagons, die in aircraft wheel wells, fall 
into highway toilets, fall from balconies, yes, people like us!, 
they are all like us!”34 
While millions of destitute and endangered African and 
Middle Eastern people were attempting to secure asylum in 
Europe, Austria granted citizenship to the opera singer Anna 
Netrebko and Tatyana Yumesheva, Boris Yeltsin’s daughter. Je-
linek considers their cases as examples of an unjust system that 
privileges those with money and influence over those in legiti-
mate need. “We only come in bulk,” her chorus of refugees de-
claims, “no longer individually, never again, even though they 
pull us out one by one. When will we be somebody again?”35 The 
refugees are denied their status as individuals because they can 
neither pay their way nor barter their commodified celebrity, 
their hypertrophied individualism. The Austrian state is figured 
as a for-profit entity as the refugee chorus announces, “[w]e are 
not value, we are extraneous to the values produced by others, 
promoted by the corporation.”36 The double meaning of the 
play’s translated title becomes clear as the nature and purpose 
of debt as Graeber articulates it becomes hopelessly confused: 
“[t]he whole city bears the guilt [Schuld] of our lot,” the refugees 
address the two high-status exiles, “[t]he water bears the guilt, 
the water carries the debt, bless you both, that you pay me more 
than the interest, that you pay with your capital, with people 
who came here as the method of payment for themselves, I’ll 
take them, do you have more of them?”37 Here the refugees are 
figured as essentially subsidizing the low-interest “loans” taken 






out by the likes of Netrebko to gain entry to the country. The 
most vulnerable members of society seek to become the charg-
es, or wards, of the state, but are instead turned down because of 
bad credit, so to speak. Their needs are assessed not in terms of 
what the refugees are owed but in terms of what they will cost. 
Graeber asserts that the informal, communitarian ethos of 
mutually sustaining indebtedness is only replaced by systems of 
precisely calculated and forcibly collected debts through violent, 
state intervention. Coinage arose in the first place because war-
ring civilizations could not always trust those they were doing 
business with to make good on more informal debts and be-
cause they had begun ripping people from their social contexts 
as slaves and needed to find ways to measure the unmeasurable 
cost of a human life. Refugees also suffer from being ripped from 
their social contexts, and advanced capitalist nations that might 
balk at putting a price on an individual human life still engage 
in cold calculations about lives that “only come in bulk.” Charges 
was partly written in response to a 2012 hunger strike staged by 
refugees housed in the Traiskirchen holding facility near Vienna 
to protest the living conditions there. Traiskirchen, which the 
United Nations has described as “inhumane” because of over-
crowding, is run by the Swiss firm ORS Service and is representa-
tive of an alarming trend toward Western governments adopting 
the for-profit, private-prison model to address the problem of 
how to accommodate overwhelming influxes of refugees while 
saving taxpayers money. This has become a multimillion-dollar 
industry, with companies charging governments per refugee per 
night or signing lucrative, multi-year contracts. Many of these 
operations stand to gain by packing prisoners in and skimping 
on basic services, but because they are private and not public, 
they are subject to less oversight, often with disastrous results.38 
Derrida drew on ideas from Levinas and The Suppliants when 
38 Antony Loewenstein, “Private Prisons Are Cashing in on Refugees’ 
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he called for progressive urban centers to become “cities of ref-
uge.” These places exist. In the US we call them “sanctuary cities,” 
municipalities that decline to enforce cruel federal immigration 
laws. “Our experience of cities of refuge then,” Derrida says, 
“will not only be that which cannot wait, but something which 
calls for an urgent response, a just response, […]. An immedi-
ate response to crime, to violence, and to persecution.”39 A fully 
adequate response will open up a space to reassess notions of 
nations, borders, democracy, and what it means to be human, to 
be responsible, and to be in debt to one another. 
As was the case when she was writing about the financial 
crisis in The Merchant’s Contracts, with Charges Jelinek found 
herself responding to snowballing events in real time, and so 
was compelled to supplement her original text with appendices. 
One of these was written after a trio of large-scale catastrophes 
befell would-be asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean just 
during the month of August in 2015. A boat capsized off the 
coast of Libya, killing two hundred refugees. Fifty went missing 
shortly after when their rubber dingy sank near the island of 
Lampedusa. That same week forty were found dead in the hold 
of a fishing boat that had begun taking on water. Migrants often 
pay half-price to traverse the Mediterranean below rather than 
above deck. Commander Massimo Tozzi of the Italian Navy 
boarded the ship and found the dead bodies in the hold “im-
mersed in water, fuel, and human excrement.”40
Jelinek seizes on this image, connecting it to the hunger 
strikers in Vienna and these most recent victims: 
It still must come out, and this end product, which is what 
becomes of donated meals no one is in charge of, there is 
nothing and no one, it is a loose end, what’s man to do if he 
39 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley 
and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), 23.
40 Phillip Pullella, “At Least 40 Migrants Die in Mediterranean: Italian 





can’t tie ends together, he would have to connect his mouth 
to his ass, in a sort of short circuit. Oh well, money, shit and 
the word. If we could spare ourselves these three it would be 
okay, but unfortunately we have nothing to spare and noth-
ing to save.41
The refugees who were protesting in Vienna objected to the poor 
quality and chaotic distribution of their meals. In Jelinek’s text, 
they are elided with the refugees on the fishing boat; together, 
they refuse to eat so that they never have to excrete, and there-
fore will never have to die submerged in their own excrement.





A century after Duchamp’s Fountain, the Italian artist Maurizio 
Cattelan installed an eighteen-karat, solid gold toilet in one of 
the Guggenheim Museum’s public restrooms. Titled America, 
the 2016 piece outperforms Duchamp’s mass-produced, porce-
lain model in at least one way; it is fully functional. Visitors to 
the Guggenheim are permitted and encouraged to literally piss 
and shit on (well, into) the art object. Cattelan’s title seems to sin-
gle out the United States as the country with the most obscenely 
bloated art market and general sense of entitlement. Writing for 
the Guardian, a puzzled and distressed Jonathan Jones reacted 
to the announcement of the installation by opining that 
the real miracle of contemporary art is not that it is bought 
and sold for lunatic prices by oligarch collectors. It is that 
you and I also find meaning in it. A luxury object sold for 
obscene amounts is at the same time a popular phenomenon 
that draws crowds to galleries. Art is both an investment for 
the 1% and entertainment for everyone else. If we could un-
derstand this paradox we might understand how 21st-cen-
tury capitalism gets away with so much. […] Can it be that 
we all buy more deeply into the culture of capitalism than 
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we acknowledge to ourselves? Perhaps this is a philosophical 
toilet, after all.”1
Possibly, some alien species will unearth Cattelan’s toilet from 
the pile of rubble formerly known as the Upper East Side cen-
turies after climate change has sent the East River surging up 
over FDR Drive, and perhaps the aliens will praise and admire 
it, as Bataille admired the pyramids of the ancient Egyptians. 
However, in all likelihood, the wealthy will simply shit in it until 
it clogs and overflows while teenage boys get shot a couple of 
miles away in the South Bronx. They’ll have to call in a jani-
tor making minimum wage, perhaps someone not so different 
from the Italian housekeeper who threw Sara Goldschmied and 
Elenora Chiari’s 2015 art installation Where Are We Going Danc-
ing Tonight? away, mistaking the installation’s materials — empty 
champagne bottles, cigarette buts, and other evidence of a night 
of privileged hedonism — for a pile of trash while cleaning up 
after hours. The janitor will mop up the shit. And that janitor 
will be the only person who ever understands America.
1 Jonathan Jones, “The Guggenheim’s Monstrous Golden Toilet Sums Up 
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